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BOOK REVIEWS

EDITORIAL

The inside front cover of this journal states that *Koinonia* "is intended to promote interdisciplinary discussion and exploration of new and emerging issues in the study of religion." Lately, we of the editorial board have been asking ourselves just what we mean by "interdisciplinary." Through our discussion, we have come to a greater understanding of the particular niche *Koinonia* inhabits in the world of academic publishing as a journal written and produced by graduate students in religious and theological studies. I'd like to share the conclusions we reached with our readers as I introduce the essays gathered together in this issue of *Koinonia*.

The most obvious meaning of interdisciplinary in the case of *Koinonia* is that we publish work done across a wide range of disciplines under the general rubric of theological and religious studies. Our editorial board brings together scholars with expertise in a variety of disciplines. Our offerings in this issue include theology, pastoral counseling, mission, New Testament theology, and Old Testament exegesis. Recent past issues have included articles on Christian ethics, philosophy, social and cultural analysis of specific contexts for the doing of theology, and history. We hope in the future to publish an even wider range of material as our pool of submissions expands.

Koinonia's understanding of interdisciplinary, however, goes beyond publishing articles from different disciplines. We are also interested in essays that are themselves explicitly interdisciplinary in their content and/or methodology. Several of the articles in this issue exemplify these criteria. Moreover, we have found that there are a variety of ways of writing an interdisciplinary article.

One approach to being interdisciplinary is to examine the basis on which current conversations between disciplines are being carried out. Many theologians, Clifford Anderson reminds us, have worked to develop models of divine agency that do not contravene the concepts of physical laws emerging from the natural sciences. In his essay, Anderson argues that this approach to divine agency is flawed because the claims made about physical laws depend on a form of metaphysical realism that is philosophically un-

tenable and leads to confounding the agency of God and the laws of nature. Anderson presents a constructivist interpretation of scientific laws that leaves open the possibility for both particular and general providence. Thus, the language game of theology, rather than the laws described by the physical sciences, provides the broader conceptual framework in which Christians may discern the agency of God in the world.

Jaco Hamman points out that interdisciplinary activity is central to pastoral theology's self-understanding. The application of pastoral theology in the clinical setting of pastoral counseling always draws on psychological insights, yet Hamman claims that the current debate about theology and science has not been addressed by practical theologians. He examines the nature of interdisciplinary activity as described in the pastoral theological models of Gerben Heitink and Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger. He then turns to the postmodern understanding of rationality found in Calvin O. Shrag's work as a possible source of both critique and affirmation for pastoral theology and pastoral counseling.

Another interdisciplinary approach places figures from different disciplines in dialogue with one another. New directions in philosophy provide us with new tools for examining theological reflection, which in turn allows us to evaluate philosophical conclusions from a theological perspective. In this issue, Dieter Heinzl places theologian Karl Barth in dialogue with Jacques Derrida, the French Jewish philosopher, to explore the aporia of human existence, the dilemma of living life always mindful of the looming border between life and death that awaits each one of us. Though Jesus Christ, presented in the New Testament as the Coming One, has crossed this border, we as human beings are still confronted with uncertainty as to what lies on the other side. Heinzl asks if the apocalyptic longing of deconstruction might return us to a New Testament understanding of the parousia of Jesus Christ.

Some topics of investigation require a scholar to work across various disciplines in order to construct an adequate response. Reid Locklin begins his essay by looking at documents of Vatican II and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops that deal with education and see schools as a response to the missionary mandate given to the church by Jesus. The U.S. bishops even suggest, as the title of their pastoral letter indicates, that the church is *"To Teach as Jesus Did."* Rather than focus on Jesus as a model educator, Locklin asks if we might not look at the evangelists as model educators. He initiates his analysis by looking at John and Luke-Acts as documents

intended to educate communities within specific sociocultural contexts. Here he draws on the insights of anthropology to help reconstruct the social worlds of the Johannine and Lukan communities. Literary analysis of the text further shows how both evangelists, though they have very different christologies, used irony and other devices to bind themselves and their audiences together in communities of meaning. Locklin brings historical evidence from the first century together with contemporary educational theory to discuss education and socialization in that context. After careful exegetical attention to particular texts, Locklin proceeds by analogy on the evangelists as educators to appropriate the insights gained from his exegesis for the education mission of the contemporary church.

Another way of being interdisciplinary in the context of a journal like *Koinonia* is to write out of one's own discipline in a way that is accessible to those outside the field. Anyone who reads Amos 3:12 might ask whom the prophet sought to represent with the figure of the lion. Addressing this question, D. Matthew Stith examines the two options usually put forth by exegetes and then offers his own suggestion, one he argues is more in keeping with the overall message of Amos. His conclusions have implications not only for Biblical scholars, but also for ethicists who examine contemporary social structures and preachers who proclaim this passage from the pulpit as God's word to and for people today.

We take very seriously the subtitle that describes *Koinonia* as a forum, a place where ideas are presented and conversations can begin. Now that *Koinonia* is present on the World Wide Web and in more than 90 libraries, it is our hope that an increasing number of graduate students will visit the forum and decide to offer their ideas and insights for publication.

This is my final editorial as executive editor of *Koinonia*. As I depart I want to offer once again my thanks to the members of the editorial board. The editors of *Koinonia* are so committed to the exchange of ideas that they take time away from their own doctoral studies to work on publishing the work of others. It has been a privilege to work with such a group. A special word of thanks must go to Tomáš Hančil, our outgoing production editor. He ushered *Koinonia* into the information age by introducing us to publishing on the Internet. He also improved the appearance of the journal in innumerable ways. I also want to thank the Ph.D. Studies Office of Princeton Theological Seminary for their financial and moral support of *Koinonia*. Finally, the board also thanks Kathleen Whalen of the Communications/

Publications Office of Princeton Theological Seminary for her help with our new cover design that marks the beginning of our second decade of publishing.

KARLA ANN KOLL
— EXECUTIVE EDITOR

Physical Laws and Divine Agency

CLIFFORD BLAKE ANDERSON

I

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO ARGUE AGAINST A METAPHYSICAL PICTURE OF the world that denies a place for God's action in the world.[1] The picture is of a universe bound in by physical laws. The idea is that once the initial conditions of the universe are established, physical laws determine the outcome of all subsequent events taking place in the universe. If scientific inquiry were to discover all the physical laws and the values of all the initial conditions, in principal scientists would be able to predict the future. Given the state of the universe at any one point in time, scientists could predict the state of the universe at any other point in time. A corollary to this picture is the expectation that scientists would also be capable of providing an account of the fundamental cause of any event occurring in the universe. Scientists could illustrate that a certain combination of scientific laws and initial conditions necessarily caused an event to occur. Science would therefore eliminate any need to speak of God's agency (cf. Hawking 1988:53).

This picture above presents a deterministic and reductionistic account of the world—what we might call a "scientistic" picture of the world. In many ways, the picture is a caricature. Yet, like all good caricatures, its exaggerations point to underlying realities. Despite the advent of quantum mechanics, which reveals the existence of indeterminacy at the substrate of physical reality, the notion of a world bound in by physical laws maintains a strong grasp on the minds of scientists and non-scientists alike. The lingering influences of the scientistic picture have spread beyond the sciences

themselves and continue to affect thinking about agency in philosophy and theology. Many theologians have worked hard to develop models for divine agency that do not contravene the concept of scientific law associated with this picture. Yet I argue in this paper that the picture itself is flawed. The picture depends on an untenable form of metaphysical realism. It also ignores recent developments in the sciences, which mitigate against both reductionistic and deterministic conceptions of scientific law. The scope of scientific laws turns out to be more modest and more limited than scientists, philosophers and theologians had once assumed. In what follows, I contend that a constructivist interpretation of the ontological status of scientific laws coupled with a clarified understanding of the function of the concept of law within scientific practice opens up renewed possibilities for thinking about divine agency within theology. I hope to demonstrate that by overcoming the scientistic picture of scientific law, theologians may defend a robust conception of divine agency without undue worry about contravening scientific laws.

Let me put forward some important provisos before I begin. I recognize that I am dealing with scientific practices at an extremely high level of idealization. To defend my thesis thoroughly would require a much thicker level of description of the way scientists use laws within the different scientific disciplines. Also, I should note that the authors whom I discuss below work with a concept of scientific law developed primarily from the standpoint of physics. I justify basing my broad, idealized discussion of scientific law loosely on a concept of law drawn physics because I think that the scientistic picture emerges from a cultural conception of the sciences that takes physics to be the paradigm for science. I do recognize, of course, that it is problematic to consider the various sciences together under the single heading "Science." My goal in what follows is to break the hold on theologians of the scientistic picture and the concept of scientific law that it engenders; whether I do so by making too many concessions to stereotypes associated with that picture I leave an open question.

II

The ontological status of the laws of nature has been the focus of intensive debate in the past several years. At question is whether scientific laws approximate to transcendent, mind-independent laws of nature, which

govern the universe, or whether they are idealized descriptions of regularly occurring phenomena, which have no language-independent existence. The first option we may entitle "platonism" and the second option "constructivism."

The platonist argues that laws of nature exist independently of scientific inquiry. In some sense, the transcendent laws have an objective existence that scientific inquiry discloses but does not construct. The platonist also holds that such laws of nature govern the physical behavior of the universe that they transcend. In *The Mind of God*, Paul Davies adopts a largely platonic conception of the laws (1992). He writes that it his "belief that the laws of nature are real, objective truths about the universe, and that we discover them rather than invent them" (1992:84). Davies argues that scientific inquiry strives to uncover these laws of nature. Of course, he admits that the scientific laws postulated by contemporary scientists in the course of their work can be considered as only rough approximations to the transcendent laws (1992:86). But Davies notes that many physicists, preeminently Stephen Hawking, anticipate that through scientific research these postulated laws will approximate more and more closely the transcendent laws. In the end, Davies notes that many— though not all—platonists hope that the laws of science will eventually converge on the transcendent laws of nature themselves (1992:86).

What is Davies' warrant for asserting the existence of transcendent laws of nature? As I understand his argument, he develops the warrant for that assertion in two stages. First, he notes that appeal to physical laws forms an integral part of the scientific explanation of any physical regularity. Second, he suggests that the physical regularities themselves imply the existence of transcendent laws that govern them.

In "The Intelligibility of Nature," Davies argues that any properly scientific explanation of physical regularities "entails exploring physical processes using experiment and observation, and fitting the data to a mathematical scheme that is organized around certain fundamental laws" (1993:148). Davies distinguishes two kinds of knowledge that contribute to scientific explanations: the phenomenological and the theoretical (1993:149). We gain phenomenological knowledge through the sensory observation of physical regularities in the world. We acquire theoretical knowledge, by contrast, by discerning the non-sensory "mathematical interrelationships" that undergird those physical regularities (1993:149–50). Davies notes that merely to record physical regularities does not constitute a properly scientific theory.

Scientific accounts of physical regularities cannot be considered mature
unless they explain those regularities on the basis of underlying physical
laws (1993:150).

Consider the following example (cf. Davies 1993:149-50). I observe that
every time I drop a ball it falls to the ground. Davies would term my obser-
vation "phenomenological knowledge" (1993:149). My observation provides
me with the raw material for a scientific account of that physical regularity
but the mere sensory observation of that regularity remains pre-theoretical.
The formulation of a general physical law (in this case, Newton's law of uni-
versal gravitation) grants me insight into the theoretical reason why the ball
falls whenever I let it drop. Moreover, by knowing the relevant physical laws,
I am also able to predict accurately what would take place were I to drop the
ball under different conditions. I now have a properly scientific account be-
cause I am able to perceive the "underlying laws governing this particular
process," which are hidden to sense observation "by incidental features such
as air resistance" (Davies 1993:149).

A properly scientific account of physical regularities therefore requires
the postulation of physical laws. But what supports Davies' speculation that
such postulated physical laws correspond to transcendent laws of nature? In
my view, Davies puts forward an indispensability argument to license that
speculation. The indispensability argument spans the epistemological gap
that exists between inductive observation and physical laws.

Davies recognizes that inductive reasoning makes a fallible epistemologi-
cal linchpin between phenomenological knowledge and theoretical knowl-
edge. He knows that inductive reasoning cannot decisively establish that any
physical regularity is lawlike (1992:81). Phenomenological knowledge, which
is based on inductive observation of regularities, cannot support counter-
factual inferences, which many philosophers of science consider to be a dis-
tinguishing mark of lawfulness (cf. Loewer 1995:266). I may reasonably in-
fer on the basis of phenomenological knowledge that, ceteris paribus, a ball
would fall to the ground if I were to drop it. Without having direct aware-
ness of the transcendent physical laws, however, I cannot say that the ball
would necessarily fall. Still, Davies recognizes that scientists "use inductive
reasoning to argue that these regularities are lawlike" (1992:81). What entitles
scientists to make such arguments? Davies admits that, strictly speaking,
there is no guarantee that the physical regularities that scientists observe are
lawful. But he contends that scientific investigation cannot proceed without
postulating their lawfulness. "The belief...that there are indeed dependable

regularities of nature…is an act of faith, but one which is indispensable to the progress of science" (1992:81). Davies' indispensability argument holds together the otherwise fragile link between inductive reasoning and the ascription of lawfulness.

Davies does not think that the "act of faith" on which his indispensibility argument rests is physically unwarranted. Davies makes clear his conviction that the physical regularities that scientific laws describe are objectively real and not projections of the human imagination.

> The existence of regularities in nature is an objective mathematical fact. On the other hand, the statements called laws that are found in textbooks clearly *are* human inventions, but inventions designed to reflect, albeit imperfectly, actually existing properties of nature. Without this assumption that the regularities are real, science is reduced to a meaningless charade (1992:81).

Crucial here is the link that Davies makes between the indispensability of postulating scientific laws for scientific investigation and the assumption that such postulated scientific laws reflect "actually existing properties of nature." Does the indispensability of postulating scientific laws in scientific practice also require us to assume that there are transcendent laws of nature? Davies does not quite argue that we must make that link. He admits that direct claims about the transcendent existence of the laws of nature are not possible because they make themselves manifest "…*in* the behavior of physical things" (1992:84). But he signals his personal conviction that real laws of nature do stand behind the regularities of the physical world (1992:84). If Davies is right to argue that the scientific laws that physicists develop are intended to reflect actual properties of nature, it would be hard to deny that among such properties are objective laws of nature. But is the purpose of scientific laws to reflect laws of nature?

In "Contemporary Physics and the Ontological Status of the Laws of Nature," William Stoeger adopts a constructivist position *vis-à-vis* the laws of nature (1993). Stoeger writes, "It is an illusion to believe that these incredibly rich representations of the phenomena are unconstructed isomorphisms we merely *discover* in the real world. Instead they are *constructed*—painstakingly so—and there is no evidence that they are isomorphic with structures in the real world as it is in itself" (1993:216). Constructivists do not deny that scientific practice requires the postulation of scientific laws

able to support counterfactuals. The descriptions formulated by scientists are stringent enough that they are ordinarily able to support counterfactuals (though they may not be stringent enough to support counterfactuals in every instance). What constructivists deny is that this requirement gives scientists license to assume that such laws exist independently of scientific inquiry. According to Stoeger, the scientific laws are useful tools for discerning larger patterns in reality, but they do not prescribe or dictate these patterns (1993:210). For this reason, constructivists hold that scientists must remain humble about the possibility of exceptional occurrences.

Recasting Stoeger's argument in Wittgensteinian terms, we might say that certain concepts—such as "scientific laws"—are required in order to play the "language-game" of science. When one is making a move within the scientific "language-game" one must respect the rules governing the use of its concepts. These rules delimit the number of successful theories that scientists may construct. An important rule of the scientific "language-game" is that scientific theories should respect the most basic scientific laws.

> For instance, if I construct a theory of gravitation which does not yield conservation laws of mass-energy and total angular momentum, I will have good reason for abandoning it immediately. These conservation laws are considered fundamental in any adequate theory because they are observed to be fulfilled in all cases—even in the most extreme and primordial ones (Stoeger 1993:220).

Stoeger admits therefore that laws such as the conservation laws may be said to have prescriptive force (1993:220). Yet these laws have prescriptive force only inside the language-game of science. The question whether a *real* "law of conservation" corresponds to the "law of conservation" posited by the scientific "language-game" remains unsettled.

Stoeger wonders if it makes sense to speculate about this possibility. He writes: "…it seems highly unlikely that we can ever justify postulating an independent existence for the laws, *or even make sense of such a suggestion*. They belong, first and foremost, to the models and therefore rely for their meaning on the details and characteristics of those models and the theoretical entities which constitute them" (1993:226; my italics). If I am interpreting Stoeger correctly, what he is suggesting is that it does not make sense to step outside of the language-game of science and declare that physical laws *really* exist in the universe. This is not to say that Stoeger is an anti-realist or

an instrumentalist. What Stoeger is pointing out is that it is already part of the language-game of science to assume that scientific laws describe reality. To press beyond that assumption in order to assert that the scientific laws are *really* real threatens to pass beyond the bounds of sense. Hilary Putnam makes this point in the following manner: "We can learn and change and invent languages, and in them we can state truths; that *is* describing reality. If you say, 'Yes, but it is not describing reality as it is in itself,' you are saying *nothing*" (1995:40). There is no reason for scientists to postulate the existence of transcendent laws of nature to which scientific laws more or less correspond. Positing such a relation of correspondence simply does not *do* anything for the scientist.

The platonist effort to furnish the laws of science with metaphysical foundations may not do anything for the scientist *qua scientist* but it does have deleterious consequences for the scientist *qua philosopher*. The conviction that truth consists in the correspondence of scientific descriptions of the world to a "real world" that stands behind them often provokes a peculiar concern that scientific descriptions may not so correspond. Do we perhaps sense this concern at points in Davies' texts? For example, in "The Intelligibility of Nature," Davies argues against the cultural relativity of scientific discoveries. He does so by insisting that science *really* does describe nature truthfully.

> Science *really has* given us a (partial) understanding of nature, and has led to genuinely new discoveries about the world, discoveries representing *true facts* that are just as true for other cultural groups as for the scientific community. The Z particle doesn't exist only in the imagination of scientists. It is simply there, for everybody, and it is almost certain that [the] Z particle would never have been discovered by a system of thought other than [the] sciences (Davies 1993:147).

Davies poses a dichotomy between "cultural construct" and "true facts" that I suggest arises from his platonist interpretation of the laws of nature (cf. 1993:147). Such a dichotomy illustrates the philosophical confusion that platonists encounter when they assert the transcendent reality of the laws of nature. The conviction that laws exist "out there" in a platonic realm independent of human inquiry leads many platonists to suppose that the goal of inquiry must be to foster progressively greater correspondence between scientific statements and that platonic realm. On the platonist interpretation,

the only alternative to a correspondence theory of scientific discovery is cultural relativism, namely, the claim that scientific discoveries take place in particular cultural contexts and therefore exist "only in the imagination of scientists." Thinking that they must choose between cultural relativism and metaphysical realism, platonists opt for the latter. The wonder is that modern science has permitted us to hook on at least partially to the "real world." Yet the adoption of a metaphysical realism forces platonists into several philosophically indefensible positions.

For example, let us consider the plausibility of Davies' claim that the Z particle is "simply there, for everybody." How is a Z particle "there" for a nonscientist? The Z particle is certainly not "there" for us in the same way that tables and chairs are. Is Davies suggesting that the Z particle is more "there" than tables and chairs are? What would that mean? I think what Davies means to say is that according to a scientific description of the world the Z particle is real and causally interacts with other members of the world, including all human beings. The platonists' temptation, however, is to move from that assertion, which is entirely legitimate, to the assertion that what scientists call "the Z particle" makes up part of the mind-independent furniture of the universe, which affords it greater reality than the entities described by other, non-scientific languages. The problem with such strong metaphysical realism is that the mind-independent furniture often winds up dissolving the reality of our everyday furniture (cf. Putnam 1987:3f.). Davies does not make that move. He notes that we ascribe existence to objects in a plurality of ways (cf. Davies 1992:84-7). But not every platonist is as circumspect as Davies is.

I think that we catch sight of another philosophical consequence of Davies' platonism when he leaves open the possibility that someone might make a scientific discovery through mystical insight. Davies speculates that certain individuals may have the ability to peer into the fabric of reality and make discoveries by pure intuition. For example, Davies discusses in *The Mind of God* the case of an Indian man who could write down mathematical theorems without accompanying proofs. "It is very tempting to suppose that Ramanujan had a particular faculty that enabled him to view the mathematical Mindscape directly and vividly, and pluck out ready-made results at will" (1992:154). It need not be debated whether it is possible for someone to have such a faculty to point out the difficulty into which such speculation brings Davies. If a figure like Ramanujan could peer into a mathematical Mindscape, he would nevertheless have to translate what he saw there into

the notational conventions used by human mathematics to make his results comprehensible to them. In effect, he would have to translate the metaphysical language of the Mindscape into the linguistic conventions that mathematicians have developed over the course of history to do mathematics. Our awareness of the historical development of the conventions that mathematicians use should call our attention to the problems of reference that any such translation would entail. How could Ramanujan be certain that the theorems he put forward in the human language of mathematics had translated accurately the theorems that he had perceived in the metaphysical language of the Mindscape?

Perhaps we may see the difficulties entailed by the necessity of translation better if we look at them from another angle. Let us imagine that a group of mystics were to discover in a mystical insight the object that contemporary scientists call "the Z particle." How could the mystics and the scientists become aware of this amazing coincidence? How could they know whether they were talking about the same entity? I think reflection on such questions makes clear that there is no language-independent manner of verifying whether the mystics and the scientists are referring to the same thing. In order to determine whether the mystics are talking about the Z particle, the scientists would have to provide a scientific translation of the mystics' mystical language. In the case of terms so embedded in theory, a straight-forward translation is hardly a realistic possibility. As W. v. O. Quine makes clear in *Word and Object*, any such translation would be plagued by referential indeterminacy. Quine reflects on the insuperable difficulties that a linguist would encounter when translating a statement from contemporary physics into the language of a forest-dwelling people.

> Thus who would undertake to translate 'Neutrinos lack mass' into the jungle language? If anyone does, we may expect him to coin words or distort the usage of old ones. We may expect him to plead in extenuation that the natives lack the requisite concepts; also that they know too little physics. And he is right, except for the hint of there being some free-floating, linguistically neutral meaning which we capture, in 'Neutrinos lack mass', and the native cannot (Quine 1960:76).

One need not hold a strong form of Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis to recognize that translating the mystics' discovery as "the Z particle" would involve a high degree of indeterminacy. Because the languages are so

different, neither the scientists nor the mystics could be certain that they were really talking about the same object. Thus, the assertion that "it is almost certain that [the] Z particle would never have been discovered by a system of thought other than [the] sciences" remains unverifiable (Davies 1993:147).

Metaphysical realism holds a strong attraction for many scientists despite the philosophical problems that it engenders. In fairness to Davies, we should note that Stoeger himself comes close at points to postulating the existence of epistemologically inaccessible transcendent laws. For example, Stoeger speculates on occasion that there are "underlying regularities and relationships of physical reality" that scientific inquiry cannot "uncover" but that we know must exist by the principle of sufficient reason (1993:210). He also suggests that scientists are incapable of determining whether their theories reproduce the "structures in the real world as it is in itself" (1993:216). Such speculations risk turning his theory about the ontological status of the laws into one that is metaphysically realist and epistemologically pessimistic. Stoeger would do better to restrict himself to considering the role that laws of science play in the language-game of science and to give up speculation about their approximation to the structures of "the real world as it is in itself" apart from its scientific descriptions.

Platonists might object that the abandonment of metaphysical realism must lead to a form of relativism. If we cannot speak about a real world apart from our descriptions, why should we think that there is a real world at all? Are we saying that what is true about the world in the language-game of science may not necessarily be true in other language-games? Does not human language become the arbiter of reality? No. If we adopted this interpretation, we would slide inevitably into the language-game relativism that many attribute to Richard Rorty. Relativism implies that we cannot criticize such language games from an external perspective. But we should not think that we may so easily split language-games apart in order to insulate the truth-values of any particular language-game from criticisms made by other language-games. Wittgenstein certainly did not develop the concept of a language-game to isolate different areas of knowledge from criticism. In fact, he thought that one could directly compare the value of different language-games. As Hilary Putnam writes: "Not only are there better and worse performances within a language game, but it is quite clear that Wittgenstein thinks that there are better and worse language games" (1995:37). Yet Wittgenstein did not think that the relative value of the statements put for-

ward in different language-games could be adjudicated by a single language-external arbiter—such as "correspondence to reality." Putnam suggests that Wittgenstein's use of the concept of language-games was an attempt to overcome the anxiety that troubles us into thinking that either we must provide a metaphysical foundation for our statements about the world or we must accept a form of relativism about the world (1992:177). In the end, Wittgenstein did not introduce the concept of a language-game to develop a new approach to epistemology; he used the concept of a language-game to study more closely the complex ways in which we use language to dissimulate our knowledge about the world.

III

Once we set aside questions about the ontological status of the scientific laws apart from the language-game of science and turn our attention to how scientists *use* scientific laws within the language-game of science, we find an unexpected measure of agreement between Davies and Stoeger.

For example, Davies and Stoeger agree that scientific inquiry involves a high degree of abstraction. Davies acknowledges that scientists disregard certain phenomena as "noise in the data" in their search for scientific laws (1993:149). "The job of the physicist," Davies writes, "is to uncover the patterns in nature and try to fit them to simple mathematical schemes" (1992:31). The physicist is concerned with discerning patterns and not with accounting for all the details. For his part, Stoeger writes that "the theories and 'laws' of the sciences—no matter how well-confirmed—are always idealized in some way" (1993:214). Like Davies, Stoeger does not think that this represents a flaw in the scientific method. According to Stoeger, scientists are not out to provide a complete account of reality; their aim is to provide an "idealized, abstract and simplified" model of reality (1993:232). For this reason, it does not trouble scientists that the phenomenological data that supports scientific theories does not always conform to scientific laws (1993:224). On Stoeger's account, scientists do not intend to account for all of reality with their scientific laws; they aspire to give an account of certain well-defined aspects of reality.

Davies and Stoeger also agree that the laws of science alone do not determine the future course of the universe. Davies cites Werner Heisenberg's discovery of indeterminacy at the quantum level as proof that scientific laws

cannot predict future events on the basis of present conditions with complete accuracy (1992:30). He explains, "Heisenberg's uncertainty principle puts paid to the notion that the present determines the future exactly" (1992:30). Stephen Hawking articulates the philosophical importance of Heisenberg's discovery in the following manner: "The uncertainty principle signaled an end to Laplace's dream of a theory of science, a model of the universe that would be completely deterministic: one certainly cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the present state of the universe precisely" (1988:55). In a different vein, Stoeger notes that many scientific theories require the introduction of certain "indeterminates" that "the theory or law does not specify" (1993:215). One might also expect him to argue further that the idealized character of scientific laws prevents us from ascribing to them the prescriptive force that such accurate predictions about the future would require them to have. In any event, it is clear that the use of scientific laws to predict the future is not justified by the scientific language-game itself. The dream of putting scientific laws to such an end belongs to science fiction writers rather than to physical scientists.

While Davies and Stoeger both agree that scientific laws cannot predict the outcome of all events in the universe in part because, as Davies writes, "the universe really is indeterministic at its most basic level" (1992:31), they do not think that the introduction of indeterminacy in scientific theories renders the notion of scientific laws defunct. "There is a difference," Davies writes, "between the role of chance in quantum mechanics and the unrestricted chaos of a lawless universe" (1992:31). Davies argues that the uncertainties that exist at the quantum level ordinarily do not ordinarily affect the behavior of events occurring at the non-quantum level (1992:31). Stoeger makes a related point. "Our ability to idealize and construct successful models and laws is due to the fact that there are levels of reality at which the dominant behavior of systems is simple and uncomplicated" (1993:219). The fact that quantum effects do not ordinarily disrupt the behavior of physical systems above the quantum level is important to Davies; for this reason he does not believe that his acceptance of the uncertainty principle compels him to retract his talk about the laws of nature governing events in the universe. Yet one wonders if Davies's commitment to the uncertainty principle does not really undermine his platonism. When Davies writes that the "statistical lawfulness" of quantum mechanical effects "implies that, on a macroscopic scale where quantum effects are usually not noticeable, nature *seems* to conform to deterministic laws," is he not admitting that what sci-

entists refer to as laws are not always lawful in the strict sense of the word (1992, 31; my italics)? In other words, is he not allowing that quantum effects may sometimes become noticeable on a macroscopic level— disrupting the otherwise *seemingly* deterministic laws of nature when they do? He remarks that the necessity of including such "indeterminates" in scientific theories is "another indication of the incomplete, approximate and descriptive character of even the best theories and laws" (1993:215).

Finally, Davies and Stoeger both concur that the laws of science cannot fully explain the complexity of the universe. In other words, neither supports the concept of reductionism. Complex physical systems exist that exhibit behavior that is consistent with but not explainable by the laws of physics (cf. Davies 1992:182). Davies writes: "We must reject the idea that a physical system, such as a rock or a cloud or a person, is *nothing but* a collection of atoms, and recognize instead the existence of many different levels of structure" (1992:182). Davies defends the idea that there may be "'higher-level' laws associated with the organizational properties of complex systems" that are not reducible to physical laws (1992:169). Stoeger accepts this idea—but he pushes it farther than Davies does. Stoeger contends that the use of the concept of law in these "higher-level" sciences challenges the concept of law in "lower-level" sciences such as physics. "Casting our glance back to the physical sciences from this perspective," Stoeger writes, "we realize that the seeds of the unraveling of our certainty and our understanding of the laws of nature are already growing in the theories and models we construct there" (1993:222). In other words, biologists and other "higher-level" scientists know that what they refer to as "laws" are not lawful in the strict sense. Yet this does not trouble such scientists for they use the concept of law to construct loose models for the behavior of their systems. Stoeger suggests that physicists employ the concept of law in an analogous manner. However, physicists slide into thinking that physical laws are truly lawful only because the systems that they study are so much less complex.

In the end, we must conclude with Stoeger that scientists do not assume *in actual scientific practice* that the models they create capture the full complexity of reality. Good scientists recognize, in the words of William James, that "experience…has ways of *boiling over*, and making us correct our present formulas" (1987:583). On the basis of his observations of the use of scientific laws within language-game of science, Stoeger contends that what scientists call a scientific law is rightly regarded as a "tight, detailed and specific *description*" of a physical regularity and not as a prescriptive law of na-

ture (1993:225). Stoeger summarizes his position by stating that "the laws of nature are impoverished but very useful and reassuring reflections of the rich and interconnected regularities which drive our evolving and life-giving universe" (1993:234). If platonists do not accept such conclusions, it is likely not because they think that constructivists misunderstand the way that scientists make use of the laws in their scientific investigations. Rather, it is because they are held in the grip of what Wittgenstein would call a metaphysical "picture." The danger of that metaphysical picture is that it may color and distort our understanding of the function of laws beyond the language-game of science.

IV

In the preceding two sections, we have demonstrated that the platonic conception of the laws is philosophically problematic and empirically unwarranted. But many theologians who have developed models for divine agency in the world have adopted the platonic interpretation of the laws of nature. This assumption profoundly affects their understanding of divine agency. On a platonic interpretation of the laws, the agency of God and laws of nature are easily confounded. To understand why this is so, one need only ask oneself the following question: If the laws of science prescribe the outcome of all events in the universe, what role is there for God to play? What becomes of divine agency?

The platonic interpretation of the laws either denies divine agency or welds divine agency to the laws of science. Theologians who wish to preserve some form of divine providence within this model wind up asserting that God creates and maintains the laws of science. God achieves God's ends by working through the laws of science. The problem with this proposal is that it denies the freedom and personality of God. According to a platonic interpretation of the laws, scientific laws cannot be abrogated or suspended. God has no choice but to obey the laws God created. This view threatens, in turn, to render divine agency an unnecessary hypothesis in the physical world. According to such deistic models, Nancey Murphy explains, "God's contribution must either be a rubber-stamp approval of whatever will happen naturally, or else God must intervene. But interventionism is ruled out as unscientific and un-Enlightened, so the world must roll along its determined or statistically regular course—with God's approval" (1989:239). Ac-

cording to such models of divine agency, to say that God acts in the world is simply to decorate the laws of nature with theological trappings. Any substantial notion of God's agency is swallowed up by the laws of nature themselves.

Some contemporary physicists have turned from deistic speculations to apotheosize the laws of nature themselves. For example, Davies remarks, "Curiously, the laws have been invested with many of the qualities that were formally attributed to the God from which they were once supposed to have come" (1992:82). He argues that scientists consider the laws of nature to be universal, absolute, eternal, omnipotent and, "in a loose sense," omniscient (1992:82–3). While Davies' manner of straightforwardly endowing the laws of nature with divine attributes is rhetorically striking, I think it reflects a belief among many scientists that the laws of nature manifest the divine plan for the universe. Such a belief rests at the basis of Stephen Hawking's claim that the discovery of "a complete theory" of physics would reveal the "mind of God" (1988:175). Hawking evidently makes this claim because he sees no distance between a knowledge of the laws of nature and a knowledge of divine decrees. On his view, scientists may literally read the mind of God off of the laws of nature.

The theological dangers of associating God's will and the laws of nature should not be overlooked. Once one accepts this identification, one cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that God causes every event in the world. Of course, Christian theologians affirm a doctrine of God's universal providence. Christians affirm that God is in control of the world's events. But what do such affirmations mean? The Bible relates subtle, dialectical stories about divine providence. Consider, for example, the death of Jesus Christ on the cross. Did God will that God's Son die on the cross? I believe that one must answer this question with both a no and a yes. On the one hand, God did not will the situation of human sinfulness that Christ entered. God did not will that the world would conspire against God's Son and crucify him. On the other hand, God did will that human salvation would come through the death of Christ on the cross. God did will through Christ's death on the cross to overcome the sinfulness of humanity and to prove the unending faithfulness of God's love. According to the scriptures, therefore, there can be no possibility of straightforwardly reading God's intentions off of the bare physical event of the crucifixion. It is not adequate simply to assert that God *caused* God's Son to die on the cross. We must relate that event to the complicated story of God's relationship with God's chosen people and with the

world to understand God's agency in it. The identification of the laws of nature and divine decrees encourages us to make simplistic assumptions about divine agency in the world. On this view, the divine decrees for our lives can be discovered in earthquakes, hurricanes, disease and all other forms of natural disaster. We may not know why God set up the laws so that such events take place. But we do know that God causes such events to take place. It is hard not to infer that God also wants us to suffer through these events. The conflation of the divine will with the laws of nature produces a more or less deistic conception of divine providence, which is far removed from biblical reflections on God's agency in human suffering and natural evil. The deistic conception encourages submission to the inscrutable and unalterable will of God. In the end, human beings can only regard *that* God as a tyrant and an enemy of human life.

A constructivist interpretation of the laws avoids the problems of conflating divine decrees and laws of nature by denying that scientific laws are transcendent entities that prescribe events in the universe. On a constructivist interpretation, God has the freedom either to act in conformity with the regularities of nature or to act in an "irregular" fashion. A constructivist model allows that God may create special exceptions to the regular order of events. The descriptive character of the laws of science means that knowledge of the laws can enable scientists to point out only what is singular or unique—not what is impossible. In other words, scientists can give no *a priori* reason why God might not cause something extraordinary to take place. The constructivist model also leaves open the possibility for particular providence as well as general providence. On this model, God has the freedom to act differently at different times and places.

Of course, the constructivist position still leaves us with the problem of theodicy. Once we allow that the laws of science do not constrain God's behavior in the universe, we are left facing the question why God should choose to contravene natural regularities at certain times and refrain from contravening them at other times. But it should be pointed out that this is a profoundly biblical question. The biblical witness never denies that it lies within God's freedom to act to alter the course of events. The biblical authors assume that possibility by questioning and petitioning God to alter God's decrees. The manner in which God responds to the pleas of God's people is itself a subject of intensive debate within the Bible. Indeed, a primary advantage of a constructivist interpretation of the laws from a theological point of view is that it does not provide a scientific rationalization for the prob-

lem of evil. Unlike the platonist position, which suggests that God does not have the freedom to choose between different courses of action and therefore cannot act to prevent evil events, the constructivist position suggests that God has the freedom to act in "irregular" ways. A constructivist interpretation prevents us from falling into the platonist's temptation to confound the divine decrees and the laws of science. In the end, the constructivist position forces us to look elsewhere—for Christians, to theology—to contemplate the question why God does not act to prevent evil events.

V

The final problem we face in this paper is whether it is possible to recognize God's action in the world. Once we have established that the laws of science do not disallow the possibility of special divine agency, how may we perceive that God is acting? The scope of this paper does not allow for a full answer to this question; our main purpose has been to illustrate that talk of laws in the physical sciences does not imply the rejection of a robust conception of divine agency. Yet we should recognize that merely opening a window for God's agency in the universe does not entail that God *is* an agent in the universe. In fact, David Hume presents a strong argument against our capacity to recognize God's special agency. Hume leaves open the possibility that God may contravene the regularities of nature but he thinks that our collective experience of natural regularities prevents us from countenancing such irregularities or ascribing them to divine agency. A brief examination of Hume's arguments against miracles again shows, I think, the fruitfulness of the constructivist interpretation of scientific laws for Christian theology.

In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Hume argues that miracles contravene the natural regularities that form the basis of scientific laws. He defines a miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature" (1975:114). Hume recognizes that unusual events take place in the world. For example, he allows that it is possible that reports about a darkness covering the earth at the beginning of the seventeenth century may be true if substantiated by enough experiential evidence (1975:127–8). But Hume also assumes that such extraordinary events will prove pliable to scientific treatment. What about claims concerning irregular, extraordinary events for which scientists cannot account? Hume admits that the character of scientific laws, which he considers to be descriptions of natural regularities that have been estab-

lished through inductive observation, means that he cannot provide an *a priori* argument against the possibility of such extraordinary events taking place. But he thinks that he can produce a solid *a posteriori* argument against them. Hume reasons that the natural regularities we describe as the laws of science are so well established in our experience that we must disallow any contravening evidence that they might be abrogated from time to time.

> Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full *proof*, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle… (Hume 1975:115)

In other words, to claim that an event is miraculous is, on Hume's account, just another way of saying that that event is unsubstantiated by the collective evidence of our common experience. A singular event that disrupts an otherwise uniform regularity should be disregarded as illusory. Thus, Hume contends that the concept of miraculous events is inherently self-defeating.

Does Hume's argument against miracles remain valid in the light of our study of scientific laws? What does our interpretation of the role that scientific laws play in the scientific language-game imply for the possibility of recognizing miracles? I think there is good reason to suppose that the forgoing constructivist interpretation of scientific laws removes a great deal of the force of Hume's argument.

First, the discovery of quantum indeterminacy and the development of chaos theory call into question Hume's right to define a miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature" (1975:114). A wide gap has opened between regularities that we experience "in the common course of nature" and the regularities described by physical laws. In many cases, scientists may now provide a scientific account for events that non-scientists would consider to contravene the "common course of nature." For example, Hilary Putnam writes that he can think of any number of physical possibilities that would explain why a cube of sugar might not dissolve in water. Such an event would

not necessarily violate physical laws, even though he notes that there is "no reason to think that all the various abnormal conditions (including bizarre quantum mechanical states, bizarre local fluctuations in the space-time, etc.) under which sugar would not dissolve if placed in water could be summed up in a closed formula in the language of fundamental physics" (1987:11). In any case, the set of events that scientists would consider to be true *violations* of scientific laws has become far smaller than the set of events that non-scientists would consider miraculous. In other words, many events that appear "miraculous" against the background of the collective experience of humankind may be perfectly consonant with the laws of science. If scientists are capable of providing scientific explanations of these events, which involve appeal to the highly-refined descriptions that constitute scientific laws, should we not also be willing to accept the veracity of such "miraculous" events? Yet to accept the veracity of these "miraculous" events would contravene our everyday experience of natural regularities. Should we base the concept of the miraculous on scientific laws or common experience? To make a decision for either disjunct would require a redefinition of the Humean concept of miracle.

Second, Hume grants the laws of nature too broad a scope in his definition of miracles. Hume writes as if scientific inquiry aims to discern laws that are complete and comprehensive descriptions of natural regularities. But as Broeger writes, "[T]he laws are not always obeyed without fail—but obeyed often enough so that the instances which deviate from them follow no understandable pattern or can be suspected of being due to outside influences, improper isolation of the experiment or observations, etc" (Stoeger 1993:224). While scientists may notice that such violations occur from time to time, they typically ignore these irregularities when constructing scientific laws unless they discern that these violations conform to some regular pattern. But do scientists feel any need to claim that these violations are illusory? Might it not be possible that another language-game might organize such anomalies into a discernable pattern? What Hume failed to consider is that we may organize the regularities that we encounter in ordinary experience according to different frames of reference. Hume did not recognize that no single conceptual language can exhaustively describe all the patterns that human beings experience in the world. Against Hume, I argue that we must use a plurality of conceptual languages to describe fully the richness of the regularities that we discover in the world. The richness of the world is such that I do not think we can describe its regularities through any

single conceptual language. Physicists describe a crucial set of regularities through physical laws but physical laws do not describe the world's regularities exhaustively. Thus, Hume's identification of the regularities that we encounter in common experience with the laws of nature that proves untenable and reductionistic.

We should not allow these objections to Hume's arguments against miracles to obscure a point of central importance to our study: Hume's argument illustrates that we cannot recognize God's actions in our lives without possessing a corresponding conceptual framework. He illustrates that we have no warrant to regard so-called "miraculous" events as anything other than hoaxes, improbable physical occurrences or unaccountable flukes of nature unless we can interpret such events within a framework that fits them into a broader conceptual pattern. In other words, Hume shows us that miracles are not self-identifying. A human being who experiences an extraordinary event cannot identify that event as "miraculous" unless he or she can fit that event into the broader story of God's interactions with human beings. In my view, the theological language-game provides the framework for Christians to discover the patterns and norms underlying divine agency. Of course, the patterns theology describes are quite different than the regularities described by the physical sciences; they stand closer to the patterns discerned in disciplines like psychology and sociology. In any case, the theological language-game organizes miracles into a pattern that *makes sense* to human beings who know the story. Without the language-game of theology, therefore, Christians could not recognize any event—even so-called "miraculous" events—as the consequence of divine agency.

VI

We must now ask ourselves what we have learned from our study of the scientific laws and divine agency. The conclusion our study has pointed us to is that we cannot expect that scientists will ever grant us a theory of everything. Scientific inquiry may provide us with an excellent account of certain aspects of reality; it cannot, however, provide us with an account of every aspect of reality. To Stephen Hawking's claim that a complete set of scientific laws would reveal the "mind of God" (1988:175), we must answer that at most these laws would reveal God's intentions for the very small and the very

large. In sum, the physical laws described by the physical sciences do not reveal or determine God's intentions for human beings. In order to discern the character of God's interactions with human beings, we must have a different way of structuring and organizing our knowledge of the world. I believe that it is a task of theology to create the broader conceptual framework against which Christians may discern divine agency in the world. In the end, theologians should recognize that the idealized and constructive character of scientific laws permits them to uphold a robust conception of divine agency without undue fear that scientific laws will disallow or contradict their assertions.

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Towards a Postmodern Methodology
for Pastoral Counseling

JACO HAMMAN

INTRODUCTION

REFERRING TO RATIONALITY WITHIN PRACTICAL THEOLOGY, RICHARD OSMER states that "the science and theology debate is yet to be fully taken up in practical theology" (1995:21). He believes that there is widespread consensus that we stand at the end of the era in which practical theology took shape, since new and much richer understandings of rationality have begun to emerge. These statements might come as a surprise to a discipline such as pastoral theology, for pastoral theology may want to claim interdisciplinary activity as integral to its self-understanding. The clinical application of pastoral theology, pastoral counseling, can hardly be envisioned without the use of psychological insights (Patton 1990:851).

If Osmer's statements have value, and I believe they do, serious questions can be raised regarding pastoral theology and pastoral counseling's interdisciplinary nature. What understanding of rationality lies within current pastoral theological methodologies? What is the nature of the "science and theology debate" that is currently operable within practical theology? More specifically, what rationality currently operates within pastoral counseling? What reasons may be given to view the current interdisciplinary methodology and practice of pastoral counseling (or practical theology) as troublesome? I believe that pastoral theology and the practice of pastoral counseling seem to be almost oblivious to postmodern rationality as a source of critique and affirmation of current interdisciplinary activity. In this essay, I want to address this very vacuity by examining Calvin O. Schrag's understanding of postmodern rationality.

A preliminary working definition of the constructs "rationality" and "the postmodern or postmodernism" is central to this essay. It is important to

mention that both terms are difficult to define and different scholars will provide diverse definitions. In his work *Rationality in Science, Religion and Everyday Life*, Mikael Stenmark makes the distinction between realistic (possible, responsible) and idealized (impossible, irresponsible) models of rationality (Stenmark 1995:5–6). The difference between the two rationalities mentioned is expressed in the axiom of reasonable demand: one cannot reasonably demand of a person what a person cannot (possibly) do. For Stenmark, scientific forms of rationality are "too idealized" and utopian to apply them to actual human beings. He opts for a realistic model of rationality, taking into account the beliefs, actions and evaluations of human beings. Stenmark's argument moves away from epistemic beliefs (or epistemic foundations) as rational, "self-evident propositions that are true, and whose truth is clear to anyone who properly understands them" (Brown 1988:40). I believe that such models of idealized rationality are common to pastoral theology and pastoral care and counseling. This essay accepts a *realistic understanding* of rationality. The shift away from epistemic foundations places the focus on the agents of rationality and an emphasis on communicative praxis.

Jean-Francois Lyotard, the well-known scholar of postmodernism, describes postmodernism as being part of modernism, but which unlike modernism, refuses to invoke "the unrepresentable as presentation itself, refuses the consensus of taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the impossible" (1992:12,15). Both Stenmark (utopian rationality) and Lyotard (nostalgia) want to move away from the impossible toward the possible, a move from idealistic rationality to realistic rationality. In this move, Lyotard states that the postmodern acts as an extension of the modern and not as something existing separate from the modern. Hence, there is a to-and-fro movement between the modern and the postmodern.

Although Lyotard and Stenmark seem to agree as to the nature of postmodernity, postmodernism is not a unified philosophy. Calvin O. Schrag mentions that anyone attempting to provide a sketch of postmodernism has to contend with "a somewhat curious diversity of portraits" (Schrag 1992:13). He points out that in the many discussions of postmodernism, the vocabulary often shifts from "the post-modern" to "postmodernity" to "postmodernism" without clear distinctions of what, if anything, is at stake in such shifts. Schrag also states that within the diversity of portraits (of postmodernism) that exist, two central attitudes, one deconstructive and one constructive, can be identified. Schrag opts for a constructive approach

to postmodern rationality, believing that discernment and decisions are possible while being postmodern.

Consistent with the postmodern emphasis on contextuality, the constructs mentioned cannot be fully defined without considering a specific context. Another factor, which complicates any attempt at providing a definition for postmodernism, is postmodernity's interdisciplinary nature. Postmodernism provides postmodern architecture, postmodern art, postmodern literature, postmodern politics, postmodern theology, postmodern science, postmodern culture studies, postmodern philosophy, and more. Can postmodern pastoral counseling be added to this list? This essay views postmodernism as a cultural attitude or a certain perspective, and an assemblage of discursive practices that can take many forms. Postmodernism has no single philosopher as its founder, nor does any school of scholars faithful to the doctrines of postmodernism exist. As John E. Thiel states it: "At most, one can speak of a commitment to a style of philosophizing shared by a number of thinkers, and often in very different ways" (Thiel 1994:1).

In the first section of this essay, I will discuss two central aspects of postmodern rationality. The two aspects (and they are not the only two) are a move away from the idealization of metanarratives (identified by Jean-Francois Lyotard) and the importance of discernment (described by Harold Brown). The two aspects mentioned "join hands" where discernment takes place within communities to produce local narratives.

In the second section, I will identify two pastoral counseling methodologies that place the emphasis on pastoral counseling's bipolar or bilingual nature to describe the interdisciplinary activity. Both models address the interdisciplinary question inherent to pastoral counseling by using epistemic foundations. The pastoral theological models of the Dutch scholar Gerben Heitink and the American scholar, Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger, are examples of European (Continental) and American thought within the Reformed tradition. Although Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger offer quite diverse perspectives on how to address the interdisciplinary nature of pastoral counseling, similarities between their models, such as a bipolar structure, will be identified.

In the third section of this essay, I will discuss Calvin O. Schrag's model of transversal reasoning. Schrag offers a model of rationality that takes the critique of postmodern rationality seriously without falling into rampant deconstruction and pluralism. I will argue that Schrag's understanding of transversal rationality has implications for a postmodern methodology for

pastoral counseling. The "lenses" through which two current pastoral methodologies will examined at are their use of epistemic foundations, the models' use of and functioning as metanarratives, and their view of discernment.

THE POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF METANARRATIVES AND THE CENTRALITY OF DISCERNMENT

The construct *metanarratives* received much prominence in Jean-Francois Lyotard's work, *The Postmodern Condition*. Lyotard identified certain metanarratives that marked modernity: the progressive emancipation of reason, freedom, and labor, as well as the enrichment of all humanity through the progress of capitalist technoscience. Another modern metanarrative Lyotard identified that is important for Christian theology is the metanarrative of Christianity, understood as the salvation of creatures through conversion of souls to the Christian narrative of love (1984:xxxiv).

For Lyotard, metanarratives are not myths in the sense of fables that would be mythical. However, like myths, metanarratives have the function of legitimating social and political institutions and practices, laws, ethics and ways of thinking. Unlike myths, metanarratives find legitimacy in the realization of an "Idea." This "Idea," be it freedom, socialism, or Christian love, has legitimating value because it is seen as being universal in nature, guiding all of human reality. However, postmodernity challenges the "Idea." Schrag quotes Lyotard as stating that "I would argue that the project of modernity (the realization of universality) has not been forsaken or forgotten but destroyed, liquidated" (1992:24). Lyotard believes that technoscience is the sustaining metanarrative within the modern paradigm. The victory of technoscience gives the impression of completing modernity, although it also means the destruction of modernity. A person's mastery over the objects generated by contemporary science and technology does not bring greater freedom, more public education, or even greater distribution of wealth, but rather the contrary.

Within the postmodern society, no metanarratives can be used with a legitimizing function. For Lyotard, the challenge of postmodernity has to do with the fostering of an attitude that he describes in terms of "an incredulity toward metanarratives," a "sensitivity to differences," "tolerat[ing] the incommensurable," learning to live with "the inventor's paralogy," and "waging a war on totality" (1984:xxiv). The postmodern challenge calls us to live with local (contextual) narratives where meaning and reference are not situ-

ated in epistemology (or beliefs as metanarratives), but rather in communicative praxis (hermeneutics) and in rational agents.

Thinking in terms of incredulity, disbelief and skepticism toward metanarratives might be foreign to pastoral counseling. However, the postmodern challenge to pastoral counseling is to move away from legitimating metanarratives. This is especially important in interdisciplinary dialogue where metanarratives may be "despised" for being remnants of modernity (Schrag 1992:24). The use of metanarratives as epistemic foundations within pastoral counseling will be discussed in the next section. It will suffice here to state that the postmodern challenge to rationality does not leave the metanarratives within pastoral counseling untouched.

The second characteristic of postmodernism that I would like to identify is the centrality of *discernment* within postmodernism. Harold Brown calls upon the importance of judgment or discernment as an integral part of rationality in his work, *Rationality*. He defines judgment as "the ability to evaluate a situation, assess evidence, and come to a reasonable decision without following rules" (1988:137). Judgment involves decisions which are based on prior knowledge gained, and which are not arbitrary, although decisions are reached without following rules.

Brown identifies three important characteristics of (postmodern) judgment. They are: 1) judgments are not made by following rules; 2) judgments are fallible; and 3) judgments are made by individuals who are in command of an appropriate body of information that is relevant to the judgment in question (1988:138). Maintaining the relationship between the modern and the postmodern, Brown says that rules still exist and that rules are still used, but in a different way. Judgment comes into play especially where a decision needs to be made between a number of competing rules, or alternatively where familiar rules fail.

Brown warns against the danger of viewing fallible judgments as "baseless." With this warning he challenges deconstructive postmodernism. Brown states that:

> If we give up this demand [of indubitability] the concept of judgment provides the basis for a new look at the problem of [epistemic] foundations, for we do indeed stop epistemic regresses, even though we do not do so because we have reached a firm foundation. Rather, we stop either because we judge that we need go no further in the present context, or because we have reached the point at which we have been trained

to stop. This leaves us with a starting point, but a tentative and fallible one that is open to reconsideration under appropriate circumstances (1988:144–5).

Judgment is not a form of dogmatism. There is no incompatibility between accepting a set of fallible claims for substantial periods of time, and being prepared to reconsider them when there are relevant reasons to do so. This reconsideration will be a matter of professional judgment by those who have mastered the relevant body of information. The information used for judgment consists of background information as well as a body of information relevant to the case at hand. As expertise in an area is needed to be informed, not everyone can exercise reasonable judgment on every topic. Furthermore, expertise does not guarantee success, as errors may occur and experts may disagree. Where experts disagree, a person must live with the diversity of opinions (the inventor's paralogy). Brown's interpretation of discernment indicates an understanding of rationality that moves away from the classical understanding of rationality which stated that only infallible methods are of any cognitive significance.

The importance of judgment within postmodern rationality supports Stenmark's view that rationality is no longer an issue of conceptual analysis, a matter of logic or a set of beliefs. Rationality is not an issue of propositions, beliefs or theories, something a property may have or lack, but an issue of discernment strategies and thus a human characteristic (Stenmark 1995:41). Discernment is a skill that can be acquired through training or experience (as practical wisdom), and something that can (and should) be cultivated in the pursuit of knowledge. Discernment and judgment are skills that challenge the rule-governed nature of modern rationality.

The shift of rationality away from theoretical propositions to an activity of persons introduces an important element that plays an integral role in not only discernment, but also in the establishment of knowledge. This element is the *power-knowledge relationship*. Michel Foucault's politics of power provides a portrait of a power-knowledge nexus that pervades personal and social existence. For Foucault, the human subject, with its strategies for achieving knowledge, is a product of power. Foucault summarizes the importance of the power-knowledge relation in the following words:

> We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it be-

cause it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformation (1977:27–8).

Discernment takes into account that the power-knowledge relationship, denied by modern rationality and modern rationality's focus on propositions and beliefs, is an integral part of all knowledge. No discernment can take place without power relations being involved, and no proposition exists without it being formed in a specific power relation. By identifying the relationship between power and knowledge, Foucault introduces an aspect central to any discernment process as power is situated not only in knowledge but also in the agent of knowledge.

The importance of judgment or discernment for pastoral counseling is clear in that pastoral counseling cannot take place without discernment. Judgment is even more complex within pastoral counseling where theological insights as well as psychological insights determine the discernment strategies. The importance of the power-knowledge relationship also challenges pastoral theology and pastoral counseling, working within the framework of "divine authority," to take the power-knowledge relationship seriously. After the introduction of two pastoral theologies, the importance of a move away from metanarratives and the centrality of discernment within postmodern rationality will be reviewed as a method for pastoral counseling.

TWO MODERN APPROACHES IN PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING

In this second section, I will briefly discuss two models of pastoral counseling. I will argue that both models depend upon specific beliefs and propositions, used as metanarratives, to guide their interdisciplinary activity. In addition, both models limit discernment almost exclusively to a pre-theoretical level, i.e., the

following of the "rules" set by the epistemic beliefs. The first model to be discussed is the bipolar model of the Dutch pastoral theologian Gerben Heitink and the second is the "bilingual" model of Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger.

Gerben Heitink's Bipolar Model

As already mentioned, interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and psychology is intrinsic to pastoral theology and pastoral counseling. In his work *Pastoraat als Hulpverlening* (1977), the Dutch pastoral theologian Gerben Heitink views interdisciplinary activity in terms of a broad understanding of bipolarity. Interdisciplinary dialogue takes place between "theology and the empirical, between theology and psychology, between revelation and experience, between faith and religion, between pastoral counseling and psychotherapy" (1977:80).[1] Within the pastoral setting, the bipolarity is emphasized as the pastoral counselor with her unique identity enters a relationship with another person.

Heitink works with the presupposition that pastoral care is a service that is beneficial and helpful to people in the form of care and assistance. He wants to strengthen the pastoral identity of the pastoral counselor as he distinguishes between pastoral counseling and three other "helping professions," namely, the medical profession, social work and psychology. These professions share similarities, including their dependence upon communication (between a trained professional and another person) and establishing a relationship with another person. However, Heitink believes that the different disciplines represent fundamentally diverse natures, and therefore each discipline experiences tension relating to the other "helping disciplines." Heitink accepts the bipolarity within pastoral counseling but stresses the uniqueness of the pastoral identity. He finds the unique character in the pastor's connection to the gospel and the church of Christ (worship, catechism and pastoral care), and in viewing faith and life questions in light of the gospel and in association with the church of Christ (1977:151). Heitink defines "in light of the gospel" as refering to God's grace and mercy, to God's concern for humanity, and to God's soteriological acts. It also refers to the coming of the Kingdom. Heitink has a wide-ranging understand-

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[1] Heitink's book has not been translated into English. The author did all translations.

ing of "faith and life questions" which may have a personal, relational, socio-cultural, developmental, psychological, or faith content (1977:155).

Heitink thus views pastoral counseling as a unique profession to be distinguished from other "helping professions" because it uses very specific epistemic foundations. "Whereas each helping profession needs to define its own identity, this is all the more important for pastoral counseling whose identity extends from *faith a priori* which is not verifiable nor can count on general acceptance" (Heitink 1977:79–80, emphasis added). The faith a priori distinguishes pastoral counseling from the other "helping professions." The unique nature of pastoral counseling is determined by its grounding in epistemic foundations.

Drawing on these epistemic foundations, Heitink defines pastoral counseling in terms of a "a pastor becoming engaged in a helping relation with other persons in order to seek with them, in light of the gospel and in fellowship with the church of Christ, a way to address their life-and-faith questions" (1977:75). The bipolarity between the pastor, who acts according to revelation and faith a priori, and the person seeking assistance while living within experience, is apparent. Heitink's model is a model of Reformed pastoral counseling and is used especially in the Netherlands and in South Africa.

Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger's "Bilingual" Approach

Whereas Heitink embraces the bipolarity inherent to pastoral counseling, Deborah van Deusen Hunsinger proposes a very different model for pastoral counseling. She draws upon the theology of Karl Barth and his interpretation of the Chalcedonian tradition to assimilate the bipolarity within pastoral counseling. It is important to state that the interest of this essay is not in Van Deusen Hunsinger's use of Barthian theology *per se.* The focus, however, is on her use of a metanarrative and religious a priori (the Chalcedonian pattern), as well as her understanding of discernment within interdisciplinary activity.

In examining the theological legacy of Karl Barth and his relevancy for pastoral counseling as a ministry of the church, Van Deusen Hunsinger arrives at the person of Jesus Christ and the Chalcedonian pattern in her book *Theology and Pastoral Counseling: A New Interdisciplinary Approach* (1995). According to Van Deusen Hunsinger, Barth's theology, "grounded solely in God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ, offers pastoral counselors a perspective

that is significantly distinguished from psychological modes of thought"
(1995:12). Van Deusen Hunsinger acknowledges that the use of Barth as a
theologian that promotes interdisciplinary dialogue may sound strange at
first, but states that Barth's

> …consistent concern to delimit the boundaries of theology, differen-
> tiating it from fields not based on God's self-revelation, makes Barth a
> promising conversation partner not only for the dialogue that is truly
> interdisciplinary, but also for pastoral counseling as a bilingual form
> of ministry (1995:13).

Van Deusen Hunsinger's model draws upon Barth's interpretation of God's
revelation in Jesus Christ and his interpretation of the Council of Chalcedon
(AD 451). Chalcedon argued for the divine and human natures of Christ,
which were related without separation or division and without confusion or
change. Barth's interpretation of Chalcedon led him to state that conceptual
priority should be assigned to the divine over the human nature. The
Chalcedonian pattern thus describes the Person of Christ (the Divine na-
ture of Christ and Christ's human nature) as "indissoluble differentiation"
(related without confusion or change), "inseparable unity" (related without
separation or division) and "indestructible order" (with asymmetrical or-
der) (1995:65).

Drawing on the revelation of God through Christ, Van Deusen Hun-
singer's use of epistemic foundations and a metanarrative is self-evident. She
states: "The knowledge of God as received by faith is understood to be sec-
ondary and derivative in the sense that it rests on the foundation of God's
own self-knowledge" (1995:119). Such "foundational language" is quite com-
mon in Van Deusen Hunsinger's work, evidenced by the following state-
ments: "Barth is concerned to find a way to ground human knowledge of
God in God alone" (1995:113); and "Barth's premise thus follows the order of
being rather than an order of becoming. God as He is in Himself thereby
becomes the ground of any true statements we might make about God as
God is in relation to us" (1995:117).

Van Deusen Hunsinger moves from a theoretical (or even pre-theoreti-
cal level) to practical application by arguing that the Chalcedonian pattern
provides methodological clarity for the interdisciplinary relationship be-
tween theology and psychology. Translated into the interdisciplinary dia-
logue between theology and psychology, the same pattern identified in the

person of Christ—described as without confusion or change, without separation or division, and with asymmetrical order—prevails. A pastoral counselor using this method would thus be "bilingual," able to communicate not only in theological "language," but also in the "language" of psychology. Pastoral competency is found in the ability to communicate effectively in the two "languages." These "languages" are never fused into one "language" and (conceptual) priority is given to the theological "language" (the asymmetrical order).

Each discipline can thus define its boundaries to secure its integrity and continue to investigate subject matter according to its nature. Interdisciplinary activity, due to conceptual priority, implies that different disciplines remain untouched by each other, and therefore "bilingualism" can be used by Van Deusen Hunsinger as a metaphor to describe her methodology. Integration of the two "languages" takes place within the person of the counselor, although Van Deusen Hunsinger does not describe just how such integration takes place.

Van Deusen Hunsinger's bilingual model draws upon very specific theological beliefs, namely, those of Reformed theology as illuminated Karl Barth, to guide interdisciplinary dialogue in a pastoral setting. Those epistemic beliefs operate on a theoretical level as well as in praxis (the clinical setting). Important to Van Deusen Hunsinger is that the bilingual nature of the pastoral counselor must be maintained, which implies that the epistemic beliefs chosen are also understood as guiding principles within the clinical setting. The epistemic beliefs seem to be beyond criticism.

Within the scope of this essay it is impossible to give justice to two models. However, I do believe that I have sufficiently described the two models to identify their use of epistemic foundations, the role discernment takes within the theories, and how these two elements inform their respective methodologies and theologies. Although Van Deusen Hunsinger and Heitink offer diverse models of pastoral counseling and have different notions of pastoral theology, they both rely on the revelation of God (in Christ and in Scripture) to inform their theologies. Both models also find themselves within a neo-orthodox understanding of theology, a theology described by Nancey Murphy as "a dead end," leading theology into a "crisis" (1990:15). The crisis arises because neo-orthodoxy leaves unanswered the question whether "we know with the required certainty what we take to be revelation is indeed the word of God?"

Murphy's concern introduces critical questions of critique against the models of Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger. How do we know that what we take to be revelation is indeed the word of God? Who decides on the "required certainty," or whose understanding of "church" and "gospel" will be used? In addition, how should contradicting theological interpretations be interpreted? This is certainly a challenge postmodernism would direct at both scholars. It is therefore important to take a closer look at the theologies and methodologies of Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger in light of the criteria discussed in the first section.

Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger Revisited

Postmodern rationality may pose several questions to the models of Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger: Why resort to the use of unverifiable a priori (epistemic) foundations in establishing a methodology for pastoral counseling? Whose definition of "church" and "gospel" will govern the pastoral counseling? Why does the personal/pastoral identity of the pastoral counselor need the guardianship (or security) of a priori foundations? In the postmodern context, with its contempt for metanarratives, how should metanarratives such as "the gospel" and Barth's understanding of revelation be evaluated? Can there be unrestrained interdisciplinary dialogue within the "confines" of "asymmetrical order," even if it is only conceptual priority? Where does the pastoral counselor as a discerning (rational) agent come into play in these models? Is discernment, defined by terms such as "bilingualism" and "bipolarity," suffcient to define interdisciplinary interpretation?

In assessing the two models discussed from a postmodern perspective, these and many more concerns can be raised. I would like to mention two aspects that are worth further investigation. The first is that both models are dependent upon epistemic foundations that act as *metanarratives*. The second aspect is the models' deficient (and possibly naïve) understanding of *discernment*.

Both Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger use epistemic foundations on which they build their models, though Van Deusen Hunsinger is much clearer about how the epistemic foundations guide interdisciplinary dialogue. Heitink presupposes interdisciplinary dialogue in which theology stays aware of its unique character. This said, the epistemic foundation for Heitink is the church of Christ and Scripture while for Van Deusen Hunsinger it is the revelation of Jesus Christ explicated by the Chalcedonian

dynamic. Epistemic foundations act as self-evident beliefs and are seen as being beyond any doubt, as they portray not only a universal character, but also guide interdisciplinary activity. The Chalcedonian pattern, used as an epistemic foundation, may even be seen as inflexible and infallible. The epistemic foundations are used in the arguments of both Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger as sources of justification, legitimization and even motivation. As such, the epistemic beliefs function as metanarratives.

A metaphor that may be used to disclose further the use of metanarratives in the models of Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger, is Willard Quine's *myth of the museum* (Thiel 1994:18–20). Quine describes the use of epistemic beliefs using the analogy of a museum. In this analogy, a conceptual scheme (such as "Chalcedon" or "the church" and "in light of the gospel") is imaged as a museum in which the words and meanings are exhibits. The walls of this museum are not defined by any individual's mental experience since a conceptual scheme is a public trust (or even Godly trust?) rather than private property. Like standing exhibits in a museum, meanings in the conceptual scheme are seen as part of the permanent collection with independent reality and a value of their own. Having this independent reality, they receive labels to identify them so that people can discuss them as they walk by.

In Quine's analogy, there are as many sets of labels as there are languages. However, irrespective of the languages or set of labels used, *the myth of the museum* presupposes words that, like museum exhibits, possess objectivity capable of appreciation, contemplation, and criticism. *The myth* distributes its epistemic foundationalism throughout the idea of a conceptual scheme in which meanings are thought to have a mental life of their own apart from their use and applicability in language. Susan Haack defines foundationalism as justified beliefs that are "basic; a basic belief is justified independently of the support of any other belief. All other justified beliefs are derived; a derived belief is justified via the support, direct or indirect, of a basic belief or basic beliefs" (1996:14). "The church" or the "Chalcedonian pattern" have objectivity beyond human (contextual) interpretation, and thus act as self-evident truths. However, *the myth of the museum* challenges such a belief.

Within *the myth*, theories are readily conceived of as universal explanations. Theorizing is successful when its explanations do justice to the conceptual scheme used. For the models discussed, pastoral counseling would be true to its "nature" only if a situation is viewed in light of the church and the gospel, or when bilingualism with asymmetry is honored. Failure in interdisciplinary activity is never ascribed to the theory used, as it has sound

foundations. Rather, failure according to Heitink or Van Deusen Hunsinger reflects an inadequate understanding of the gospel and the church, or the pastoral counselor not being bilingual enough. This would necessarily imply that a rational agent does not comprehend the definitions as Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger understand them.

It is this very dynamic that exposes the *myth of the museum* in pastoral counseling. *The myth* identifies the objective nature of metanarratives, which is challenged by postmodern rationality. Postmodern rationality views meaning as being provincial or contextual (local) and not universal or transcendental. Meaning is a function of discernment and of context, and immanent within both. There are no context-free (or even person-free) theories. From a postmodern perspective both Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger's models can be placed within the *myth of the museum*.

Pastoral counseling's *myth of the museum* has *discernment* inseparably linked with the conceptual theory that would guide interdisciplinary dialogue. As the brief description of discernment in the first section indicated, movement away from metanarratives (and *the myth*) implies a central role for discernment. Staying congruent to the "two languages" (Van Deusen Hunsinger) or even interpreting a situation in "light of the gospel" (Heitink) functions on a pre-theoretical level and does not honor the intricacies, such as power relations, self-consciousness and language use of discernment. Foundationalist theories find knowledge and insight in the epistemic foundations used and not in the rational agent.

The questions mentioned in the first paragraph of this section receive even more importance if the power-knowledge relationship is accepted as a central concern for the discerning agent. Since Foucault indicated that power could produce knowledge, how is the Chalcedonian dynamic and the specific interpretation of church and gospel influenced by the discerning agent(s)? Can religious a priori, often seen as objective truths, guide contextual situations without being influenced by rational agents at all?

These questions identify a postmodern critique of the models of discernment used by Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger. The use of universal religious a priori (metanarratives) influences the very nature of pastoral counseling and the decisions made within the counseling setting. Could it be that such a use of religious a priori actually inhibits pastoral theology from entering interdisciplinary dialogue? Using metanarratives may not even be sufficient for intra-disciplinary discussions (within theology) due to the variety of theologies prevalent today. Postmodern discernment places the

emphasis on comprehension, intervention and manipulation, or in short, on reasoning strategies. These reasoning strategies call for a rationality located in the rational agent and not in rational foundations or beliefs. Both Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger are silent on the reasoning strategies they use but are clear as to the rational foundations they use.

Positively, both Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger offer an insight that would be important within a postmodern methodology for pastoral counseling. This can be described in terms of the "unique" character of pastoral counseling (Heitink) or "without confusion or change" (Van Deusen Hunsinger). Both scholars indicate that pastoral counseling should be distinguished from other disciplines such as psychology. The "languages" of theology and psychology should not be conflated into a single "language." This distinction is congruent with the postmodern call for local narratives, where theology and psychology would each imply a different (local) narrative. A fusion of theology and psychology into a single entity would not honor either discipline and would invite postmodernism's critique.

I further agree with Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger that pastoral theology and pastoral counseling need to claim their authority. Within a postmodern approach to pastoral counseling this remains true as well. However, theology can claim its authority as a discipline in a manner that would not elicit postmodernism's critique of metanarratives. A methodology for pastoral counseling is needed that would move away from metanarratives as a source of validation, while accepting the challenge of responsible discernment. Additionally, this methodology should guard the unique identity of pastoral counseling while placing emphasis on the rational agent and not on rational beliefs. While not having pastoral counseling in mind, Calvin O. Schrag proposes such a model of interdisciplinary activity. He accepts the postmodern challenge toward rationality, honors the integrity of different disciplines within an interdisciplinary setting, and offers *transversal reasoning* as a methodology of interdisciplinary activity.

CALVIN O. SCHRAG'S TRANSVERSAL REASONING AND PASTORAL COUNSELING

In his book, *The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge* (1992), Calvin O. Schrag searches for a philosophical position between modernism and postmodernism. His concept of *transversal rationality*, to be defined in the following paragraphs, offers a method of interdisciplinary

activity that is truly postmodern as it takes postmodern critique seriously,
but also continues the relationship with tradition and modernity. Transver-
sal rationality strengthens pastoral theology in intra-theological discussion
and pastoral counseling in interdisciplinary dialogue. It honors the concerns
of Heitink and Van Deusen Hunsinger, namely, that different disciplines can-
not be fused and that pastoral counseling has a unique character.

The central thesis of transversal rationality is that it is characterized by
three phases of communicative praxis. Transversal reasoning operates "in
and through the transversal play of discourse and action, word and deed,
speaking and writing, hearing and reading," through critique, articulation
and disclosure (Schrag 1992:9).

As a philosopher, Schrag views the central task of philosophy as being
twofold in nature: philosophy should cultivate reason while acting as its
caretaker. Schrag accepts this responsibility as he draws on postmodern phi-
losophy in commenting on reason while guarding rationality at the same
time. He portrays a critical but constructive attitude, constantly searching
for ways to overcome polarities and deconstruction. For Schrag, transversal
reasoning takes place within the tension field between the modern and the
postmodern, and he argues for maintaining the tension.

Schrag finds the postmodern challenge directed at reason difficult to
comprehend as postmodernism is neither a single theory nor a set of doc-
trines. Postmodernity communicates a sociopolitical ethos or mind-set that
can be seen in art, literature, science, politics, philosophy, theology, etc. Ac-
cepting Jean-Francois Lyotard's understanding of the postmodern, Schrag
identifies a to-and-fro movement between the modern and the postmodern
(1992:7). For Schrag, modern rationality has been problematized by
postmodernity, and transversal reasoning is an attempt to solve the uncon-
trolled pluralism of postmodernity, something that contradicts Schrag's
constructive and "in-between" nature.

To explicate transversal reasoning's "in-between" nature, Schrag exam-
ines how reason has been understood throughout history. This leaves him
with an image of rationality as "the despised logos" (1992:17). Traditionally
the logos informed the grammar and self-understanding of knowledge and
played a central role in Greek philosophy, the medieval period and the mod-
ern period. It has a pervasive and ubiquitous character and views the human
mind as rational insofar as it participates in the rational structure of the
cosmos. The pervasive character of the logos (rationality) is apparent in
modernity's shift from the ontological nature of knowledge to scientific ra-

tionality. Within modernity, rationality is defined as logic: method, measurement, effective control and prediction. Through this shift to logic, scientific (with technical) reason is universalized.

Schrag's use of postmodern scholars such as Lyotard, Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault further enhances the despised nature of the logos. Using these scholars, Schrag concludes that local, small narratives, intertwined with issues of power and desire, should replace metanarratives. Deleuze and Guattari call for "nomad science" to replace "royal science" that would use metanarratives. Nomadology and postmodernism react against the epistemological paradigm of modernity with its unimpeachable foundations of knowledge and epistemological certainty. Building on a phrase from Richard Rorty, the "poverty of epistemology," Schrag moves away from an epistemology of foundations to hermeneutics (1992:24).

Postmodernism's attack on reason leaves no secure space in which meaning can be found and references made. This said, Schrag believes that there is a "safe place between the modern and the postmodern, where the logos falls to neither logic nor illogic, where reason rules but does not tyrannize, and where we enjoy the temperate gains of the postmodern without suffering its extremes" (Bottum 1994:379). This place is the transversal sphere. Schrag thus supports the postmodern attack on reason insofar as it identifies the ahistorical universalism of modernity, but denies postmodernism's "rhapsodic play of différance and rampant pluralism" (1992:9).

Schrag states that epistemologists, who use epistemological foundations in their reasoning, do not consider the dependence of meaning and reference upon discursive contexts and the role of the addresser/addressee interaction. Meaning and reference are not established once and for all, as the postmodern attack against metanarratives does not leave meaning and reference untouched. Under the postmodern attack on reason, meaning and reference fall into plurality and paralogy. It is thus no surprise that Lyotard emphasizes a postmodern society of heterogeneity, multiplicity, dissensus and incommensurability.

Schrag's discussion of postmodernism and historicism identifies postmodernism as the radicalization and retrenchment of modernity and not as a period that follows modernity (1992:45). Within the new historicism of postmodernism, the past and future are devalued, and the present is reshaped into a short-lived "present-becoming." Although the past is devalued, Schrag follows Alisdair MacIntyre in that a break with tradition is impossible, as no thought and action can be traditionless (1992:48). Tradition re-

mains important although constructs and meaning may be deconstructed. It may just be that incommensurability, conflict of perspectives, paralogy and dissensus do not have the final word. The communicative practices of our historical inheritance may provide possibilities for rational critique, articulation and disclosure, as these are geared to an understanding of shared experiences, evaluation and emancipation. Discourse and discernment are thus of central concern if tradition remains important to rationality.

In response to a modern view of discernment (as theory-grounded critique) that depends upon rules, Schrag resituates critique within the space of communicative practices and the dynamics of our lifeworld involvement (1992:59). Schrag coins this critique "praxial critique," as it does not depend on foundations and does not search for certainty. The critique is inseparable from the practices and projects of the various communities of investigators and interpreters as they attempt to communicate meaning. Thought and action, two central characteristics of discernment, are constantly seen against the backdrop of changing and historically determined conditions. Praxis, to be distinguished from practice (as the application of contextless theory), encompasses a variety of social practices in personal and public existence. Praxis "refigures social practices as performances of meaning, [and] displays intentionality that exhibit their own insight, comprehension and sense-constitution" (1992:59). The theory/practice bifurcation still exists within praxial critique, but practice is not helpless without theory.

Praxial critique, as a method of discernment, infuses social practices such as the human sciences. Especially within the human sciences, praxial critique as discernment overcomes methodologism. It is systematic in nature without falling into the finality and totality of system building searching for absolute certainty. Using Habermas's "communicative reason" that refutes subject-centered reason, and the Wittgensteinian perspective of the communality of reason, Schrag wants to keep the relationship (and tension) between rationality and community. He does this by identifying a transversal interplay between the claims of reason and the claims of the community as these "intersect, lie across each other, [and] converge without becoming coincident" (1992:63). Transversal interplay takes place within communicative practice and the dialectical action of participation and distanciation.

Participation and distanciation are important moments as no discernment is possible without pre-judgments, habits and skills that inform a person's participation in the communal world. Participation and

distanciation describe an attitude toward intellectual heritage or tradition. Within any discipline, Schrag envisions a person embracing tradition while critically distancing himself or herself from that very same tradition. Distanciation is especially important as without it participation leads to traditionalism and conservatism. As Schrag identified participation and distanciation as central to the discernment process, rationality—infused by hermeneutics—is forced to come to terms with the consequences of interpretation. The central metaphors used to describe these consequences of hermeneutics are "a hermeneutics of nostalgia" versus a "hermeneutics of affirmation" (1992:68).

The two metaphors of affirmation and nostalgia are irreconcilable, yet Schrag argues for both as attitudes to describe an investigator's relationship to knowledge. Staying within the "in-between" tension, Schrag refuses to accept a context neutral concept of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics for Schrag implies an interactional and communicative praxis where the rational requirements for discernment, formed by the dialectic of participation (nostalgia) and distanciation (affirmation), remain in force. In this affirmative approach to rationality, transversal hermeneutics replace universal hermeneutics as a source for rationality. Tradition and knowledge can be used (participation) only if there is critical discernment (distanciation) of that very tradition.

Transversal rationality's emphasis on interpretation and hermeneutics introduces matters of discourse and language. Schrag is confronted with postmodernity's lack of taking non-discursive dispositions and practices into consideration as exhibiting articulatory functions, and thus playing a central role in any discernment process. Non-discursive practices may be the time and space of the action, mood, desire, bodily and institutional inscriptions, power relations, etc. Transversal rationality reclaims the articulatory power of a person's nondiscursive involvements of the lifeworld because actions, desires, emotions and gestural comportment are also ways of understanding and articulating the self and the world. Schrag defines rationality in a way that accepts nondiscursive involvements of the lifeworld in terms of the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of *chronotope* (1992:83). The chronotope is the assimilated time and space of our socio-historical existence, reaching into the worlds of perception, action, desire and institutional associations. The chronotopal configuration as a time-space assimilation houses a heteroglossia of voices that speak of times and places under varying circumstances. As a plural-

ity of discourses the chronotope stays dialogical as the discourse remains linked to different contexts: scientific, legal, moral, economic, aesthetic, and religious.

Within a conjugated space-time frame of the chronotopal horizon, narrative becomes important as an element inherent to human experience and action. Schrag warns against the danger (for postmodernity) of turning narratives into another metanarrative or narratology. He finds narrative emplotment as integrating, binding together, and assimilating a multiplicity of discourses articulating knowledge. The meaning of narratives lies for Schrag in hermeneutics and communicative praxis, forcing the importance of interpretation. Interpretation is the articulation of the forms of life as they become manifest in discourse and action positioned against the background history of social and institutional practices. This forms the lifeworld that forms an integral part of interpretation, discernment and disclosure (1992:103). Disclosing is uncovering, unmasking, and opening up, a responsibility assisting in moving from reality to the lifeworld. As Schrag sees disclosure, it cannot be understood without taking into consideration the lifeworld, the perception, the non-discursive practices and actions of the person doing the disclosure. Disclosure is intimately connected to rhetoric.

Rhetoric is seen as the interweaving of discernment, deliberation and action, making disclosure possible (Schrag 1992:117). Without rhetoric, (transversal) rationality is not possible. Schrag argues for the refiguring of rhetoric into communicative rhetoric that takes into consideration the notion that rhetoric takes place within power structures that alienate and rupture, but also create and produce knowledge in a community. Rhetoric is not rule-governed but requires "good reasons" to validate claims. The knowledge generated through rhetoric is fallible and probable, and no universalization can be done with rhetoric's communicative products. Rhetoric also persuades the acceptance of local narratives through critical participation and distanciation. Schrag's rhetoric implies that the critical appropriation of tradition as discernment is never traditionless.

For Schrag, rhetoric discloses that which must be seen and heard. Agreeing with Habermas, Schrag believes that the disclosure rhetoric fosters can take place across different genres. The acceptance that the genres are different and cannot collapse into each other is important (1992:142). Schrag identifies this as a danger within postmodernism in that no appropriation of history takes place.

Transversal rationality thus operates in no specific genre and promotes interdisciplinary dialogue in many different disciplines. For Schrag, the use of the transversal metaphor

> exhibits interrelated senses of lying across, extending over, intersecting, meeting and converging without achieving coincidence. By way of complex maneuvers of borrowing and conjugation, metaphorical play and refiguration, the various disciplines make use of these interrelated senses ensconced within transversality to understand and explain geometrical space, events in nature, anatomical structures, physiological processes, human behavior, and cultural and historical configurations. It is thus that transversality, most generally construed, provides a window to the wider world of thought and action (1992:149).

Transversality has no single meaning of unity, as each discipline operates in its own field of inquiry. Transversal rationality never transcends human experience nor is it inherent to experience; it is transversal to various forms of personal and social forms of life. It operates between these various forms of life to critique, articulate and disclose them without achieving a coincidence with any particular form of discourse, thought or action. The integrity of the "otherness" of various disciplines is maintained as transversal rationality falls out as a convergence without coincidence, an interplay without synthesis, an appropriation without totalization, and an unification that allows for difference. It is thus no surprise that Schrag offers Lyotard's "translation" as a synonym for transversal reasoning. Lyotard submits that translation requires pertinences that are "transversal to languages" (Schrag 1992:153). In translating from one language to another, one needs phrase regiments and genres of discourse in the one language that has analogues in the other. This requires the discernment of pertinences that lie across the two languages, which are somehow analogous, exhibiting a "sameness-within-difference."

It is difficult to explicate Schrag's highly philosophical argument. Forming a clear understanding of transversal rationality is not an easy task. Schrag provides an example of the social contextualization of transversal reasoning that he borrows from Félix Guattari, who describes transversal rationality in a psychiatric hospital. Within this multidisciplinary setting, psychiatrists, medical doctors, nurses, social workers, chaplains, families and patients may form part of a patient care conference where all disciplines and people present discern the best care plan for the patient. A peculiar network

of groups and subgroups, types of expertise, lines of authority and con-
cerned parties need to be taken into consideration. There is also an emo-
tional "investment" (as a non-discursive practice) by the conversation part-
ners that will inform the decision making process. "The exercise of decision
making, with its multiple rationales, is transversal to the different groups and
various social roles that make up the institutional complex" (Schrag
1992:162). Each discipline plays a role in the discernment process by bring-
ing its unique contribution, thus reaching a disclosure that is in the best in-
terests of the parties involved.

Moving from this example of transversal reasoning to the pastoral care
setting is helpful in establishing a concept of transversal reasoning for pas-
toral counseling. In pastoral counseling, theological and psychological in-
sights are used as the pastoral counselor searches for disclosure through dis-
cernment. The benefits of transversal reasoning for pastoral counseling and
pastoral theology are multiple, but I would like to mention some challenges
transversal reasoning directs at pastoral counseling:

· Transversal rationality offers pastoral theology a rationality that is situ-
ated between modernity and postmodernity, accepting the challenges of a
postmodern rationality.

· Pastoral theology can move beyond the use of metanarratives and rules,
using local narratives—i.e. narratives that would make sense to the person
being counseled—and discernment processes.

· Transversal reasoning offers pastoral theology a methodology that is
truly interdisciplinary and which may be honored by many disciplines. The
methodology can also be used in intra-theological discussions, especially in
a discipline such as practical theology where Christian education, homilet-
ics and pastoral theology have diverse subject matter and orientations.

· Transversal rationality calls any specific discipline beyond its own
boundaries, not to be threatened by "the other," as transversal rationality is
inherently interdisciplinary in nature. Transversal rationality thereby invites
theology to interact with philosophy of science or psychology and to enter
dialogue with these and other disciplines.

· Transversal reasoning challenges pastoral counseling and pastoral the-
ology to consider the pastoral counselor as a rational agent within the dis-
cernment process. With its focus on non-discursive practices, transversal
reasoning accepts the challenge that people's experiences (in a lifeworld) do
influence discernment processes. Knowing without the rational agent (and
thus experience) is impossible. Within the discernment process various

theological traditions and psychological schools of thought can be used. This allows for great diversity, creativity and personal choice within the pastoral practice. Transversal reasoning offers feminist theology the opportunity to inform the pastoral practice. Eco-theology can also inform the pastoral practice by incorporating nature as an object of healing. Transversal reasoning offers liberation theology, black theology, and many other theologies the opportunity of having a central voice as these theologies inform pastoral counseling and pastoral theology. Transversal reasoning, of course, also allows for theologians such as Tillich, Barth, Bonhoeffer, and others to inform this process. The postmodern challenge to the use of metanarratives will remain regardless of the theology (and psychology) used.

· Lastly, transversal reasoning implies a back-and-forth movement between the different disciplines, so that theology may be influenced not only by the interdisciplinary activity itself, but also by the other disciplines within the interdisciplinary dialogue.

CONCLUSION

Stanton Jones, in his paper, "A Constructive Relationship for Religion with the Science and Profession of Psychology: Perhaps the Boldest Model Yet," states that whenever psychology formally interacts with theology, it has typically been in one of three classic modalities (Jones 1994:184). The three methods of interaction Jones identifies are psychology of religion, psychology supplying useful psychological information to guide the practice of pastoral care, and psychological theories used to revise, supplant, dismiss, redefine, or reinterpret established religious traditions. For Jones, all three methods are unidirectional, with psychology being unaffected in any substantive way by any interaction. None of the unidirectional interactions views theology as a peer or a partner. Jones, therefore, argues for a different relationship between psychology and theology based on mutuality and respect.

Unidirectional interaction, where one discipline informs the interdisciplinary methodology and much more, also typifies theology's interaction with psychology. Traditionally, theology informs the interdisciplinary practice of pastoral care and counseling. Two examples of unidirectional models were discussed in this essay. Unidirectional models are usually found where theology uses epistemic foundations that lie outside the inquiry of all

non-theological communities of inquiry in order to inform its methodology.

Calvin O. Schrag's model of transversal rationality breaks the unidirectional nature and interaction of theology with psychology through acceptance of the postmodern challenge. The critique of moving away from metanarratives or rational discernment is not just a critique directed at theology, but also to psychology. Within transversal rationality, with its interdisciplinary dialogue, different sciences become equal dialogue partners. This of course implies that theology can be informed by psychology and vice versa, as no single discipline has (conceptual or practical) superiority over the other. Discernment is possible, but deprived, if all available disciplines are not involved in the discernment process.

In this essay, I discussed a communicative model of rationality as a model to describe the interdisciplinary activity of pastoral counseling. It offers a model of rationality that is realistic (vs. utopian), making discernment—which is embedded in background beliefs, traditions, discursive and non-discursive involvements, and the person of the pastoral counselor—a realistic possibility. Schrag offers pastoral counseling a communicative model of rationality that locates rationality in the rational agent and not in propositions or beliefs. Regarding such a communicative model for practical theology, Richard R. Osmer states that

> Looking at rationality as a form of communication means that you do not have to say everything all at once. There is time later for further explanation and defense in response to the challenges and insights of others. Let us, then, begin a process of communication that is not intended to end here, but to be the first step in an unfolding conversation (1997:72).

Schrag's model of transversal reasoning offers many opportunities for further discussion. It challenges pastoral counseling to embrace a communicative model of rationality that accepts the challenges of postmodern philosophy (of science), moving beyond the use of metanarratives and realizing the importance of discernment within a person as a rational agent. Acknowledging that an impartial view of the models discussed in this essay is impossible, I hope this essay will elicit "further explanation and defense in response to the challenges and insights of others."

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The Aporia of Existence

DIETER U. HEINZL

KARL BARTH ARGUED THAT GOD'S INCARNATION IN JESUS CHRIST
left an indelible imprint in human history comparable to a meteor impact-
ing on the surface of the earth, leaving behind nothing but a vast crater (Barth
1922:5). It is in this crater that human beings must consequently exist. They
are able to perceive the reality of life within this *Hohlraum* below, but they
cannot conceive the edge of the chasm created by this explosion, let alone
that which lies beyond the border above. Hence, God's enfleshment in Jesus
of Nazareth occasioned for human beings a double bind: on the one hand,
human beings must live a life of real homelessness in this world; on the other
hand, they are given a promise of a coming Kingdom, where God's will will
be done on earth as it is in heaven. Thus, the existence of human beings
takes on a nomadic characteristic fueled by an eschatological or apocalyptic
longing,[1] a longing that Karl Barth identified in his second edition of *Der
Römerbrief* as the "dialectic of life,"[2] which this essay will refer to as the *apo-
ria of human existence.*

As the Word was made flesh, Jesus Christ changed human history forever
by "upsetting the balance" (Johnson 1997:1) between heaven and earth. Thus,
it becomes the task of the theologian to stand in the midst of the crater be-
low, in the aporia of human existence, reaching for the border. It is a task to

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1 "Homeless in this world, not yet at home in the next, we human beings are
wanderers between two worlds. But precisely as wanderers, we are also children
of God in Christ. The mystery of our life is *God's* mystery. Moved by Him, we
must sigh, be ashamed of ourselves, be shocked and die. Moved by Him, we may
be joyful and courageous, hope and live. *He* is the Origin. Therefore, we persist in
the movement and call: 'Hallowed be Thy name! Thy Kingdom come! Thy will
be done, on earth as it is in heaven!'" (Barth in McCormack 1995:xx).

2 "What is in view here is the common human experience of the contradic-
tory nature of human existence... " (McCormack 1995:12). McCormack evalu-
ates Barth's thought in this respect as "Dialectical Theology in the Shadow of a
Consistent Eschatology."

always "begin again at the beginning." In this situation, in which God "sets
a question mark against all truths," (Barth 1922:11) the human being is left
without a perceptible foundation on which s/he can rest securely.[3] Home-
less in a place that is no place, the human being's task of becoming really
human progresses into a journey through time that, in Barth's theology, bears
the characteristic of a "triadic pattern."[4] In the search for humanity's true
identity in the aporia of human existence, the human self is decentered as
God's work of reconciliation is ongoing and the promised day of final re-
demption has not yet dawned.

The question concerning the aporia of human existence is also the ques-
tion of the French Jewish philosopher Jacques Derrida, who will serve as a
dialogue partner for this essay to hone in on and focus the problem raised
by Karl Barth. Employing a theological method informed by Barth's theo-
logical epistemology of "critical realism,"[5] I intend to write this essay as a
"witness to the mystery of divine action in revelation" by placing the aporia
of human existence under the scrutiny of the New Testament lens of Jesus
Christ as the Coming One.

The wise saying of the Bohemian farmer of the old German folktale *Der
Ackermann aus Böhmen*, that, as soon as a human being comes or is brought
into life, this human being is at the very same time old enough to die, is true.
And although death is a particular moment for a particular individual, it is
also *the* particular moment for *each* particular other individual—the aporia
of human existence, the moment between birth and death, which is charac-
terized by doubts and perplexities concerning the impassable,[6] the incon-
ceivable passage between one place and time and another.

3 "A major feature of postmodern theology is its nonfoundationalism. A truly
nonfoundational approach will seek to abandon all appeals to presumed self-
evident, non-inferential, or incorrigible grounds for its intellectual claims"
(Johnson 1997:184).

4 This triadic pattern consists of "The beginning point [that] is always pri-
mordial, lying behind the present moment. The ending point is always
eschatological, lying on the distant horizon. The midpoint signifies the present
moment, an instant marked by God's ongoing work of reconciliation" (Johnson
1997:6).

5 "Like the Chalcedonian formula, it [critical realism] points out errors on
the right hand and on the left without giving positive expression to the truth in
the middle. And the reason is quite simply that the truth in the middle can only
be expressed by God" (McCormack 1995:464).

6 *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language*. vol. I. 101.

According to the biblical witness, Jesus Christ, the Son of "Man" and Son of God, has transcended this very moment, the aporia of human existence, and has crossed the border to the other side, thus resolving the dilemma of uncertainty and not knowing. But this does not help us as human beings in the first instance. To harbor the desire to circumvent our human predicament by abandoning the notion of aporia through moving swiftly from the Cross to the Resurrection does not provide us with relief either because the border of death still exists. The women at the empty tomb of Christ were the first ones to be confronted with this "diastatic dilemma."[7] In Mark's gospel, the women cannot conceive of the fact of Christ's resurrection and the situation which it created for them as they flee "from the tomb, for terror and amazement had seized them; and they said nothing to anyone, for they were afraid" (Mk 16:8; NRSV). When they did not find Jesus' body in the expected place, they felt "fear and great joy" (Mt 28:8) while being perplexed as they return from the tomb (Lk 24:3–4; 9). As the Greek text indicates, these women were the first "aporia-ed-ones" (Lk 24:4; *kai egeneto en to aporeisthai autas peri toutou…*) of the post-Easter-*Gemeinde* who now were confronted with a life to be lived in what Karl Barth once called *Hohlraum* (1922:35; [ET, 57]). Jesus was risen indeed. However, his resurrection neither provided clarity of mind nor heart for the human beings who remained behind. On the contrary, they were thrust into the whirlpool of intellectual and spiritual turmoil, being amazed, terrified, overjoyed and afraid, all at the same time.

It is in this place, in the aporia of human post-Easter existence, that this essay wants to linger, together with the women who emerged on Easter morning from an empty tomb into a life of incertitude. We receive initial assistance in the contemporary task of exploring the diastatic dilemma or *Hohlraum* of human existence, not in the first instance from Christian theologians (as we might expect), but from the philosophical corner of deconstruction, particularly from Jacques Derrida, whose overarching disposition has recently been associated with a profound desire for the religious, the messianic, and the prophetic.[8] Perhaps theology can gain fresh insight by

7 "A 'diastasis' is a separation that also at the same time involves a falling into place, as with a bone that is separated but without fracture. This dilemma in reference to God is 'diastatic' because it prompts us to think of God as occupying a place betwixt and between our own reality and God's reality, a 'place' that is 'no place'" (Johnson 1997:19).

8 Caputo (1997:xix) talks about deconstruction in terms of an "overarching aspiration… a religious or prophetic aspiration… a movement of 'transcen-

viewing the aporia of human existence through the spectacles of the apoca-
lyptic longing of deconstruction, a longing which in return might fuel the
fire of theology in its ultimate search: the search for the Reign of God, indeed
of Godself.[9] It will remain to be seen whether deconstruction, according to
the Jewish French philosopher Jacques Derrida's notion of the *New Arrivant*,
can provide us in this task with a hermeneutical key or if Christian theology's
flickering flame will be rekindled through deconstruction's apocalyptic long-
ing by returning us to a New Testament understanding of the *parousia* of
Jesus Christ.

Derrida shares our curiosity. He begins his reflections on the subject of
aporia with a rather enigmatic statement: "Dying—awaiting (one another
at) the 'limits of truth'" (Derrida 1993:v). How is this possible? How can one
cross the borders, or the limits, of truth? According to Derrida, the question
points one to the fact that truth is simply limited, finite and confined. In
other words, one could conclude from this statement that truth is not every-
thing, that there is something better *behind* truth. If this were the case, then
truth would be finite and finished, and so would Derrida's reflections. How-
ever, the answer is not quite as simple.

Each particular human being lives a particular life story which is com-
prised of two elements: birth and death. The narrative discourse that arises
regarding the issues of being born, dying, death and the space in between
these limits at the bottom of the crater consists of a "rhetoric of borders"
(Derrida 1993:3). The human being does not own the property rights over
the space in between birth and death, a.k.a. life, and has to be content with

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dence'… the exceeding of the stable borders of the presently possible… a pas-
sion for transgression, a passion for trespassing the horizons of possibility… a
passion to go precisely where you cannot go… hoping in a certain messianic
promise of the impossible."

9 "The incoming of deconstruction upon religion and theology, the advent of
deconstruction in theology, turns theology around to the future, to what is com-
ing, which returns theology to what it was meant to be all along, *quid quod erat
esse*, before the wilderness camp of the prophets was overrun by Eleatic
ontotheologigians, before their prophetic desert voices were drowned by an ex-
cessively Hellenistic logos…. what if… theology returns the favor and reinvents
deconstruction so that deconstruction turns out just the way of translating the
prophets, of giving prophetic passion a new turn?… Might not the invention of
the other turn out to be, in the final accounting, beyond all ontotheology, the
invention of God, the God of the invention, the expectation of the incoming of
the kingdom? Watch (out)" (Caputo 1997:115).

the fact that the right of absolute property is limited. The logical question following this assertion is: Who, then, is the master of one's life? With the notion that one's life might be governed by an other, or Other, arises the anxiety and fear that results from the loss of control, a fear that contributes to little deaths along each step of life's journey. The human being seems to always die before his or her time. Death, from the point of view of the human being, is always immature and premature because it is imminent at every instance. The threat, or simply the reality, that death can occur at any moment in one's life evokes in the human being the reaction of deference, i.e. the denial of one's mortality. The human being does not want to face up to the fact that s/he has to die.

How, then, is it possible to speak about this immature and premature situation into which the human being is locked? Contrary to common understanding, the aporia of human existence as the passage from life to death is not characterized by a single act or action like the crossing of a line, a departure or a separation, but can best be interpreted as ongoing process. "Is not death, like decease, the crossing of a border, that is, a trespassing on death [*un trépas*], an overstepping or a transgression (*transire*, 'sic transit,' etc.)?" (Derrida 1993:6) Instead of being cut off abruptly from life by death, Derrida suggests that the human being penetrates (*perao*), traverses across the border by penetrating into the *khora*, the place that is no place (*eis choran*), and in traversing by penetrating into the *khora*, s/he arrives on the other side (*eis to peran*). This crossing-over motif is not a new word play invented by the deconstructionist's mind. It is at least as old as Sophocles' "Oedipus" and appears in the Synoptic gospel traditions as well. And the questions that arise from reflection on this motif are also ancient ones: How is this crossing-over possible? Who has ever crossed the borders and, more importantly, who can testify to this crossing?

From one point of view, the crossing-over the border to the other side is not possible. The limit or boundary does not yield and refuses the human being entry; the passage is denied. However, Derrida does not think that one has to capitulate in light of this fact because the impossible passage is somehow transformed into an event of coming that opens up a passageway for the aporia of human existence. "The 'I enter,' crossing the threshold, this 'I pass' (perao) puts us on the path... of the *aporos* or of the *aporia*... the impossible passage, the refused, denied, prohibited passage,... the non-passage, which can in fact be something else, the event of a coming or of a future event.... It would be the 'coming to pass' of an event" (Derrida 1993:8). As a

result of this opening, the possibility of the impossible confronts the inter-
preter with the problem of *projection* or *protection* or, to speak in
Heideggerian terms, the problem of *task* or *shelter*. This is exactly the prob-
lematic of the border. This dilemma, however, creates tension within the
aporia of existence. At the point of crossing over the threshold, at the border
of human existence which is death, the human being does not know his or
her direction anymore. There is no more shelter that can be sought and no
more tasks that can be performed. The human being is completely exposed
and vulnerable in the face of death.

But can one speak of an "experience" of the aporia of human existence?
If it is a place that is no place, if it is a place to which the human being is
confined all his or her life, how is an experience possible that would *not* be
an experience of the aporia? There are two sides to this concept, the "double
concept of the border" (Derrida 1993:18). On the one hand, the aporia of
human existence is a door that does not open, or that can be only unlocked
by a secret. On the other hand, it is a non-passage that has no limits and no
borders. In the latter case, then, there were no borders to be crossed, and
even the transgression would be subject to sublation. If the aporia of human
existence constitutes a non-passage without borders, the possibility of jour-
neying down a path such as this is obliterated: there is no more process of
moving from one place and time across the border into another. There is no
more "… trans- (transport, transgression, translation, and even transcen-
dence) (21). There is no more passageway, no more method. Like a pilgrim
in a barren land, the human being is confronted by his or her own death
without a center or foundation upon which s/he can stand, and the inquiry
concerning his or her own death becomes, at best, difficult to answer.

To be sure, the human being is challenged by the impinging and recur-
ring questioning about his or her own personal, individual death as *my death*.
As such, *my death* is wedged as a *hapax legomenon* between the particular
moment of the individual, and *the* particular moment of each particular other
individual. *My death* bears the possibility to become everybody's death. "My
death [is certainly said] one time each time, indefinitely only one time"
(Derrida 1993:22). An inherent trait of this possibility, according to Derrida,
consists in the strange and unsettling notion that at every border of the
aporia of human existence, there is a light that flashes like a "nightwatchman
or nightlight" (24). This light that flashes at the border in the waning mo-
ments of one's biological life, a *bios* lodged in *cronos*, is the light of death,
which demarcates the threshold of the crossing-over or transgression.

However, the death of the human being, of *Dasein* (to use Heidegger's terminology), is not the end. It simply provides a border which exists at the *limes* of the aporia of human existence through which the human being journeys like a nomad moving among the desert sands of one's life, never at any point sure of the direction which s/he is about to take.[10] When the human being embarks on this ancient road, traveling toward the ultimate border of dying and death, s/he perishes as his or her life is ebbing away in the process of the closing in of the line that was invisibly drawn in this desert sand. This passage that appears to be a non-passage in the end is a secret, a mystery buried underneath the dunes of time, which is yet to be un-covered and re-covered;[11] not through inquiry into the noetic or the ontic, but substantiated by an apocalyptic longing because what is to be expected in the moment of crossing-over cannot be subject to knowledge. Perhaps there is nothing that comes to pass in this passage.

Driven by his apocalyptic longing, Derrida, however, is quick to point out that, in his opinion, there must be more to the crossing-over of the threshold than nothing, more than a movement into sheer nothingness. If a passageway over onto the other side exists, there must also be *something* on this other side. This something Derrida names the "*New Arrivant*" (Derrida 1993:30).

It is interesting to note that this *New Arrivant*, which Derrida conjures up, signifies the neutrality of that which arrives and characterizes the singularity of the one *who* arrives. Thus, the encounter with the one who arrives, and arrives unexpectedly, becomes a personal and individual one. The

10 "Isn't the desert a paradoxical figure of the aporia? No [*pas de*] marked out [*tracé*] or assured passage, no route in any case; at the very most trails that are not reliable ways, the paths are not yet cleared [*frayés*], unless the sand has already re-covered them. But isn't the uncleared way also the condition of *decision* or *event*, which consists in opening the way, in (sur)passing, thus in going beyond?" (Coward and Foshay 1992:299).

11 "How can a path pass through the aporias? What would a path be without aporia? Would there be a way [*voie*] without what clears the way there where the way is not opened, whether it is blocked or still buried in the nonway?" (Coward and Foshay 1992:320).

"… the death of *Dasein*… is the limit of the *ending*, the place where, in a way, the ending ends" (Derrida 1992:30).

apocalyptic longing for the encounter with the *New Arrivant*, the one who is other, appears to be another significant element of deconstruction.[12] Furthermore, this event, the arrival and the encounter with the *New Arrivant*, impacts the very perception and experience of the threshold. There is light, not only at the border as watch-light, but also on the other side. This light invites, calls, gives a name, and shows forth a promise. It is a light that proclaims the arrival, not of any but of the "arrivant par excellence,... absolute arrivant" (Derrida 1993:34). The *absolute arrivant* neither has a place, nor a language, nor a home. The one who arrives in singularity is yet to be identified by the one who will be hosting it; and thus, calls everything prior to its arrival radically into question. "He [the new arrivant] surprises the host [the human being]... enough to call into question, to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity.... The absolute *arrivant* does not yet have a name or an identity" (34). What lies behind the border, after the crossing-over of the threshold, on the other side is already in the coming toward the human being and can only be identified as it makes itself known to the human being.

The *New Arrivant* might not have an identity yet which is disclosed to the human being, but it is also not an intruder or a stranger, not someone who violates the human being through an act of aggression. On the contrary, the *new* and *absolute arrivant* will assist the human being in realizing his or her full potential, a potential of which s/he is not able to speak prior to the arrival or the coming of it. "It [the new arrivant] makes possible everything to which... it cannot be reduced, starting with the humanity of man..." (Derrida 1993:35).

Hence, the human being is also incapable of uttering any truth concerning that which lies beyond the border. Although the human being knows that death awaits at the crossing-over of the threshold, death as such remains concealed to life as such and to speech as such. This is the aporia of human existence, the "Dying—awaiting (one another at) the 'limits of truth'" (Derrida 1993: title page).

The waiting for one another at the limits of truth invariably happens on this side of the threshold, since the human being cannot cross over from the aporia of the this-worldly experience to the beyond. Thus, the aporia of human existence remains always here, on this side, in any case. There is no

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12 Deconstruction means "... to prepare oneself for this coming (*venue*) of the other..." (Caputo 1997:73).

exception. Death, then, becomes for Derrida *the* human possibility par excellence. If this is true, then the "... being-possible is the being proper to *Dasein*, then the existential analysis of the death of *Dasein* will have to make of this possibility its theme.... [which becomes the essential impossible possibility for] with death, *Dasein* has a rendezvous with itself" (1993: 63–6). Ultimately, however, death must remain undisclosed to the human being. Its border cannot be crossed and communication with that which lies beyond the border is impossible from this side. Death is not so much an insurmountable wall that forbids one entry, as if it were a mist or fog which cannot be penetrated by the eye of the human being. It is the undiscovered country that lies hidden in its reality, that is veiled in its unveiling. This death, which awaits the human being at the limits of the aporia of his or her life (-time) must in any case be faced as *my death*.

Thus, death must always remain a mystery as the sign of "irreplaceable singularity" (74). Even the *New Arrivant*, who is coming toward the human being from the other side of the border and who is about to illumine and bestow real identity onto the human being, will fail to un-cover and re-cover this mystery of the aporia of human existence. For it is only in the anticipation and expectation of the coming, the *Viens*, as in Revelation's 22:20 "Come, Lord Jesus!" that the apocalyptic and messianic longing finds its realization. The *New Arrivant*, the messiah, is never actually supposed to arrive. "If the Messiah actually showed up... that would ruin everything. The very idea of the Messiah is that he is to come, *a venir*,... not that he would ever actually arrive" (Caputo 1997:74–8). Derrida is neither interested in any incarnation of this arrivant par excellence nor in his or her *parousia* because, as he is convinced, the *Viens* of the apocalyptic longing has no correlation in human history. Thus, the notion of a *New Arrivant*, who flashes like a night light at the crossing-over of the threshold onto the other side, becomes nothing other than the continuation of Derrida's deconstructive endless play of meaning(s). The actual arrival of the absolute arrivant is never expected to become historical reality, there is no *New Arrivant* in the flesh, no Messiah, no God-Human Being. Deconstruction's, and in particular Derrida's, understanding of this figure bears no characteristic of a Reconciler or Redeemer in the Judeo-Christian sense at all. Rather, this mysterious entity, without name and identity, resembles more a play-maker who keeps the deconstructionist wrecking-ball in the game of philosophical and theological discourse. And this, perhaps, might just be the intention of Derrida's deconstruction in order to rekindle and fuel the fire of the apocalyptic long-

ing of Judeo-Christian theology that appears to have lain dormant for a long time.

The German scholar Knittermeyer describes the term *aporia* (*Aporie*) in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* as "*Weglosigkeit, Verlegenheit, Ratlosigkeit.*" (1957:496). It characterizes a situation where there is no path anymore, where one is confused and embarrassed about not knowing; thus, one is being thrown into perplexity and utter helplessness by the *uncomfortable disturbance* (*unbequeme Störung*) caused by the aporia of human existence. No path, no crossing-over of the threshold, no awaiting one another at the limits of truth, of the limits of a life (-time). And although the *prayers and tears* of the French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida cannot penetrate the veil of dying and death, they can remind Judeo-Christian theology that the passageway through the aporia of human existence, permeating the border of dying and death, leads exactly through the valley of prayers and tears (Ps 23:4).

To be sure, this passageway through the valley of prayers and tears is no ordinary one. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the prayers that human beings utter and the tears that they shed are not merely expressions of human emotions regarding the aporia of their existence. For Jews, they are transformed into the prayers and tears of God through the prophets of the Hebrew scriptures, and for Christians, they are identified with the tears and bloody sweat of Jesus of Nazareth in the Garden of Gethsemane (Pelikan 1961:50). Perhaps Derrida wants to refer back to this rudimentary understanding of human existence, and perhaps Judeo-Christian theology would do well to take heed to his apocalyptic longing filled with the prayers and tears of old.

Regardless whether Jewish theology listens in on the words of the prophetic discourses of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos and Hosea, or Christian theology to the parables of Jesus Christ and the preaching of Peter and Paul: The theologians of both traditions are called upon to listen to the word of God, which does not provide them with a way around the fear of the valley of the shadow of death, but a way through this valley of death in order to find the good path of life in God (Pelikan 1961:50). Indeed, the apocalyptic longing concerning the threshold of the aporia of human existence is not a phenomenon conjured up by the intellectual elite of the outgoing twentieth century but its ripples reverberate through chronological time, as the reflections of the early church father Cyprian demonstrate, who wrote: "We pass by death to immortality nor can eternal life succeed unless it has be-

fallen us to depart from here. This is *not an end, but a passage*, and, the journey of time being *traversed*, a *crossing over* to eternity" (Pelikan 1961:60; emphasis added).

At this bifurcation, we must depart from Jewish theology and leave it to wrestle with Derrida's questions concerning the *New Arrivant* and his understanding of the messiah[13] as we turn our attention to the questions of Christian theology. Borrowing once more from Jacques Derrida's terminology, the border at the limits of truth of life (-time) needs a nightwatchperson who illumines the *limes* between life and death. For the Christian, the light in the night of the aporia of human existence presents itself as a shadow, the shadow of the cross of Jesus Christ at Golgotha that thrusts humanity into the place that is no place. This *uncomfortable disturbance* proves to be more powerful than any meteor physically impacting on earth's surface, a disturbance that Karl Barth once identified as the *Great Disturbance, Die Große Störung*, in human history in his *Römerbrief* (1922:447). It is in this place that the human being lives in fear and trembling, ravaged by nations in distress and tossed back and forth by the waves of the roaring sea (Lk 21:25). Exactly through this place the human being must traverse, crossing the threshold of death into the unknown territory in prayerful and tearful anticipation, trusting that there is not only a shadow on this side of the Resurrection, but that the True Light is to be found on the other side. Into this country the Christian, and with him or her all humanity, must venture in order to find the good path, which is the way, the truth and the life.

Although the New Testament remains silent about the crossing of the border at the limits of truth—there is absolute silence about Jesus' thirty-six hours in the tomb, "… the silence of irreparable rupture; those 36 hours of historical reality when a decomposing corpse was all that remained of Jesus, Son of David, Son of God…" (Lewis 1986:336–62)—it permits a fleeting glimpse at the light that flashes on the other side (Lk 24:1–9). When the women came to the tomb on the first day of the week, they found the stone that had sealed off the secret of Holy Saturday rolled away from the entrance. Here, God allows the human being in his or her aporia of existence entry into the mist looming beyond the border after Jesus' death and resurrection. The entry into the place of death changes their perception of the event of

13 However, the dialogue between Jewish and Christian theologians regarding Derrida's questions would prove, in my opinion, to be a most fruitful one in the future.

death, about which no one can speak, forever. They expected Jesus' body lain in the cold grave, but there was no body to be found once they had entered. Humanity exchanged one place of aporia for another, for when the women saw the empty tomb, they were in a state of being perplexed, i.e. "aporia-ed ones." The pre-Easter aporia of human existence has been exchanged for the post-Easter one. Thus, the crossing-over of the threshold at the limits of truth or life (-time) is a truly diastatic dilemma, for it appears to not be re-solved on either side of the Resurrection.

But although the women at and in the tomb experience an emotional roller-coaster ride between terror, fear, joy, amazement and perplexity, they are also permitted to watch the dark cloud—that shadow cast by the cross over the aporia of human existence—move aside and glimpse at the new reality ushered in through this earthshaking event; an event that illumined all other events of history and rendered them intelligible (Niebuhr 1941:68). God's angels, arrayed in dazzling clothes, described the new reality beyond the border to them: "Why do you look for the living among the dead? He is not here, but has risen. Remember how he told you, while he was still in Galilee, that the Son of Man must be handed over to sinners, and to be crucified, and on the third day to rise again" (Lk 24:5b-7). Thus, this new re-ality beyond the border is always veiled in its unveiling. Throughout the scriptures, the coming of the new reality had been foreshadowed: First through Moses, who, as he came down the Mount of Sinai with the two tab-lets of the covenant with God in his hand, did not know that the skin of his face shone because he had been talking with God (Ex 34:29–35). Then, through Jesus Christ's metamorphosis on the Mount of Transfiguration, when his clothes became dazzling white, such as no one on earth could bleach them (Mk 9:1–8). And finally, it was proclaimed by the angels at the tomb who were arrayed in dazzling clothes. As the human face must remain veiled in God's presence, God's presence nevertheless shines forth in unimagin-able glory, piercing every corner of the night by setting a beacon at the bor-der of the crossing-over of the threshold, blinding human eyes.

The unknown territory that is so frightening from this side of the thresh-old is empty. Instead of death, through which humanity must pass, there is the good path of life that is to be found through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. All of a sudden, after having seen the new reality with their own eyes, the women, blinded as they were, recalled that Christ had spoken to them about this new reality earlier. And as they returned from the tomb to the apo-ria of their human existence under the shadow of the cross, they brought the

light from the other side of the border with them, remembering and telling the eleven and all the rest that Jesus Christ had indeed crushed death. The nadir of death through which humanity had to pass with Christ lies behind the valley of the shadow of death and is in the process of being lifted up on the other side through the Coming One (Pelikan 1961:13). Here, Christian theologians must utter a definitive and affirmative statement regarding the arrival of the Coming One in history in response to Derrida's notion that all would be spoiled were the *New Arrivant*, the messiah, actually to arrive. Yes, indeed the Coming One, the Messiah, Jesus of Nazareth, has truly and really arrived in history for, with, in and among human beings!

Karl Barth described this event as the threefold coming again of Jesus Christ (CD, IV/3:290–6). For Barth, the Easter event is the pivotal moment in history in which Jesus Christ is revealed as the One who was, is, and will be the same, yesterday, today, and forever (Heb 13:8). He is the light, to paraphrase Barth in Derridean language, who shines into the world as a nightlight at the crossing-over of the threshold from beyond and who will never be extinguished. This parousia of Jesus Christ consists of the "effective presence" of God, who manifests Godself in the covenant with human beings. What was once veiled is now unveiled in the carpenter from Galilee, who was born, who lived, who died, and who will come again. Barth understands this unfolding of the divine drama in history to be "one continuous event" that is acted out in a threefold way. The first mode consists of the "Easter event" itself.[14] The second mode pertains to the outpouring of Christ's spirit, His return in the Holy Spirit as the mode of His Pentecostal coming. And the final mode, which will seal the continuous event of Christ's coming in history, belongs to that day that has been promised from of old when all things will be made new. Just as Barth affirms that the three persons of the Godhead are one and distinct at the same time, he interprets the threefold coming of Christ as one event, *parousia*, which is acted out in three distinct modes: resurrection, outpouring of the spirit, and coming again, all of which are characterized by their eschatological reality. "The happening of the *parousia* is thus eschatological throughout its course" (CD IV/3:290–6).

However, in the meantime, in the midst of the eschatological reality of Christ's having come, coming, and coming again, humanity is destined to

14 Barth (CD IV/3:290–296) writes: "... so that we might be tempted to describe the whole event simply as one long fulfillment of the resurrection of Jesus Christ."

live in a place that is no place called world, where rain still falls on the just and the unjust alike. Trapped in the aporia of human existence, the human being is allowed to behold one faint beacon of grace and hope that flashes at the border between life and death, at the limit of truth or life (-time). This beacon, Jesus Christ the Coming one, can shine at the limits of truth because he himself is the Truth. Behold the glory of God! Under the shadow of the cross, all truth is thrust into no place. However, in the reality of the light that shines in the night of the aporia of human existence, these same truths fade into nothingness as they are left behind at the border of death. Christian theology's *New Arrivant*, who is also its Reconciler and Redeemer, who comes to humanity from beyond the border to give human beings their true identity, the one who calls humanity by its name, has a name of his own: as Christian theologians we call him Lord, Jesus Christ, Son of God, Savior. He is the Coming one, *o erchomenos*, whose Advent, whose coming toward us, will shatter all final borders, limits and thresholds. This event, too, is veiled in its unveiling, as the One whom we call Jesus Christ is the only One who knows his true and real name (Rev 19:11–16). It is a reality in which one does not have to wonder why the women at the tomb where struck with terror, fear and amazement.

Ultimately, however, the new reality that is ushered in by the *parousia* of the Coming One is no secret, no mystery, as Paul wrote to the Corinthians almost two-thousand years ago: "For it is God who said: 'Let light shine out of darkness,' who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the day of glory of God in Jesus Christ… We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed (aporia-ed ones—*aporoumenoi*), but not driven to despair;… always carrying in the body the death of Jesus… For while we live, we are always being given up to death for Jesus' sake, so that the life of Jesus may be made visible in our mortal flesh" (2 Cor 4:6–11). Jesus Christ, the *Great Disturbance* of history, illumines with his blinding light the aporia of human existence as the New Arrivant who truly and really arrives and who will return humanity again to the place that is its home, and restore its identity that is lost on this side of the limits of truth and life (-time). The Coming One reminds humanity that this place is no place but has a name. Its name is God.

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To Teach As the Evangelists Did?

An Experiment in New Testament Theology

REID BLACKMER LOCKLIN

INTRODUCTION

LET THE FAITHFUL LABOR AND COLLABORATE WITH ALL OTHERS IN THE proper regulation of the affairs of economic and social life. With special care, let them devote themselves to the education of children and young people by means of different kinds of schools. These schools should be considered not only as an outstanding means for forming and developing Christian youth, but also as a service of supreme value to humankind, especially in the developing nations, a service elevating the level of human dignity, and preparing the way for living conditions which are more humane (*Ad gentes* [Vatican II Decree on Missionary Activity in the Church]:par. 12).

The Church's involvement in the field of education is demonstrated especially by the Catholic school. No less than other schools does the Catholic school pursue cultural goals and the natural development of youth. But it has several distinctive purposes. It aims to create for the school community an atmosphere enlivened by the gospel spirit of freedom and charity. It aims to help the adolescent in such a way that the development of his or her own personality will be matched by the growth of that new creation which he or she became by baptism. It strives to relate all human culture eventually to the news of salvation, so that the light of faith will illumine the knowledge which students gradually gain of the world, of life, and of humankind (*Gravissimum educationis* [Vatican II Declaration on Christian Education]:par. 8).[1]

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1 Translations of the documents of the Second Vatican Council have been adapted from Abbott (1966). They have been modified to render them in inclusive language.

The above documents from the Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church offer a portrait of the Catholic school as a privileged place wherein two central Christian interests converge: the proclamation of the gospel and service to humankind. By implication the bishops of the Council viewed such schools as a response not only to social needs but also to the missionary mandate given by Jesus to the church. That is, they seem to postulate a mission directed specifically to education, distinct from either "straightforward" preaching of the gospel message or "straightforward" service on behalf of the community—an "educational mission" at the intersection of evangelism and social concern. The American bishops' first pastoral letter devoted entirely to Christian education, entitled *To Teach as Jesus Did* (hereafter *TJD*), makes this connection explicit: "Within both the Christian community and the educational ministry the mission to teach as Jesus did is a dynamic mandate for Christians of all times, places, and conditions" (par. 4).[2] Whereas the Council documents do not invoke scripture in their discussion of Catholic schools—instead relying on the familiar church and world language from *Gaudium et spes*—the American bishops appeal to Jn 14:5–7 ("I am the way, and the truth, and the life...") to justify the mission and to three further texts to lend it a distinctive shape. They define this shape under the rubrics message (Jn 12:49–50), community (Jn 13:34–35), and service in the world (Jn 13:13–15; *TJD*:par. 5, 15, 21, 27). These texts are quoted without commentary or context, as though they provide a self-evident basis for the proposed shape of Catholic education. Those familiar with contemporary biblical scholarship on the Fourth Gospel might find this ironic. On the one hand, the Gospel of John, unlike other NT voices such as Luke-Acts, does not possess an entirely unambiguous missionary mandate for its disciples (see Köstenberger 1998:5–16); on the other, its polemical language likely reveals a community more isolated from "the world" than any other represented in the NT (see, e.g., Culpepper 1975:288–9). From both observations, an "educational mission" for Catholic or other Christian schools with full liberal arts curricula and religiously diverse student bodies appears remote from the author's perspective. When viewed in the broader context of John's thought, the quoted texts may well be unable to support the weight that the bishops wish to place upon them.

This criticism, however, need not mean that NT authors have nothing to offer such a hypothesized "educational mission." In this study, I explore pos-

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2 This letter is published in Connell (1996:79-116).

sible resources for Christian education as an aspect of missionary activity in the Gospel of John and the Acts of the Apostles. I proceed in three steps. First, by appealing to recent sociocultural and narrative studies of the two books, I establish the relevance of these texts to the task of education. Second, through a comparison of key passages from the farewell discourse of John and from the first five chapters of Acts, I discern major themes pertinent to identity, mission, and community in each evangelist's social and literary world. Finally, I offer some reflections on the theological significance of Luke and John for a Catholic or other Christian "educational mission" by returning to the American bishops' statement. Throughout, my emphasis will fall not on Jesus as a "model educator,"[3] but rather on the evangelists as "model educators" of the communities to which they wrote.[4] In the course of this analysis, comprising theoretical background, exegetical interpretation, and practical application, I will attempt to explore what it might mean to "teach as the evangelists taught." Before proceeding, however, two brief notes are necessary.

First, a note on method. The question of how best to appropriate and use biblical texts for the purposes of theology and ethics has become a thorny issue in contemporary scholarship; indeed, entire monographs and whole panels at the American Academy of Religion address this question exclusively, yet no clear consensus seems likely to emerge. On one side of the spectrum, theologians frequently find themselves indicted for "proof-texting," citing isolated passages in the course of an argument without any attention to literary or historical context. On the other side, theologians sometimes grow impatient with an actual or imagined unwillingness on the part of biblical scholars to move outside the narrative sequence or historical context of a given text. How then to proceed? I attempt below, particularly in the central exegetical portion of the essay, to steer a middle course, moving fluidly between the two evangelists' texts, painting first in broad strokes and then more carefully at the level of short passages selected in accord with a given theme. Biblical scholars might find this back and forth movement disorient-

3 For studies of this type, see Sawicki (1988:esp. 41-68), the intriguing discussion of the "School of Jesus" in Culpepper (1975:215-46), and further references in Pazmiño (1988:32-4).

4 For the purposes of this study, I use "Luke" and "John" to refer to the authors and/or redactors who placed Luke-Acts and the Fourth Gospel in their final forms.

ing and may further ask whether the questions I pose condition the answers that I receive. Theologians, on the other hand, may find the attention to relevant terms and images within their narrative contexts distracting or even unnecessary to the argument of the piece. I can only answer that the potential gain of such a method outweighs, in my judgment, the potential liabilities incurred therefrom. Through this treatment, attentive to each passage's discrete contribution to our reflections without thereby losing sight of its relationship to the whole, I hope to "break open" the evangelists' texts without doing violence to them.

Next, a personal note. As a Roman Catholic Christian with some professional experience in both Catholic mission and secular teaching environments in the United States, I naturally perceive my investigation primarily within a context particular not only to Roman Catholicism but also more specifically to the American Church. At the same time, I hope that its consequences will extend beyond narrow denominational or regional interests. I must leave it to readers to make appropriate applications to their own contexts.

These points having been acknowledged, we are ready to turn to the two figures and texts who will function as models for the church's "educational mission," as hypothesized by the bishops. Who are these educators, and how do they proceed?

DOCUMENTS THAT EDUCATE: JOHN AND LUKE-ACTS IN SOCIOCULTURAL AND NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE

At first glance, John and Luke-Acts seem to have little in common. In his study of the Johannine community, for example, Raymond Brown notes sharp differences between John and the synoptics in both christology and ecclesiology (1979:85–8). Behind the immediate and obvious differences, however, may lie common strands. In the early seventies Oscar Cullmann proposed a historical connection between the Hellenists recorded in Acts 6:1 ff. and the Johannine community, both with common roots in a "heterodox Judaism" opposed to the Jerusalem temple (1975:41–56). In a more recent article C. K. Barrett refutes the specific details of Cullmann's historical hypothesis (1996:164–9). At the same time, he proposes several areas in which the two works as literary products do show considerable affinity. First, both diminish the "futurist" eschatological expectation characteristic of other

NT writers: while John moves the eschatological future into the present, Luke places it in the distant future (169). Second, both portray a witnessing community empowered by the Holy Spirit after Jesus' departure (170–3). Finally, despite their striking differences in christology, these two evangelists share the image of Jesus' ascending or being "lifted up" in or shortly after the passion, and both generally lack sacrificial interpretations of this event (174–6).[5] For both, salvation moves from the eschatological end of time into the present reality of believers (cf. Culpepper 1983:87–9; Powell 1989:80–1). All of these characteristics highlight the role of the communities that received these texts. Cullmann offers the following summary:

> In each individual event of the life of the *incarnate* Jesus the evangelist [John] seeks to show that *at the same time* the *Christ present in his church* is already at work. Thus from each narrative he draws out the line leading to the risen Christ who is at work in every activity of his community. ... Luke [on the other hand] maintains a perspective of *chronological* sequence and therefore takes another course: the *first volume* of his work tells of the work accomplished by the 'historical' Jesus, the *second* of what he continues through his disciples (1975:14).

For the purposes of this essay, it is enough to assert that both Luke and John reveal an explicit concern both for their respective communities' continuity with Jesus and for their continued survival into an indeterminate future. This seems logically to entail the need for some form of education or social transmission. Two strands of biblical scholarship—sociocultural analysis and narrative criticism—offer further insight into this dimension of the evangelists' work.

Sociocultural Analysis: The "Why" of Education

Some recent scholarship on the NT, led by such figures as Wayne Meeks (1972), John Gager (1975), and Howard Clark Kee (1995), has focused on the relation between the historical communities that created the gospels and the "symbolic universes" that sustained those communities' social structures (see esp. Kee 1995:9–13). A first insight for this kind of analysis arises from the sociology of knowledge, according to which "language itself, as well as what it communicates, is the product of a sociocultural group that shares a

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5 Exceptions to the latter occur in Acts 20:28 and Jn 1:29, 36.

world of perceptions, convictions, understandings, and modes of expression" (Kee 1995:2). For early Christian self-understanding, such "worlds of perceptions" turned uniquely on a community's image of Jesus (227). A second insight arises from sociological and anthropological study of millenarian sects. In relation to the broader Greco-Roman world and first-century Judaism, according to John Gager, early Christianity may be viewed as such a sectarian movement or movements involved in the creation of new "social worlds" for new religious communities (1975:9–12; cf. Brown 1979:14–5). All of these communities—located socially among the Greco-Roman urban populace—shared to some degree a situation of "relative deprivation" in relation to the rest of the social order (Gager 1975:94–6, 106–8). As a result, in their literature they envisioned worlds which reduced status distinctions among their members and reversed insider/outsider distinctions from their environment (27–35). These worlds both reflected their social reality and postulated new ones. In the terms formulated by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, they provided both models *of* and models *for* the community's lived experience (1973:92–3; cf. Gager 1975:9).

For Luke and John, important differences in language suggest that their communities faced different tensions and asked different questions. The highly charged polemics of the Fourth Gospel against "the Jews" and "the world," as well as its several references to expulsion as a consequence of confessing Christ (9:22; 12:42; 16:2), suggest separation from and persecution by Jewish synagogues as a dominant element of its community setting (Rensberger 1988:25–6; cf. Culpepper 1983:211–2; Brown 1979:22–4, 110–20; Perkins 1990:945–6). In the text of John's Gospel, this dynamic reveals itself through a persistent demand for full confession and rejection of all alternate beliefs, as well as restrictive baptism and Eucharist for creating and reinforcing clear social boundaries (Rensberger 1988:59–61, 64–86). The Fourth Gospel offers a model of a community "deeply embattled and oppressed" by outside forces (Segovia 1991a:307). Similarly, Luke's polemic against "the Jews" and portrayals of persecution suggest a conflict. Yet Philip Esler argues that this involved psychological discomfort rather than violent confrontation (1987:46–51). As a community composed primarily of Jews and Gentile "god-fearers" converted to Christianity, the movement's rejection by the Jews and subsequent separation from the synagogue raised questions about its legitimacy (42–5, 54–7). In the face of such questions, Luke sets out to prove that Christianity is *the* legitimate heir of "Jewish ancestral roots" through construction of a symbolic universe that builds the Jewish

past into the present and future of the community (16–9). Whereas John's "introversionist" sect turns inward, Luke's "conversionist" sect emphasizes continuity and expansion (59–65; cf. Rensberger 1988:27), employing table fellowship to unite Jews and Gentiles, rich and poor, across the divisions that threaten the community (Esler 1987:105–9). Whether facing a literal expulsion from synagogues or the more subtle questions posed by Jewish rejection of Jesus, both Luke and John thus create models *of* the realities that they confront in order to respond to them.

These responses, however, do not rest content with such appropriations and comforting re-interpretations of the communities' historical contexts. Both evangelists also draw upon the diverse Jewish and Hellenistic resources at their disposal to present bold new visions for participation in the new people of God (Kee 1995:44–59). Kee traces Luke's "model *for*" reality in two phases. First, in the Gospel, Luke presents Jesus as both "founded in the traditions and institutions of Israel" and as the one who uniquely extends the claims of that tradition and its covenant beyond its "traditional" boundaries to the socially outcast (1995:187–90). In Acts this movement beyond boundaries transforms into a geographic expansion of the Christian community, first in Jerusalem (1:1–11:18) and then through initial (11:19–14:28) and subsequent (16:1–20:35) missions into climactic confrontations not only with its own Jewish and Gentile identity (ch. 15) but also with both Jewish and Gentile law (20:36–28:31; Kee 1995:192–207; 1990:42–69; cf. Conzelmann 1987:xlv–xlviii). Whereas in Acts the constitution of God's new covenant community proceeds geographically, Kee traces in John's Gospel a more subtle and progressive revelation of God's *logos* in Jesus, comprising both Jesus' own union with God and the full participation in life offered to the members of his community (1995:161–70; cf. Minear 1993:142–56). "To reject Jesus and his word is to reject God and his purpose, and thereby to forego participation in eternal life (12:44–50). The theme that Jesus alone provides access to God is given its basic formulation in John 14:6: 'I am the way, the truth, and the life'" (Kee 1995:169). Members are called into intimate "mystical" communion and unity with this way, truth, and life— indeed, with the foundation of created reality itself. Like Luke, John offers an invitation into this new people of God as a model *for* his community's lived experience. Yet for both evangelists the effectiveness of these offers in their communities naturally depend largely upon the effectiveness with which they are communicated. We turn now to some strategies employed in pursuit of this goal.

Narrative Criticism: The "How" of Education

Thus far we have occupied ourselves with the gospels in their function as documents addressed to social needs. In the face of conflict or rejection, the "symbolic universes" presented therein serve to confirm and influence the shared perceptions and understandings of the communities to which they were written. But the evangelists accomplished these goals by setting their work in narrative form. Recent discussion around both John and Luke-Acts has turned on the genre of the works in comparison to other Greco-Roman narrative forms, such as ancient biography, Greek novel, or historiography.[6] While John may more closely resemble the biography and Luke-Acts (particularly Acts) the novel, both genres served a similar didactic function in the ancient world as "religious propaganda" for their authors' views (Kee 1995:51, 85; cf. Aune 1987:59–63; Tolbert 1989:60–1). John and Acts, moreover, stand out in this regard. In comparison to the more episodic form of the synoptic gospels, both John and Acts reveal a tighter structure and greater evidence of a deliberate order of presentation: a "plot" in which each event relates to the others and moves the story towards its conclusion (Culpepper 1983:86–9; Tannehill 1990:5–7).[7] In this regard they resemble ancient and contemporary works of fiction. Narrative criticism on these works reveals how the "implied authors" or narrators use the plot and literary devices such as irony to draw the "implied audience" into the world created by the narrative (Culpepper 1983:4–5).

In the discussion of "social worlds" above, certain elements of plot have already come to light, notably the expansion of the people of God beyond "traditionalist" social or geographical bounds in Luke-Acts and the progressive revelation of the divine *logos* in John. In the case of Luke-Acts, a deeper ground of unity for the two volumes lies in the universal "purpose" or "plan of God" which drives Jesus' mission in his lifetime and is carried forward by the community that follows him (see Lk 2:30–32; 3:6; 24:47–49; Acts 1:8;

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6 For recent contributions to the conversation concerning the genre of the gospels (including Luke-Acts as a single unit), see Aune (1987:46-76); Tolbert (1989:35-79); Balch (1990); Powell (1991:9-13); Segovia (1991b:47-9); Burridge (1992); and Cancik (1997).

7 It seems reasonable to suppose that Luke may have had less dependence on prior traditions (such as Mark and Q) in his construction of Acts, which gave him greater freedom to shape the narrative. On the possible relationship between journeys in the plot of John and the synoptics, see Segovia (1992:535-41).

26:22–23; Powell 1991:38–42; Ray 1996:28–31; Tannehill 1990:7). The phrase "it is necessary" occurs frequently to underscore this purpose. In addition, while the prophecies of scripture and of diverse characters within the narrative set the stage for subsequent developments (Ray 1996:69–72), the initial acceptance and subsequent rejection of God's plan by the Jews also provide dramatic conflict and portray a "typical" Jewish response for the implied audience (104–6). These motifs combine in an engaging account that answers the uncomfortable realities of a crucified Messiah and unbelieving Jews in terms of the one purpose of God for the whole world (Ray 1996:128–9). In the case of John, the gospel narrative also possesses a plot with a definite purpose: to reveal the Father (1:18) and, through this revelation, to remove the sin of the world (3:28; Culpepper 1983:87–9). This goal unfolds as the narrative proceeds toward the "hour"—both future and present—when Jesus is "glorified" (12:23; 13:1;17:1; cf. 1:14; 2:4; 4:23; 5:28) by being "lifted up" or "exalted" in his passion (3:14; 8:28; 12:32; cf. O'Day 1986:111–2). From its beginning in signs and testimony (e.g., 5:36), increasing levels of conflict with "the Jews" (ch. 1–8), and an "interpretive interlude" (ch. 9–10), Jesus' public ministry culminates in the resurrection of Lazarus from the dead (11:1–44) and the events leading up to the crucifixion (11:45–12:50).[8] The narrative "slows down" noticeably as it approaches this final "glorification" of the Son. Jesus prepares his disciples for this event (ch. 13–17) and then finally completes his work and returns in fact if not in appearance to the Father from whom he had come (ch. 18–21).[9] Like Jesus himself, the narrative of the gospel draws the implied reader into this moment of revelation, dividing all people—past, present, and future—into those who "have the light of life" through belief in Jesus and those "who walk in darkness" through their corresponding unbelief (8:12; see Culpepper 1983:234).

Both John's dramatic revelation of the Son and Luke's motif of prophecy and fulfillment also employ irony to achieve their rhetorical goals. John, by announcing the divine identity and incarnation of the *logos* in the prologue, creates a stable "double context" comprising "higher" and "lower" understandings (Fredriksen 1988:20–3; Culpepper 1983:166–8; Brodie

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8 This account of the plot of the gospel follows Culpepper (1983:89-97) and accords closely with Fredriksen (1988:23-4). For alternatives in comparison with Greco-Roman biography and the life of the individual believer, see Segovia (1991b:535-41) and Brodie (1993:31-50).

9 But see 20:24-29.

1993:17–9).[10] Throughout the narrative, characters such as "the Jews," Nicodemus, and even the disciples persistently misunderstand Jesus' words and actions because they cannot ascend to this higher level. In addition to moving the plot forward, these ironic misperceptions invite the implied reader—who presumably already shares many values with the implied author and who, in any case, has been prepared by the prologue—to identify with the view of the implied author against the victim of the irony (Culpepper 1983:177–80, 199–202). Whereas for John this irony turns on the identity of Jesus, for Luke it turns on the purpose of God that frames the entire narrative. Two events are central for the implied author and his audience in Luke-Acts: first, the rejection of the Messiah by the Jews in his trial and crucifixion (see esp. Lk 23:33–43) and, second, the subsequent rejection of his message by the Jewish people and its acceptance by the Gentiles (see esp. Acts 28:25–28; Ray 1996:8–9). The "God of surprises" (Tannehill 1990:3) reverses these apparent failures: crucifixion becomes the pre-eminent sign of Jesus' Messianic identity (see 24:44) and persecution by the Jews becomes the occasion for the spread of the movement beyond Israel (see 8:1 ff.; 11:19 ff.; Ray 1996:132–3). To the extent that both evangelists can use such irony to promote identification with the plot and with the pre-eminent figures and events that move that plot forward, they also create and sustain effective bonds between implied author, implied audience, and the communities of meaning in which both find their primary social identity (O'Day 1986:4–5, 29–31; Culpepper 1983:161–5; Ray 1996:40–1).

I began this study by raising the question of the missionary function of Christian education as instituted and practiced within the Roman Catholic Church. Although we have yet to approach the question of mission, we may now be in a place to see how these two NT authors function as educators. Neither one of them presents an explicit curriculum or an institutional vision. Rather, from sociocultural analysis we can see that each presents a symbolic universe or "world" which both reflects the community's historical situation and presents a bold vision to sustain it in that context. Narrative criticism further reveals how the implied author of the text draws the implied reader into his "system of influence" through the plot of the story and through such literary devices as irony (Tannehill 1990:4). In reading these narratives

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10 By "stable" irony I mean irony that does not turn in on itself; it is intended to be successfully interpreted and understood by the reader. See O'Day (1986:22-6) and Culpepper (1996:201-5).

we witness a decisive confirmation of and intervention in a larger process of socialization. The evangelists write for a social purpose. Specifically, they write to draw their readers into a distinctive way of perceiving and understanding the world, and they do this through the texts that they compose. They write to educate.

Some readers may see the step from socialization to education as a rather long one. At least one educational philosophy drawn from the Hellenistic context, however, suggests quite the opposite. According to Werner Jaeger (1961), for example, classical Greek *paideia* incorporated both socialization and literature as integral components of its educational vision. He writes:

> The formative mold of early Greek paideia was Homer, and as time went on that role was extended to Greek poetry at large. In the end, the word paideia meant Greek literature as a whole. The Greeks had no other word for it. For them it was most natural to regard that which we nowadays call literature from the viewpoint of the social function it had fulfilled throughout their history (1961:91; cf. Young 1996:229).

To be educated in *paideia* was to be molded by Greek literature, culture, and the world views that this language and culture brought with it. Its influence, moreover, extended beyond Greece to the whole Greco-Roman world—including, of course, Hellenistic Judaism. As a concept, "*paideia*" became a significant element both of the Septuagint and of Philo's speculative theology (Bertram 1967:608–16; cf. Jaeger 1961:6–7, 24; Crenshaw 1998:11–5). As an educational practice, it gave a new shape to Jewish institutions of teaching and learning. The ideal of "closing the distance" between events in the sacred text and the contemporary experience of the religious community already had roots deep in the Jewish scriptures (see, e.g., Levenson 1985:36–45; Brueggemann 1982:14–39, 102–17; Crenshaw 1998:124–5). The influence of *paideia* offered a distinctive shape to this tradition from the second century BCE to the first century CE, when many Hebrew schools adopted structures parallel to the Greek system while simultaneously substituting Torah for Homer as their primary formative text (Townsend 1992:315–6; Young 1996:239–40).

What emerges from this brief treatment is suggestive rather than conclusive. It would be rash to identify the evangelists' efforts with *paideia* in a narrow sense, and the precise influence of this educational philosophy upon them

or upon their communities will likely remain obscure. [11] We can, however, safely conclude from the widespread influence of *paideia* in the Greco-Roman world that neither the connection between education and socialization nor the employment of literature for this purpose would have been entirely foreign to the gospel writers.[12] In fact, it is far more likely that the imposition of any hard and fast distinctions between these three dimensions of social life *would* have been foreign: in writing to produce and sustain viable communities, they naturally engaged in rhetoric, in socialization, and thus also in education. Moreover, if John and Luke themselves reflect the vision with which they endowed their narratives, they must have perceived this educational task in fundamental continuity with the Jewish scriptures and with the very stories they set out to narrate. In this sense, at least, the evangelists provide a model and a vision of what it means to engage in Christian education. Rather, they present models and visions—plural—for, despite their similarity, the symbolic worlds of each work differ significantly from one another. We now turn to the concrete details of these worlds.

EDUCATIONAL CURRICULA: JOHN 13–17 AND ACTS 1–5

The above discussion has already drawn attention in broad detail to many characteristics of the "social and literary worlds"[13] constructed by Luke and

11 It should be noted that Jaeger (1961:12-26) suggests that even the letter of Clement to the Corinthians at the end of the first century CE bears the distinct mark of the *paideia* educational philosophy.

12 Crenshaw, in his recent study of ancient Israelite education and Near Eastern parallels, concurs with this connection between socialization and education: "In the ancient Near East education preceded literacy and arose as an effort to create an orderly society characterized by a kind of utilitarian morality" (1998:279; cf. 1-4). It is worth noting that it was only during the Hellenistic period considered here that this ideal expanded to include relatively widespread literacy (by the standards of antiquity) and the central value given to formative texts (Crenshaw 1998:43-9; but cf. 221-37).

13 I use this single phrase for convenience to indicate the world of the text as it participates in the broader construction of the community's social world. At the same time, it must be recognized that these two realities—the social world of the community and the symbolic world of the text—necessarily remain distinct and in some tension with one another.

John. Because space does not permit a survey of both texts in their entirety, in order further to clarify the particular dimensions of these worlds I turn to two segments of the texts in their final forms: the Farewell Discourse of John and the period of the Jerusalem community portrayed in the first five chapters of Acts. The former relates Jesus' washing of the disciples' feet at the Last Supper and the departure of Judas (13:1–30), two major sets of discourses (13:31–16:33), and Jesus' final prayer on behalf of his disciples (ch. 17). The latter narrates three major chains of events, including the ascension of Jesus and re-constitution of the twelve apostles (1:1–26), the Pentecost event and Peter's sermon (2:1–47), and a series of speeches, summaries, and confrontations beginning with the healing of a lame man and concluding with Peter and John before the Sanhedrin for a second time (3:1–5:42). I choose these texts for four reasons. First, both treat similar themes, including Jesus' departure, the sending of the Holy Spirit in his absence, and the community's conflict with "the world." Second, the Johannine Jesus ostensibly addresses the disciples to prepare them for the time immediately after his departure, which is precisely the period figured in the first chapters of Acts. Third, if we regard Luke-Acts as a single narrative and follow some commentators in dividing John into two major movements (1–12 and 13–17; see Brodie 1993:21–3, 33; Bultmann 1971:452–61), we may see both in analogous positions in their respective narratives—between the final announcement of God's ultimate purpose in Jesus (Jn 12:23, 32; Lk 24:47; Acts 1:8) and the beginning of the fulfillment of that purpose (Jn 18:1 ff.; Acts 6:1 ff.; see Barrett 1994:57–8; Fredriksen 1988:23; Segovia 1991a:308–19). Finally, both passages present large pieces of material by reliable voices within the narrative—notably Jesus' discourses in John and the various speeches and summaries in Acts—that may provide fairly direct access to the implied author's perspective and thus to the social and literary world that he constructs (Culpepper 1983:34–43; Tannehill 1990:28, 433–44).

The inquiry will proceed on three levels that appear to reflect the authors' genuine aims as well as those of an "educational mission" in the contemporary church: first, the disciples' relation to Jesus; second, the relation of these disciples' witness to the Holy Spirit; and third, the community's relation to the world. Thus, beginning with Jesus and moving through his Spirit and his community of disciples into the world, we shall be able to isolate significant images and tendencies which will then inform our subsequent constructive re-appropriation.

Jesus and the Disciples

Education requires a teacher, and within the narrative of the gospels this role is most frequently occupied by Jesus. But who is this teacher? John answers this question at the very start of his gospel, identifying Jesus as the unique, incarnate *logos* of God (1:1–18). Following his lead, we may begin our comparison with two passages that echo the prologue in form and content: the introduction to the foot washing episode (Jn 13:1–5) and Jesus' introduction to his final prayer (17:1–5; Brodie 1993:446–8, 508–10). Each begins with a pronouncement that the "hour" has come for Jesus to "depart from this world and go to the Father" (13:1) and for the Son to "glorify" the Father in the Father's glorification of the Son (17:1). Following this announcement of his divine destination, the text of 13:1b-5 describes his action in successively more concrete and humble forms: loving "his own … to the end" (13:1b) and "knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he had come from God and was going to God" (13:3) he takes up water and a towel to wash their feet (13:4–5). The juxtaposition of divine with mundane here seems almost dizzying, a "stereoscopic" summation of the incarnation (Culpepper 1983:33–4). The final prayer is similarly stereoscopic, although it ascends from earth to heaven: the Son has been "given" all authority, including the power to give eternal life to those "given" to him (17:2), he has "glorified" the Father on earth by completing the work that he has been "given" (17:4; cf. 4:34), and now petitions to be glorified with the glory that he had in the Father's presence "before the world existed" (17:5; cf. 1:1, 14). Together, these passages summarize major themes of the Son's identity as well as the revelation that he bears: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent" (17:3; cf. 14:6–7). The Son has been sent by the Father who gives him authority, work, and a community of "his own," will return to the Father, and uniquely reveals the Father because they were together at the beginning and are ultimately one (cf. 14:10–11; 10:30; 1:1; Culpepper 1983:108–9; Cullmann 1975:14–5).

In contrast to John's "uniquely high christology" (Brown 1979:145), Luke portrays Christ in quite different terms: "The emphasis on Jesus as Messiah falls more on the functional factor of what he does in fulfillment of God's purpose than on who he is in relation to God …" (Kee 1990:12). In Acts 2:33–36, as in many of his speeches in Acts, Peter presents one version of the "kerygma" concerning Jesus to the crowd that gathers in response to the Pentecost event (Dillon 1990:732–4). He offers a kind of proof in three parts.

First (2:22–24), he sets out distinctive signs of Jesus' role in God's plan of salvation, including the "deeds of power, wonders, and signs that God did through him" while living (v. 22), his crucifixion by the Gentiles "according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" (v. 23) and his resurrection by God. Second (2:25–31), he presents an argument from scripture (primarily Ps 16) that these events—particularly the resurrection—confirm prophecies by David. Finally (2:32–35), he appeals to the fact of the resurrection, to which "all of us [apostles] are witnesses" (v. 32), and to Jesus' exaltation "at the right hand of God" (v. 33) as further fulfillments of David's prophecy (vv. 33–34). He concludes his proof: "Therefore let the entire house of Israel know with certainty that God has made him both Lord and Messiah, this Jesus whom you crucified" (2:36). Peter thus simultaneously places responsibility for Jesus' death upon the shoulders of his Jewish audience and attributes the entire series of events to the agency of God (Tannehill 1990:36–7). Indeed, God remains the major actor throughout the whole speech, not because of Jesus' unity with God, but rather because Jesus' signs, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension all occur through the power of God. He is more than "merely" the Jewish Messiah, but this follows from his special role in God's plan of salvation, which extends beyond "mere" restoration of Israel (Fredriksen 1988:27–36; Powell 1989:29–63, 79).

Peter can speak with such authority because the one whom God has made "both Lord and Messiah" has already shown him "many convincing proofs" and taught him about "the kingdom of God" (1:3) before his ascension. We may infer elements of this teaching both from Peter's speech and from Jesus' teaching of the disciples at the conclusion of the gospel (Lk 24:26–27, 44–46), in which he "opened" the disciples' minds to the scriptures and revealed how they confirmed his own status as Messiah in God's plan (Tannehill 1990:13–4). As presented in Acts, this teaching primarily concerns the events that will bring this plan to fruition. Jesus assures the disciples that they will soon receive the "promise of the Father" (Acts 1:4) through their baptism in the Holy Spirit (1:5). Possibly still misunderstanding the scope of God's plan of salvation, they inquire about the restoration of Israel (1:6). Jesus rebukes them (1:7) and concludes his teaching with an explicit announcement of the plan in its entirety: "But you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" (1:8). From this point forward, when education must take place, the Holy Spirit will do the teaching (e.g. 10:44 ff.;

16:6–8; cf. Kee 1990:36–41). But the essential shape of this instruction has already been stated.

In several places throughout the Farewell Discourse of John's Gospel the disciples ask questions or make statements that, like the disciples' question in Acts, reveal their misunderstanding of Jesus and his revelation (Jn 13:6–10; 13:36; 14:5; 14:8–9; 14:22). The final such episode occurs in 16:25–33 and again begins with an announcement of the "hour" in which Jesus "will no longer speak to you in figures, but will tell you plainly of my Father" (v. 25). On the one hand, the broad context of the gospel reveals in many places that this pronouncement has come true for members of the community (cf. 2:22; 12:16; 13:7; 20:9; Culpepper 1983:28, 36–41). On the other hand, in its immediate context it becomes both a source for further misunderstanding and a clue to the way Johannine language has functioned throughout the narrative (O'Day 1986:108–9). Jesus commends the disciples for their belief and love, for which they will receive the love of the Father (v. 27) and repeats the descent ("I came from the Father … into the world") and ascent ("I am leaving the world … to the Father") language with which the implied reader has by now grown familiar (v. 28). The disciples ironically mistake his statement as referring to their present state, making successively stronger statements about the plainness of his speech (v. 29), their knowledge, and their belief (v. 30; Barrett 1978:496–7; Brodie 1993:502–3). Again as in Acts, Jesus responds to this misunderstanding with a rebuke (vv. 31–32). Whereas for Luke a description of the plan of God followed the rebuke, for John it gives way to a further revelation of Jesus' identity as being in the presence of the Father (v.32) and as the one who has already "conquered the world" (v. 33). In a sense, these statements ironically confirm the disciples' own misapprehension, for Jesus moves the locus of revelation from the future into the present of the disciples' (and implied reader's) experience of his identity as Son (O'Day 1986:70–1).

Despite some similarities in structure, the evangelists' different portrayals of Jesus condition their vision of his relation to his disciples. Luke's Jesus announces God's plan of salvation as the fulfillment of the Jewish scriptures, his own role as Messiah, and his disciples' function as witnesses. For John it is both simpler and more complex, for what Jesus, the incarnate *logos*, announces is himself. For both evangelists, however, Jesus communicates through more than merely his announcements. After washing the disciples' feet, Jesus states:

Do you know what I have done to you? You call me Teacher and Lord—and you are right, for that is what I am. So if I, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have set you an example [*hypodeigma*], that you also should do as I have done to you (Jn 13:12b-15).

As part of the revelation imparted to the disciples, Jesus has given them a "pattern" (*hypodeigma*) of a particular ritual act, a pattern for their service, and by extension the broad pattern of his testimony and works: "If you know these things, you are blessed if you do them" (13:17; cf. Bultmann 1971:475-6). In a similar vein in Acts, Peter, standing before the Sanhedrin for the second time (Acts 5:29-32; cf. Lk 22:66-71), announces his witness and that of the Holy Spirit (v. 32) to Jesus as "Leader [*archēgos*] and Savior" (5:31). As "prototype" (*archēgos*) of the disciples (Kee 1990:24-7, 90), Jesus provides a kind of pattern for the signs and wonders they do in his name, for their preaching, and for their suffering under persecution throughout the book of Acts (Tannehill 1990:29, 51-5, 69-72; Fredriksen 1988:29-31).

On this point the two evangelists seem to concur: in addition to his explicit teaching, Jesus presents himself as a concrete pattern or prototype for all who would follow in his name. This may suggest immediate possibilities and images for the church's contemporary mission, but it also presents its own set of difficulties. Clearly Jesus' own teaching example as portrayed in John and Acts cannot be irrelevant to the disciples' (and evangelists') own efforts in this regard. At the same time, despite their differences, both Luke and John portray Jesus as occupying a unique place in God's plan and a unique relationship to Godself. Hence it seems inappropriate, at first glance, to assume that every aspect of Jesus' relation to the disciples would carry over directly into their relations with one another and with the world (see esp. Köstenberger 1998:194-8, 212-7). Therefore, prior to making our appropriation, we must fill out the portrait with a treatment of the disciples' distinctive task and of the power given to them for its fulfillment.

The Holy Spirit and Witness

All students have teachers, but only the community of Jesus' disciples is promised one that will remain with them throughout their lives. The above discussion has already alluded to some of the roles that the Holy Spirit takes in Acts following Jesus' departure. The Spirit is arguably the main character of

the story from that point forward. In Luke's view of history, this Spirit has been active from the beginning, inspiring the prophecies of the Jewish scriptures (1:16; 4:25) and empowering Jesus' own earthly ministry.[14] At the same time, the narrative of Acts depicts Pentecost as a moment in which God gives the Spirit to the apostles in a new and definitive way (2:1–21). This event fulfills the first part of Jesus' commission in 1:8 ("the Holy Spirit") and foreshadows the rest in its image of the apostles speaking ("witness") to people from every nation ("to the ends of the earth"; Barrett 1994:108, 115). In his speech following the event Peter confirms this universal image through a citation of Joel to the effect that God will pour out the Holy Spirit on "all flesh" (v. 17), that those who receive it "shall prophesy" (v. 18), and that "everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved" (v. 21).[15] At the conclusion of his speech (2:37–38), he enacts this prophecy by calling upon his audience to repent, to be baptized "in the name of Jesus Christ" (who is both "Lord and Messiah" in 2:36), and to receive "the gift of the Holy Spirit" (vv. 38–39). Although the Spirit is associated with both the name of Jesus and baptism, it is not confined to them; rather, as subsequent events reveal, the Spirit remains a gift freely given by God (Kee 1990:32; Tannehill 1990:30–1; cf. Acts 8:20; 10:45; 11:17). The Spirit's primary function, as indicated by the image of Pentecost and the quotation of Joel, involves empowering witness through signs (2:43) and words (4:8; cf. 5:32; Powell 1991:50–6).

Although John—like Luke—presents an "oblique" reference to the Spirit's baptism of Jesus and empowerment of his ministry (Jn 1:33; 3:34; Brown 1979:88; Barrett 1996:170), his emphasis falls more strongly on the Spirit's role as Jesus' successor in the community. Thus, when the "Spirit of truth" occurs for the first time in the Farewell Discourse (14:16–26), Jesus identifies this Spirit with "another Advocate" that will "abide" with, in, and/or among (*en hymin*) the disciples (14:16–17), creating a parallel with Jesus as the first such "Advocate." Jesus' following words—"I will not leave you orphaned; I am coming to you" (v. 18)—further reinforce this parallel. Although Jesus will shortly depart and no longer be seen by the world (vv. 19, 22), he and his Fa-

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14 E.g., Lk 1:35; 3:22; Acts 10:37; see further references in Kee (1990:28-30) and Powell (1989:108-11).

15 Although Ray (1996:145-6) stresses the Joel quotation as a proclamation of the messianic time, it seems to me that this strengthens rather than diminishes the role of the Holy Spirit according to Luke's particular understanding of that messianic time.

ther will love (v. 21), reveal himself (v. 21),[16] and make their home (v. 23) with those who keep Jesus' commandments (v. 21, 23–24) and who love him (v. 21). After Jesus' departure, the Holy Spirit sent "in my name" will continue to teach his disciples "everything" and "remind" them of his teaching (v. 26). A second group of references (16:7–15) further extend the Advocate's role. Not only will Jesus not leave the disciples orphaned (14:18), it is to their advantage that he depart (16:7). In his absence, the Advocate will "prove the world wrong about sin and righteousness and judgment" (v. 8; cf. vv. 9–11).[17] Not only will the Spirit confirm Jesus' teaching (14:26), but the Spirit will teach them more than Jesus has taught (16:12)—indeed the Advocate will "guide you into all the truth" by speaking what has been heard (v. 13), glorifying the Son (v. 14), and declaring what the Father has given to the Son (v. 15). As the "living presence" of Jesus in the community and in each individual member of that community, the Spirit extends Jesus' own mission—including the revelation of himself and the Father in him—beyond the bounds of his earthly ministry (Brown 1979:88).

This continuation of Jesus' revelation through the community includes "greater works" (see 14:11–12), as well as testimony in the pattern of both Jesus and the Spirit (15:26–27). The Advocate, the Spirit of truth sent by the Son (v. 26; cf. 14:16–17), again parallels the Son by coming from the Father and testifying on Jesus' behalf (v. 26; cf. 8:42; 13:3; 16:27; 17:8). In v. 27 Jesus extends this pattern to the community of believers (Brodie 1993:489–90): "You also are to testify because you have been with me from the beginning [*archē*]." Here *archē* may refer to the disciples' association either with Jesus' earthly ministry (cf. 16:4) and/or with his divine origin (cf. 1:1; see Barrett 1978:483). This mission of the disciples comes into clearer focus in Jesus' final prayer (17:17–21). Just as the Father sent Jesus into the world, so Jesus sends his disciples into the world (v. 18); just as Jesus sanctifies himself (v. 19), so he peti-

16 I have left the pronoun "himself" singular in reference to either Jesus or the Father in preference to the plural "themselves," since this ambiguity seems to accord well with Jesus' own relation to the Father (cf. vv. 9, 20, 24, and the discussion above).

17 Commentators tend to associate the Spirit's exposure or conviction of the world either with action on the conscience of the individual believer or action through the presence of the community in the world. See Brodie (1993:493-4, 496-9); Bultmann (1971:562-3); Barrett (1978:486-8); and Perkins (1990:977). Either way, it seems to refer to an activity immanent in the life of the community and its members.

tions that the disciples also be sanctified in the truth which is the Father's *logos*, Jesus himself (v. 17; Barrett 1978:510); just as Jesus is in the Father and the Father in Jesus, so also the disciples and those who believe through the disciples' *logos* (v. 20) are in the Father and in Jesus (v. 21). Thus the community's origin, sanctification, and unity in relation to Jesus closely mirror and parallel those of Jesus in relation to the Father.[18] They also reflect the same fundamental goal: "… that the world may believe that you [the Father] have sent me [the Son]" (v. 21; Barrett 1978:510–1; Segovia 1991a:210–1). The concrete form of testifying to Jesus and fulfilling his mission remains somewhat ambiguous.[19] What does stand out clearly is that the revelation of Jesus' identity occurs in and through the community formed, sanctified, and sent in his name (Meeks 1972:56–7).

Whereas John remains content to leave the commissioning of the disciples largely implicit in his narrative, so-called "commission scenes" occur frequently in Luke's account, including the programmatic introduction to Acts as a whole (Acts 1:8). The account of the replacement of Judas (1:21–25) highlights the necessity of finding such a replacement (v. 21) as well as this replacement's divinely ordained function (v. 22): "One of these must become a witness with us to his resurrection," the very event which—along with his crucifixion—proves Jesus' identity as Messiah (cf. Lk 24:46; Acts 2:34–36; 3:18). While John leaves the reference to those with Jesus "from the beginning" deliberately ambiguous, Luke makes it explicit in the case of Matthias as "beginning from the baptism of John until the day when he was taken up from us" (Acts 1:22), thus emphasizing their participation in Jesus' earthly activity in the service of God's plan (Tannehill 1990:23–4). Peter draws attention to the fulfillment of this plan in his speech at Solomon's Portico following his healing of the lame man (3:12–26). After upbraiding the Jewish onlookers for their wonder at this miraculous event (vv. 12–13), Peter convicts them of handing over God's "servant Jesus," rejecting the "Holy and Righteous One," and killing "the Author of life, whom God raised from the dead. To this we are witnesses" (vv. 13–16). Along with this verbal witness to the resurrection, this healing by

18 But see Köstenberger (1998:212-9) and the discussion above on limits to this parallel.

19 It seems to include, however, at least some missionary activity among the Samaritans and the Gentiles, if not the Jews. See Rensberger (1988:144); Cullmann (1975:16, 49); and Brown (1979:67-8).

Jesus' "name itself" also testifies to God. In a pattern familiar from the previous discussion, Peter first indicts the Jews but then recognizes their ignorance (v. 17), identifying God's fulfillment of divine prophecies (v. 18; cf. 22–26) as the true cause of the passion events. The expected response to this fulfillment is repentance (v. 19) in obedience to the one so rejected and raised (vv. 22–23), so that "times of refreshing" (v. 20) and the "universal restoration that God announced long ago through his holy prophets" (v. 21) can come with Jesus' return. In the subsequent narrative this mission occurs concretely through the further "sending" of God's salvation from the Jews to the Gentiles (cf. 10:18; 28:28; Kee 1990:70–1).

Both evangelists portray witness to Jesus and to God's work in and through him as one primary function of the disciples. Both, moreover, connect this activity to the prior, empowering work of the Holy Spirit. The clear structural similarities between the Lukan and Johannine accounts of the Spirit's presence in the witnessing community have been aptly summarized by W. F. Lofthouse (1941:336):

> The Spirit is sent by Jesus and by the Father in Jesus' name; He [*sic*] is given to the disciples as their special possession; He reminds them of Jesus; witnesses of Jesus, as they do themselves; guides them, glorifies Him. … The Spirit is linked as closely to the company of disciples in the life which awaits them as He is linked to Jesus.

At the same time, as we saw above in reference to Jesus' teaching example, the very different conceptions of Jesus presented by each evangelist transform their respective accounts of the Spirit and witness. In John, Jesus confers the Spirit directly upon the disciples in a gesture that echoes God's breathing of life into the human in Gen 2:7 (Jn 20:22; cf. 1:3,12–13; Culpepper 1983:107). In Acts, Jesus rebukes the disciples for inquiring into "the times and seasons" of God's plan (Acts 1:7), and the Spirit comes upon them unexpectedly when they are gathered together well after Jesus' departure (2:1 ff.). In John, testimony on behalf of Jesus appears—in the pattern of his own identity and work—to involve revelation of his divine identity, a revelation realized in the community after his "exaltation" (cf. Jn 7:39). In Acts, testimony on behalf of Jesus—again, in the pattern of his own identity and work—involves bearing witness to his call to repentance and fulfillment as Messiah of God's universal plan, a plan that remains in some sense open even in the final events of the narrative (Tannehill 1990:353–7).

In short, John portrays the Father, the Son, the Spirit, and the disciples as one tightly knit, relatively closed, and inter-penetrating reality, whereas Luke sees them as bound together primarily by virtue of their parallel and mutual participation in the one plan of God, as yet incomplete, for the salvation of the world. This distinction in the evangelists' visions of the Holy Spirit and witness will add a further element of complexity to our subsequent appropriation. We may indeed find that we have to be selective, to identify the strengths of each portrait and draw them together into a new one—a delicate task, at best. We may draw some courage for this project from the very diversity that we encounter in these two texts, clear evidence that the evangelists themselves served in a synthetic role as they generated their educational narratives. We shall have to do likewise as we apply their insights to our contemporary context. But we should not do so too quickly. First, having established the Holy Spirit as the primary link across space and time from the disciples' witness to its source or beginning in Jesus, we must examine one more important relation that will prove decisive both for Jesus' community and for the modern Christian school.

The Community and the World

As envisioned by the American bishops, the Catholic school is a kind of community and exists within two other communities. On the one hand, it is a community within the church; on the other, it functions in relation to the broader culture of its social milieu. For John, these same two contexts clarify one another by contrast: to understand the community of the church we must first turn to the broad concept "world," which occurs some 40 times in the discourses (Barrett 1978:438). Broadly speaking, in the final half of the gospel this "world" is roughly analogous in function to "the Jews" of the first half: "the heart and soul of unbelief" in Jesus as the one sent from God (Culpepper 1983:125–30). The hatred of the world for both Jesus and for those who follow him comes to the fore in Jn 15:18–25: "If the world hates you, be aware that it hated me before it hated you" (v. 18). The world loves "its own," but the disciples have been chosen "out of the world" and therefore incur its hatred (v. 19; cf. 13:1). The parallels continue and conflict intensifies in this and subsequent passages (Segovia 1991a:208–9). As "they" persecuted Jesus, so "they" persecute the disciples (v. 20). Moreover, they do these things on account of Jesus' name, because they do not know the one who sent him (v.21; cf. 16:3), ironically fulfilling the *logos* of "their" law in their persecution of the divine *logos* and of those who have kept his *logos* (v. 25; v. 20; cf. 17:8,

14). At the end of Jesus' final prayer (17:22–26), these parallels and themes coalesce with many of those discussed above, and in v. 25 Jesus draws a fundamental contrast: "Righteous Father, the world does not know you, but I know you; and these know that you have sent me" (cf. 14:21). Although sent to the world that it might believe that God sent him (cf. vv. 21, 23; 3:16–17; 1:10–11), Jesus makes the Father known only to those chosen out of the world, and it is in and among these—"his own"—and not in the world that the Father's love dwells (v. 21; Brown 1979:59–60).

Although Luke does not draw such a sharp contrast between Jesus' own and "the world," he no less than John does portray a situation of mounting conflict with the Jews—to all of whom, as we have already seen, he assigns "corporate guilt" for the killing of Jesus (Fredriksen 1988:33–4). The community's prayer after Peter and John's first confrontation with the Sanhedrin sets out the major terms of this conflict (Acts 4:23–31). Similar to John, Luke begins this prayer with an invocation of God as creator of the world (v. 24; cf. Jn 1:3; 17:5, 24) and cites opposition as fulfillment of God's prophecy in scripture (vv. 25–26; cf. Jn 15:25). Like Peter's statement about "universal restoration" (3:21) in his speech before the Jerusalem temple, this scripture passage and its fulfillment reach beyond the disciples' immediate context, stating that "the Gentiles" (vv. 25, 27), the "kings" and "rulers" of the earth (v. 26), and "the peoples of Israel" have all "gathered together against your holy servant Jesus" (v. 27) and have threatened the apostles (v. 29) in accord with divine prophecy. Against this threat, the community petitions God to empower them to speak God's word while God's "hand" performs signs and wonders through them (v. 30), just as God anointed Jesus to do whatever God's "hand" and "plan had predestined to take place" (v. 28). Thus, both the reason behind opposition and the power to resist it reside in God, and this power receives further confirmation in the physical manifestation of the Holy Spirit (v. 31; Barrett 1994:247–8). Unlike John, in which genuine recognition of truth appears to reside exclusively within the community,[20] in the conclusion to the second trial before the Sanhedrin (5:33–40) Luke presents a quite different picture. When the Jewish leaders wish to kill Peter

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20 Although John's "favorite trick" (Culpepper 1983:170) involves putting the truth into the mouths of Jesus' opponents, as for example when Pilate writes "the King of the Jews" in Hebrew, Latin, and Greek on Jesus' cross in Jn 19:19-20, it seems to me that little evidence exists that anyone other than those within the community recognizes these truths.

and John (v. 33), Gamaliel, a well-respected Pharisee and "teacher of the law," has the apostles sent out (v. 34) and—after citing the cases of Theudas and Judas the Galilean (vv. 36–37)—warns his colleagues against rash action (vv. 38–39; Barrett 1994:298–9). The members of the Sanhedrin follow his advice, at least for the time being (vv. 39–40). More importantly for Luke's portrayal of the world, Gamaliel speaks the truth about God's plan and thus becomes a "reliable voice" of the implied author (Tannehill 1990:67; Conzelmann 1987:43). Luke, then, does not characterize the world in such negative terms that he excludes it entirely as a source of truth about God and the plan of salvation.

Despite such ambivalence about the world in Acts, enduring opposition and suffering persecution in the pattern established by Jesus undeniably serve as sources of confirmation for the apostles' participation in this plan (e.g. Acts 5:41–42; cf. Kee 1990:73–4). Suffering is not the only sign of such participation. In two summaries (2:42–47; 4:32–35), Luke presents his idealized vision of the Christian community. In the first such summary, this vision is characterized by four activities: teaching by the apostles, fellowship, breaking of bread, and prayer (2:42). The further verses of both passages fill out this picture in terms of the apostles' testimony, signs, and wonders within the community (2:42; 4:33), the appropriate response to this testimony in a common life and common ownership of possessions (2:44–45; 4:32, 34–35), temple worship (2:46), and meals enjoyed at home in grateful thanksgiving (2:26–47). Luke presents the early Christian community in terms of the Greco-Roman friendship tradition as being "of one heart and soul" in their common life and participation in God's plan (4:32; Powell 1991:77–8; cf. Tannehill 1990:45–7). This picture receives further definition by means of the contrast between Barnabas, who generously lays the proceeds from the sale of his property at the apostles' feet (4:36–38), and Ananias and his wife Sapphira, who sell their property, present only part of the proceeds, and pay with their lives for lying to the Holy Spirit (5:1–10; Tannehill 1990:78–9). After this, "great fear" seizes the whole *ekklēsia* (5:11). Luke thus presents both a positive view of the unity of the community and a negative consequence for violating this unity.

John achieves a similar purpose through his well-known image of the vine and the branches (Jn 15:1–17). The main theme—the mutual indwelling of the Father, Son, and disciples—receives explication through a constellation of related terms (Barrett 1978:472–3). Those that "bear fruit" by abiding in Jesus the true vine (v. 5) and in his love (v. 9), who have been cleansed by his

logos (v. 3), and in whom his words (*logoi*) abide (v. 7)—these become his disciples, glorify the Father (v. 8), and indeed "bear more fruit" because the Father prunes them (v. 2). Those, on the other hand, who do not bear fruit because they do not abide in Jesus (vv. 5–6) will be removed from the vine by the Father (v. 2) and then burned (v. 6). What does bearing fruit entail: missionary activity (Perkins 1990:976; Köstenberger 1998:184–5), union with God (Brodie 1993:480–4), or acts of mutual love and service (Bultmann 1971:532–3; cf. Culpepper 1983:65–6)? The passage that follows weighs interpretation in favor of the latter of these options. Like Luke, John draws on Greco-Roman ideals of friendship (Bultmann 1971:544–6), calling by the name "friends" those to whom he has made the Father known (v. 15) and who obey his commandments (vv. 14, 10), particularly his command to love one another as he has loved them (v. 12) by laying down his life (v. 13). He concludes:

> You did not choose me but I chose you. And I appointed you to go and bear fruit, fruit that will last, so that the Father will give you whatever you ask him in my name. I am giving you these commands so that you may love one another (15:16–17).

John thus draws abiding in Jesus, bearing fruit, and loving one another into one single whole (see Köstenberger 1998:189–90). Those who abide in Jesus follow his commandment of mutual love and remain within the community; those who do not abide in Jesus do not follow this commandment and are thus separated from the community, from Jesus the true vine, and, by this separation, from life itself (cf. 14:6).

If we return to the previous occurrence of the love command, immediately after Judas' departure "into night" from the last supper scene (13:31–35), we see that this single whole—although realized only within the community—has implications that extend beyond that community's boundaries. After announcing his glorification (vv. 31–32) and imminent departure (v. 33), Jesus announces the love command for the first time (v. 34). He then states its significance: "By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another" (v. 35). We have already seen above that Jesus sends the community into a world that does not know him in order for it to believe (17:21, 25) and also that the Spirit empowers its members to testify on Jesus' behalf (15:26–27). Now the internal life of the community appears to become a privileged instrument in this mission: by seeing this love,

the world comes to know the identity of the community as Jesus' disciples—as those who abide in Jesus and keep his *logos*. In his close juxtaposition of testimony and common life (Acts 2:43–44; 4:32–33), Luke both echoes this underlying unity and gives it concrete shape in the economic life of the community. No less than the Johannine community, the early *ekklēsia* of Acts bears witness to God's plan of salvation not only in but also through its worship, breaking bread, and sharing possessions. In both cases, the community embodies and carries forward the message and the mission with which it has been entrusted by Jesus, for which it is empowered by the Spirit, and due to which it stands distinct from the world that surrounds and threatens it (cf. Rensberger 1988:147–52; Powell 1989:111–21).

Equipped with these final insights, we are ready to move forward from Luke and John into their distinctive contribution to the "educational mission" of the contemporary church. What might it look like to appropriate their vision to our own—in short, to teach as they might have taught? It is to this question that we now turn.

TO TEACH AS THE EVANGELISTS DID: A FEW REFLECTIONS

> Since many have undertaken to set down an orderly account of the events that have been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed on to us by those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and servants of the word, I too decided, after investigating everything carefully from the very first, to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the truth concerning the things about which you have been instructed (Lk 1:1–4).

> Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book. But these are written so that you may come to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through believing you may have life in his name (Jn 20:30–31).

In the first major section of this study, a brief survey of sociocultural and literary criticism of Luke-Acts and the Fourth Gospel revealed the evangelists' function as educators in a broad sense, inviting their respective audi-

ences into their social and literary worlds as part of a larger social process in their respective communities. They write to educate the members of their implied audiences in the terms of this world so that these members might "know the truth" and "believe." In the second major section, comparison of selected texts revealed both similarities and differences in these worlds and in the ways in which the evangelists envision their communication. Although both see this as a single process proceeding from Jesus through the Holy Spirit and the community formed in Jesus' name into the world, their very different conceptions of Jesus shape quite distinct conceptions of his communication to his disciples, the Spirit's relation to the witnessing community, and that community's relation to the world. In order to appropriate the insights thus gained for an "educational mission" in the contemporary church, we may proceed by analogy on the evangelists as educators in their communities.[21] By definition, such an analogy contains both similarity and difference. Certainly, it cannot be credibly maintained that the evangelists foresaw their literary works as models for modern schools, nor even that they imagined such schools within their communities.[22] If, however, they are seen as engaged in an "educational mission" in their construction of the social and literary worlds of their narratives—an activity distinct, as set out in our introduction, from either straightforward preaching of the gospel message or straightforward service on behalf of the community—then we may draw from these worlds general theological guides for our own educational mission. I present four such guides below in the form of short theses and their further explication in reference to the American bishops' pastoral message *To Teach as Jesus Did*, cited at the beginning of this study.

First Thesis: Catholic and other Christian schools participate in an "educational mission" of the church to the degree that their identity reflects that of Jesus in relation to God and to God's plan of salvation.

This thesis virtually follows from the terms of the analogy itself. We have seen that both Luke and John create and reinforce identities for their communities through their respective narratives. The image of Jesus stands at

21 For a similar analogy from the Johannine community to contemporary liberation theology based on the common term "oppression," see Rensberger (1988:107-34).
22 Although, in this connection, see Culpepper (1975:261-90).

the center of this identity for both evangelists, but this image receives its
significance from the frame given it by each. Luke creates a vision of sacred
history as the arena for the working out of God's plan of salvation, with its
past in the Jewish scriptures, its present in Jesus and in the *ekklēsia* as the
fulfillment of these scriptures, and its future in their completion, as salvation
moves to "the ends of the earth" and toward "universal restoration." John
chooses not to emphasize any such plan in favor of a tight focus upon God's
own *logos*, who himself encapsulates all time from the past creation of the
world, through his earthly ministry and "hour" of his exaltation in the
present, and into the future of his indwelling presence in the Father and in
the abiding community. The disciples and, by extension, the recipients of
John's or Luke's education stand with Jesus in this wide frame incorporat-
ing all time and all history, including their own. Jesus is the beginning, pat-
tern, and prototype for all those who witness in his name. As a symbolic
world view shapes his identity in the text, so also it shapes theirs in their
concrete lived experience.

The American bishops' pastoral message illustrates the need for attention
to such questions of identity. When they call upon Jesus as the founder of the
church's educational mission, as a model for that mission's effort to promote
human dignity, and as the initiator of the message, fellowship, and service
that characterize this mission, they focus correctly upon him as their central
image, but also leave a great deal—perhaps too much—implicit in the con-
text that gives this image its special character (*TJD*:par. 6–14).[23] By shifting
our focus from teaching as Jesus taught to teaching as the evangelists taught,
we also shift the emphasis from a somewhat naive imitation of a Jesus de-
void of context toward the construction and maintenance of a "world of
shared perceptions and understandings" that give Jesus' identity its signifi-
cance. This becomes the first task of education. If we choose to follow Luke
and John, then this world must include an account of our place as followers
of Jesus in the past, present, and future of our world—that is, we must have
a (hi)story or (hi)stories for our schools. As educators in a context different
from that of either evangelist, a context that includes a canon with Luke,

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23 It should be noted, however, that the bishops leave the explication of "sa-
cred history" implicit in part because the document addresses a specific concern
in the light of the documents of Vatican II, as well as of the broader traditions of
the church, which themselves provide a context for their image of Jesus and of
his present-day disciples.

John, and other distinct voices as well as a diversity of authentic Christian traditions, we cannot simply adopt their worlds and the identities that go with them. Indeed their worlds, at least if taken in their entirety, appear to conflict on key points. Rather, each new generation and each new context calls for new construction of such worlds and identities shaped in the light of the evangelists and of other NT witnesses.[24] John and Luke make one criterion for such construction clear. While the broad contexts of their "social and literary worlds" give Jesus his distinctive significance and identity, so also *within* these worlds Jesus in his relation to God (John) and in his participation in God's plan (Luke) gives significance to history and identity to the community that follows him. Catholic or other Christian schools participate in the educational mission of the church to the degree that their worlds share this emphasis upon Jesus with those of Luke and John.

This fundamental insight leads to three shorter theses:

Second Thesis: Realization of this identity occurs not only in a message, but also in a process of discovery.

After stating their central motif in terms of Jesus as the model educator, the American bishops further explicate the educational mission of the church in terms of its message of salvation revealed by God, communicated in Jesus, and taught in the doctrines of the church (*TJD*:16–20). From our examination in the second section, we may see that this characterization of God's communication in Jesus as a "message" approximates Luke's portrayal in form if not necessarily in content. Jesus teaches the disciples about God's plan of salvation and its fulfillment in him, and in his pattern they bear witness to this plan through signs, proclamation, and suffering. John also sees the disciples in the pattern set by Jesus, but to their message he adds a further educational dimension. In Jesus' revelation of his own identity and in the ways that John uses irony to reveal this identity further, the readers—John's students—become involved in a process of discovery, of confronting their identity in relation to the Son and the Father revealed by him, and of com-

24 For two examples of such constructions from Catholic tradition, see Augustine of Hippo's motif of the two cities in his *De catechizandis rudibus* (1950) and Bernard Lonergan's account of progress, decline, and redemption in the transcendental notion of the good (1993:49-70).

ing to believe (cf. Meeks 1972).[25] If a school participates in an educational
mission analogous to that identified in John, therefore, it cannot remain
content merely to transmit a "message," if this indicates a body of informa-
tion about God's plan or about Jesus' identity. It can and must teach about
these things, for they will be central to the world that gives the school its dis-
tinctive identity, but it cannot stop there. Rather, in the image of John as an
educator, Catholic or other Christian educators must strive to move beyond
the content of a religion class or homily of a worship service to encourage a
process of discovery in their students, a process that will ultimately deter-
mine how the students understand themselves in relation to Jesus who
founds the identity of the school.[26] Such encouragement in the form of ex-
ercises, projects, and/or events that confront students with difficult ques-
tions about themselves, about their world, and about God requires patience,
a willingness to experiment, and persistence. Moreover, nothing guarantees
either the students' active participation or the end results of the process. Yet,
if we are to educate as the evangelists educate, we cannot reduce the revela-
tion of Jesus to a "message"; on the contrary, we must teach a "how" of rev-
elation in Christ as well as a "what" (cf. O'Day 1986:43–8).

Third Thesis: Full realization of this identity remains incomplete, open
to truth from the Spirit and even from the secular world.

Both John and Luke affirm the guidance of the Spirit in the life of the
community after Jesus' departure. After comparing them on the issue of
the Holy Spirit and witness, we concluded that John presented this guid-
ance as operating in the tight and relatively closed environment of his
community. In the following section this translated into a sharp dichotomy
between the community and the hostile "world" that surrounds it. Luke,
on the other hand, loosens these connections, emphasizing the Spirit's
operation in and before Jesus' ministry as well as God's freedom to bestow
the Spirit on the community in a time or season unknown to it—and even
to surprise them. The relative "looseness" of Luke's picture translated in

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25 Brodie (1993:36) points out that John never uses "belief" as a noun but
employs verbal construction to portray "believing" and coming to believe as
ongoing activities, indicating a process rather than an accomplished fact.
26 See Lonergan (1993:88–91, 104–5) on "horizons" and "active methods."

the following section into his freedom as a writer to portray Gamaliel, a member of the hostile "world," as a reliable witness to the truth of God's plan. It is telling that when the American bishops write of educational mission as a service to the world (*TJD*:par. 28-30), although they quote John, the terms which describe this service—consoling the distressed, caring for the sick and poor, setting free those who are oppressed—echo Luke (cf. Lk 4:18-19). While the question of service lies outside our immediate inquiry, our analogy allows us to draw a few conclusions about the Christian school in the world. John asserts that the Spirit will lead the community "into all truth" and Luke illustrates a similar process in the Spirit's unexpected interventions in the community. If we educate in the model of the evangelists, then, we must become educators attentive to the possibility of new truth and new guidance from the Spirit. Luke further extends the possibility for reliable witnesses to the truth to "the world," which in our contemporary context refers primarily to a secular culture rather than to a Jewish one. As institutions that educate in the liberal arts as well as religion, contemporary Catholic schools are "worldly" institutions. Rather than seeing this as a concession to the culture, Luke allows us to perceive secular disciplines and culture within the schools as opportunities for the further realization of the truth about God's plan—except where those disciplines and culture threaten to replace the school's identity with another one based exclusively on secular values such as merit, wealth, or prestige. Thus schools that educate in the model of the evangelists recognize and carefully protect their distinction from the world and its values; at the same time, they educate with an eye for the new, for surprise, and for the truth that hadn't been seen before in quite the same way. In this sense, they can bravely embrace innovation and listen for other voices.

Fourth Thesis: Realization of this identity takes place in the concrete life of the school community.

After citing Jn 13:34-36, the American bishops state: "Community is at the heart of Christian education not simply as a concept to be taught but as a reality to be lived" (*TJD*:par. 23).[27] On this point, I believe that we can re-

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27 Cf. *Gravissimum educationis* (par. 8): "But let teachers realize that to the greatest possible extent they determine whether the Catholic school can bring its goals and undertakings to fruition. … Bound by charity to one another and to

sponsibly affirm both the use of the selected text and the conclusions drawn from it. At the conclusion of the second major section, we saw how the patterning of the disciples after Jesus, of the Holy Spirit's action in the community after that of Jesus, and (in John) even of the unity of the community after the unity of the Father and Son takes concrete form in the community's internal relations (cf. Minear 1993:149–50). In John these relations are founded on the love command. In Luke they are illustrated through the common devotional and economic life of the early Christian *ekklēsia*. Either way, these relations serve as privileged instruments of the community's witness to its members' new identity in the pattern of Christ. Here the translation from the evangelists' educational mission to that of Catholic or other Christian schools takes place in a direct and challenging manner. If we take John seriously, then the school's Christian identity and participation in a Christian educational mission resides largely in the love that motivates its internal operation. If we take Luke seriously, then this love will not remain a vague feeling, but will become concrete in social and economic decisions on every level—in such affairs as employment practices, budgets, disciplinary protocols, and student activities. Naturally, we cannot expect that any school will present a perfect model of Christian charity all the time; indeed, both Luke's highly idealized portraits and the later history of the Johannine community suggest that this was difficult even for the early Christian communities (see, e.g., Esler 1987:183–7; Brown 1979). Despite the natural limitations that we share with early Christians, however, we must begin to perceive an intrinsic connection between the life of the school, its identity, and its educational mission. In the final analysis, in order to educate according to the model of Luke and John, schools must educate by giving attention to the concrete common life of their school communities. In this way, above all others, Catholic and other Christian schools can bear witness to Jesus and to God's plan of salvation and thus participate in an "educational mission" to spread the gospel of Christ to the world.

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their students, and penetrated by an apostolic spirit, let them give witness to Christ, the unique Teacher, by their lives as well as by their teachings."

28 I would like to acknolwedge J. Paul Sampley and Lesley A. Woo for their generous assistance on this essay.

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Whose Lion Is It, Anyway?
The Identity of the Lion in Amos 3:12

D. MATTHEW STITH

INTRODUCTION

Much critical attention has been devoted to the evident textual problems in the second half of Amos 3:12. While it is certainly true that text-critical concerns are crucial to the interpretation of 3:12, the surrounding oracles, and Amos as a whole, it seems that perhaps the famous *crux* in Amos 3:12b has distracted the attention of interpreters from a more subtle exegetical question in the first part of the verse. The allusion to the legal tradition of Exodus 22:10–13 is clear: if an animal is killed by wild beasts, the shepherd is to bring the remains to the owner in order to be absolved of responsibility.[1] The question of symbolic import, however, is less clear. The figure of the lion represents someone or something in this verse, and the identity of that person or force has substantial implications for the interpretation of Amos 3:12 and the surrounding material. Accordingly, this study will examine the two most commonly adopted options for identifying the lion—Yahweh and the nation of Assyria—discussing biblical and extra-biblical support for and the interpretive consequences of each option. A third option, identifying the lion as Israel, will be proposed. Biblical and contextual evidence will be cited to demonstrate that this option is at least as plausible as the first two.

YAHWEH AS LION

The first strong possibility is that the lion represents Yahweh, wreaking destruction on Israel as punishment for their sins. Indeed, at first glance this

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1 A similar regulation appears in the Code of Hammurabi, according to Mays (1969:67).

seems to be the only reasonable reading, and many scholars accept it without much comment. The support for this position is substantial. In Amos 3:8, the parallel between אריה שאג and אדני יהוה דבר leaves no doubt as to the identification of Yahweh with the figure of the lion. The phrase יהוה מציון ישאג in 1:2 is also a clear appropriation of leonine imagery for descriptions of Yahweh, one that is echoed in Joel 4:16 (3:16 in English) and Jeremiah 25:30.[2] It is tempting to add Amos 3:4 to the list of verses supporting the divine-leonine synthesis in Amos, by virtue of its proximity to 3:8. Moreover, Edward Hope, claims that the actual behavior of lions is misunderstood by most interpreters and reinterprets the verse to reflect a warning of upcoming disaster for Israel (Hope 1991:204–5). Whether 3:4 is adduced in support or not, however, there is clearly precedent in Amos for identifying the figure of the lion with Yahweh.

Such an identification also draws support from the context in which 3:12 is found. In chapters 1 and 2, oracles announcing the coming punishment of various nations are proclaimed, each one beginning with the messenger formula כה אמר יהוה. This formula is also found in 3:12. If this is part of a parallel oracle against Israel, then the events described should, logically, also reflect Yahweh's punitive action. Since it is the lion doing the damage, then the lion must represent Yahweh. A declaration of divine punishment on Israel would certainly be in keeping with the message of Amos as a whole.

Biblical material outside of Amos also provides evidence in favor of viewing the lion as Yahweh. Other 8th century prophets, Hosea and Isaiah of Jerusalem, make frequent use of such imagery. In Hosea 5:14 and 13:7, God, speaking through the prophet, identifies himself in leonine terms, as a "שחל[3] to Ephraim" and "becoming like a שחל to them," respectively. Both of these divine self-identifications are cast in the context of a disastrous judgment of Israel, a context quite familiar to readers of Amos. The common perception of the lion as the mightiest and most dangerous of animals, implacable and unstoppable in its fury (Botterweck 1974:382), lent a dire urgency to the prophetic message. It is interesting to note, however, that Hosea 11:10 dem-

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2 Botterweck (1974:383) and Hall (1995:12) point out the parallel uses of the leonine שאג and the theophanic קולו in these verses as typical of a particular tradition, emphasizing divine judgment. Another example is Job 37:4.

3 According to Botterweck, שחל, while unclear in etymology, has generally been accepted as a term for "lion," although other translations, including "serpent" and "panther," depending on context, are attested in various places, such as LXX (1974:377).

onstrates an entirely different appropriation of the image of a lion. The roar of the lion in this verse still represents the voice of Yahweh, and still inspires fear and trembling in those who hear it, but rather than a message of judgment, it carries a message of hope. It is the lion's roar that will signal the end of Israel's punishment and their restoration to the land. Despite the possibility that this text is a later addition, given its assumption of the exile (Wolff 1974:203), it is certainly the case that the portrayal of Yahweh as a lion is a device well attested in Hosea.

Likewise, Isaiah employs lion images for Yahweh in more than one way. In Isaiah 15:9, the divine אריה is again a figure of judgment, this time on Moab. In 31:4, however, a similar lion image, again explicitly identified as Yahweh, is employed in the context of protection and preservation of Jerusalem. Here, the power of the divine warrior, יהוה צבאות, is turned back to its customary use, against the enemies of Jerusalem, whereas in some places throughout the prophetic literature, the divine warrior is portrayed as fighting against Israel in a stunning inversion of the commonly held order of things.[4] Isaiah's record of the prayer of Hezekiah also presents a leonine depiction of Yahweh giving punishment in relation to a single person, rather than a nation (38:14).

While the 8th century prophets make frequent use of the lion as a symbol for Yahweh, and their testimony must have the heaviest influence on our reading of Amos, it is worth noting that such imagery occurs elsewhere in the Old Testament as well. Jeremiah 49:19, along with the parallel text in 50:44, portrays the vengeance of Yahweh on the enemies of Israel, Edom and Babylon, respectively, as the depredations of an אריה, and in 25:38, the divine lion wreaks divine wrath on all the nations on the eschatological היום ההוא. Lamentations 3:10 demonstrates a parallel usage to Isaiah 38:14, with the divine lion seen as an expression of judgment upon an individual. In short, there is certainly ample scriptural evidence for identifying the lion in Amos 3:12 with Yahweh.

Such association of lions with the divine is not unique to Israel in the ancient Near East. Lion- and lioness-cults were common in Egypt, and the lion was often venerated as a real manifestation of the sun god. Images of lions also appear in association with many other deities, including Atum, Schu, Tefnut, Shesmu, and Horus. These associations appear to have been derived either from the god's connection with the sun or from the god's

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4 See, for example, Amos 3:13, 5:16, 9:1–6, Isaiah 3:1.

possession of a stereotypically leonine trait, like prowess in battle or blood-thirstiness (Botterweck 1974:378). The latter type of association seems particularly parallel to many of the Old Testament uses discussed above. Sumerian and Akkadian literature also depicts numerous gods and goddesses in leonine terms, particularly concentrating on violent, fighting-oriented images (Botterweck 1974:379–80), and there is a certain amount of archaeological evidence which presents various goddesses of the ancient Syrian people in connection with lions (Botterweck 1974:381). The association of lions with deity, then, was not idiosyncratic to Israel but was common among its neighbors throughout the ancient Near East (ANE).

The evidence for reading Amos 3:12 with Yahweh as the destroying lion is substantial within Amos itself, the rest of the Old Testament, and the literature and iconography of the surrounding nations. Such a reading, if adopted, would have several interpretive consequences. First, this reading clearly identifies Yahweh as Israel's opponent, at least for the moment. The image of Yahweh gnawing on the slain carcass of the nation, leaving no more than the worthless bits necessary to prove that destruction was complete, sets this opposition in stark relief. The complacent assumption by the בני ישראל in Samaria that Yahweh would save them from any danger is shattered by the identification of Yahweh as the very danger from which there is no salvation. As the "bits" retrieved by the shepherd indicate, there is nothing to be done when a lion visits the flock. There is no hope. All that will remain of Israel is a few worthless pieces that will serve to prove the finality of their destruction.

Such a reading also preserves the most common interpretation of the extremely difficult second half of 3:12. Regardless of the exact meaning and intent of בפאת מטה ובדמשק ערש, which identifies the particular בני ישראל in question, the object of Yahweh's predatory attentions is taken to be the same exploitive, indolent Samaritan upper class at which most, if not all, of Amos' message is directed.

ASSYRIA AS LION

A second plausible option is that the lion represents Assyria as an instrument of God's judgment against Israel. While there is no direct evidence for this interpretation within Amos, unless 3:12 itself is a reference to Assyria (Botterweck 1974:386), there are several facets of the context and content of Amos' message that make this reading attractive. First, Amos' clear interest in and knowledge of the geopolitical situation increases the likelihood that

the doom he foresaw was couched in such terms. The oracles against the nations in chapters 1 and 2 contain numerous demonstrations of this geo-political focus. For example, the oracle against Damascus/Aram refers to the Aramean campaign against Gilead in the last few years of the 9th century (Mays 1969:29–30), several decades prior to Amos' prophetic activity. Amos' contemporary Hosea even demonstrates familiarity with the military history of Assyria itself, referring to the 841 campaign of Shalmaneser III which destroyed the transjordan city of Beth-arbel in Hosea 10:14.[5]

Joseph Blenkinsopp has described the 8th century prophets as "dissident intellectuals" (1995:144), members of a cultural, economic, and literary elite, who provided intellectual leadership through social criticism in the transformation of Israel's faith brought on by the demise of the old clan system and the rise of the state.[6] The prophets are thus cast as the voices of the marginalized in terms of allegiance, as well as the messengers of Yahweh in terms of vocation. It need hardly be said that such a characterization fits very well with the message of Amos. If the prophets were indeed dissident intellectuals and social critics, it stands to reason that they would likely have been well educated, literate, well-informed people with a knowledge of, and—in Isaiah's case—direct involvement in (Blenkinsopp 1995:142), current and historic political events. Such a conception of the role and background of the prophets in general, and Amos in particular, is quite congenial to those who would see Assyria behind the figure of the lion in Amos 3:12.

But was the lion ever used as a symbol of Assyrian power? The 8th century prophetic writings preserve only veiled references, if that. Isaiah 5:29 describes the nation that Yahweh sends against Israel as roaring, growling, and carrying off its prey (Israel) like a לביא or a pride of כפרים.[7] It seems likely that Isaiah refers to Assyria, which, under Tiglath-pileser III carried out exactly such a destruction and "carrying off" of Israel's Galilee and Gilead territories in 734–732 (Cogan 1996:1150). It has also been proposed that the divine self-identifications with lion imagery in Hosea 5:14 and 13:7

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5 Blenkinsopp sees a reference to the same event in Amos 6:2, perhaps assuming that Calneh and Hamath fell during the same campaign. In any case, they were also under the dominion of Shalmaneser III, which may be the point of 6:2. See also Isaiah 10:9, although this verse appears to refer to Tiglath-pileser's 738 campaign (1995:142).

6 See also Walzer (1985:13–27).

7 Botterweck indicates that both לביא and כפר can refer to any young beast but often indicate lions or young lions in particular (1974:376–7).

Figure 1

are veiled references to Tiglath-pileser III and Shalmaneser V, respectively (Botterweck 1974:383–4), though there is no immediate evidence within the text for this claim.

Later prophetic literature, from the 7th century on, contains more depictions of Assyria and other enemy nations as lions. Jeremiah 2:14–15, referring to the plunderers of Israel, speaks of roaring כפרים. The "evil" and "great destruction" which Yahweh brings upon Israel "from the north" in 4:6–7, which is almost certainly Assyria, is an אריה which destroys whole nations in its going forth.[8] Most explicitly, Jeremiah describes the "king of Assyria" and King Nebuchadrezzar of Babylon as אריות who devoured Israel and gnawed on its bones, respectively, in 50:17. Nahum 2:11–12 describes the wantonly destructive power of the Ninevites (i.e. the Assyrians) with a rich variety of leonine vocabulary, as a preface to the announcement of Yahweh's judgment upon them.

A possible reason for the prevalence of lion imagery for the military leaders and power of nations in the Old Testament lies in the royal iconography practiced in the great nations of the ANE, particularly Egypt and Assyria it-

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8 There is no convincing reason to see this as a reference to the Scythian campaign against Egypt which is described by Herodotus, as proposed by Botterweck (1974:386). Assyria is a much more likely candidate to be described as "destroyer of nations," and would have threatened Palestine from the north.

Figure 2

self. In Egypt, the king was often portrayed in the company of lions, either hunting them as a demonstration of martial prowess,[9] fighting alongside them in battle (Fig. 1), and even as one of them himself (Fig. 2). A similar pattern holds true in Assyrian and other Mesopotamian materials. A 7th century wall painting from Tell 'Ahmar shows a king hunting lions (Fig. 3), as do reliefs from Ashurbanipal's palace in Nineveh (King 1989:274). Reliefs and statuary (Figs. 4 and 5) also depict kings as lions, emphasizing their deadly battle skills. In general, according to Othmar Keel, throughout the ancient Near East,

> (t)he mighty paws of the lion illustrate the merciless, irresistible grasp of tyrants; the lion's open maw denotes their dangerous, insatiable greed; the lion's fearsome roaring matches their invincible pride (1997:85–6).

A use of lion imagery to represent an invading monarch, particularly an Assyrian one, on Amos' part, would not have been unprecedented.

An identification of the lion in Amos 3:12 with Assyria would have several implications for interpretation. First and foremost, it must be noted that

9 Keel (1997:281–2) cites examples from depictions of Amenemhet and Tutankhamun. See also Pritchard (1969:419).

Figure 3

Figure 4

such an identification does not remove the predicted punishment of Israel
from the sphere of Yahweh's control. Indeed, Amos clearly views all the na-
tions as subject to Yahweh's will, as attested in 9:7–8. Thus, even if Amos does
have Assyria particularly in mind, the primary theological claim of God's
sovereignty is not weakened. Indeed, it could even be strengthened, if
Yahweh can control so great a nation as Assyria in the exaction of punish-
ment upon Israel.[10]

10 See also Isaiah 10:5–11.

Figure 5

The paradigm of prophecy as social critique by dissident intellectuals advanced by Walzer and Blenkinsopp would seem to require, or at least anticipate, that predictions of doom would be cast in a political and military idiom. Amos' prophecy certainly fits that mold. However, it is not absolutely necessary for the military disaster foreseen by Amos to have been pegged to a particular nation or ruler. Amos could very well have predicted disaster based only on the internal rottenness of Israel's society, assuming that such doom would come about as an application of Yahweh's control over the lives of nations. He could assume such destruction without knowledge or anticipation of a forthcoming era of westward and southern expansion of Assyrian influence.

Ultimately, it is the timing of that era of expansion which provides the strongest argument against seeing Assyria behind the lion in Amos 3:12. The re-establishment of Assyrian dominance in the Levant did not begin until the accession of Tiglath-pileser III to the Assyrian throne in 745. During the entire first half of the 8th century, the time of Amos' prophetic activity, Assyrian fortunes were at their lowest ebb. During the reign of Adad-nirari III (810–783) and the subsequent interregnum (782–745), Assyria's military might was in decline, its territorial influence shrunken, and its very existence as an independent state seriously threatened by the nation of Urartu (and

their sometime allies, the Arameans) to the north and the Babylonians to the
south (Grayson 1992:743–4). Indeed, it was this very eclipse of Assyrian
might, coupled with similar internal troubles in Egypt (Spalinger 1992:356–
8), which created the power vacuum into which Israel under Jeroboam II
and Judah under Uzziah expanded, achieving influence and prosperity un-
matched since the United Monarchy. All of the most explicit and clear bibli-
cal references to Assyria as lion, as mentioned above, are from sources no
earlier than the latter half of the 8th century, after Tiglath-pileser III seized
power and began his vigorous and successful program of reconquest and
expansion. It seems unlikely that Amos, if he sought to refer to a particular
nation as the instrument of divine wrath, would choose a nation as weak as
Assyria was in his day.[11]

A THIRD OPTION: ISRAEL'S RULERS

The two possibilities for the lion's identity discussed thus far, Yahweh and
Assyria, are the most commonly held, and both of them suppose that the
object of the dubious rescue described in 3:12b is the nation of Israel.[12] The
present paper proposes that a third option has a similar degree of plausibil-
ity—that the lion in Amos 3:12 represents the nation of Israel, or at least its
political and economic leadership, and those who will be "rescued" are the
poor who suffer under their depredations.

Three challenges must be met for Israel and its leaders to take their place
alongside Yahweh and Assyria as possible referents of the lion image in
Amos 3:12. First, the resultant reading must sound like something Amos
might have said, consistent with the devices and themes of the rest of the
book. Second, the reading must make sense, or at least as much sense as the
other readings, with the latter part of verse 12. Finally, verse 3:12 as read must
fit within the flow and form of its immediate context. If all three of these

11 Of course, this argument assumes that Amos is dated to the first half of the 8th
century, following most scholars, based on the references to Uzziah (1:1) and
Jeroboam (7:9-11). If one postulates a later date for Amos, Assyria's viability as a
potential identification of the lion is substantially enhanced.

12 There are other possible options, but none that has been broadly discussed or
proposed in relation to this text.

challenges are met, the case for Israel as a third possible referent is surely defensible.

There is substantial biblical precedent for characterizing Israel with lion imagery. In Micah 5:8 (5:7 in Hebrew), the restored remnant of Jacob is described as an אריה and a כפיר, tearing and destroying its enemies beyond hope of rescue. A similar "Israel as tearing/destroying lion" motif is evident in passages from the later prophets, as well. In Jeremiah 2:30, the sword of Israel devours the prophets of Yahweh like a ravening אריה. Ezekiel 22:25 portrays the "princes"[13] of Israel as a roaring lion, this time tearing and devouring people, presumably the poor. The princes in question are accused of hoarding treasure and "making widows." In verse 27 the "officials" of the nation are accused, this time with wolf imagery, of "destroying lives to get selfish gain," in what appears to be a parallel to verse 25. The affinity between this verse and the proposed reading of Amos 3:12 is clear. Another, possibly even clearer parallel is found in Zephaniah 3:3. In this הוי oracle against Jerusalem, the oppression and defilement which characterize the life of the city are laid at the feet of the "officials and judges," the social and political elite, who are again portrayed as אריות שאגים.[14] These prophetic texts, along with Jeremiah 12:8, which uses leonine imagery to depict Israel's rebellion against Yahweh, represent an ironic inversion of a widely-practiced custom of using animals in general, and lions in particular, to symbolize the positive qualities of kings and elites (Roberts 1991:213). Such inversion of common symbols, along with the themes of economic and judicial abuse, are characteristic of Amos no less than his later prophetic colleagues.[15]

Positive symbolic use of animals for nobles and leaders was widespread in the ANE. The above discussion of lion imagery in the royal iconography of Egypt and Assyria gives witness to this phenomenon, as do Hebrew, Ugaritic, and Phoenician sources (Miller 1970:177–8). The tribal blessings in Genesis 49 and Deuteronomy 33, the prophecies of Balaam in Numbers 23–24, and the allegory in Ezekiel 19:1–9 attest to the existence of this practice

13 Following LXX over the MT, per Zimmerli (1979:465).

14 Another possible, though later, parallel is suggested in 4Q169, the *pesher* on Nahum, which appears to interpret the lion imagery in Nahum 2:12-13 with reference to the abusive elite in Israel and their foreign allies.

15 In the previous discussion of Assyria as a possible referent of the lion imagery in 3:12, the witness of later prophetic sources was discounted due to the difference in geopolitical conditions between the time of Amos' activity and that of the later prophets. However, the internal conditions of Israel and Judah remained

in biblical writings as well.[16] Thus, there was a well-established tradition available for Amos to re-appropriate and invert the image.

As suggested above, a negative depiction of Israel's elite using animal imagery would represent an inversion of the customary use of such imagery. Amos is notorious for employing such inversions of common symbols and traditions, and space only permits the mention of a few examples. "Come to Bethel—and transgress; to Gilgal—and multiply transgression," he cries in 4:4, twisting what appears to have been a familiar "call to worship" used in the official sanctuaries of the day (Wolff 1977:218) into a scathing indictment of hollow religious practices. Amos 9:1–6 utilizes the traditional imagery of the divine warrior: Yahweh killing with the sword, earth melting, the land reverting to watery chaos, and the very forces of nature entering into battle at Yahweh's command. The twist here (as mentioned above) is that Yahweh the warrior is fighting against Israel, rather than for it, as was customary. Finally, in perhaps the most famous inversion of them all, Amos works a shocking reversal of the traditional picture of the "Day of Yahweh" in 5:18–20. These three examples are more than adequate to establish that prophetic inversion was a device used by Amos with considerable frequency.

The intention of the proposed inversion is also in character for Amos. The indictment of the rich who exploit and destroy the poor for their own selfish gain is probably the preeminent theme of Amos' prophecy. Furthermore, lions were often used as symbols of just such rapacity and violence, as noted above. In short, it is entirely plausible that Amos used lion imagery in a prophetic inversion to indict the leaders of Israel for their conduct toward the poor.

The relationship between the two halves of Amos 3:12 has been the subject of much discussion, none of which has been conclusive. The text of 3:12b is almost certainly corrupt as given in MT, as no reading that makes complete historical and semantic sense has been proposed (Wolff 1977:196). The present paper advocates the adoption of Rabinowitz's emendation, in which the consonantal text of the last two words is redivided, from ובדמשק ערש

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fairly consistent over this time period, at least *vis à vis* the situation of the poor, so the later witnesses are correctly included here.

16 Genesis 49:9, Deuteronomy 33:20, 22, Numbers 23:24, 24:9, and the Ezekiel passage all make use of lion imagery in positive reference to Israel and its leaders, although there is at least a hint of the prophetic inversion in Ezekiel 19:1–9.

to וּבַד מֶשֶׁק עָרֶשׂ, translating to "and a part from a leg of a bed (1961:229)."
The entire verse, however, should then be read, *contra* Rabinowitz:

> Thus says Yahweh:
> Just as the shepherd rescues from the mouth of the lion
> two shank bones,
> or the tip of an ear,
> So will be rescued the children of Israel,
> who dwell in Samaria on the corner of a couch,
> and a part from a leg of a bed.

The key to this reading is the interpretation of the last two lines. It seems reasonable that those who have no more than a couple of sticks of furniture are likely to be the poorest and most vulnerable members of Samaritan society. Thus, the picture painted by this oracle is of an oppression as fierce and all-consuming as the ravening lion who represents the oppressors. The injustice of Israel is such that there will barely be enough left of those victimized by it to identify. Two shank bones and the tip of an ear (which it appears might be the sort of thing Samaritan merchants might offer to the poor for sale!) will be all that remains of the poorest of Samaria's residents.[17] The only relief available is death. This reading of verse 12 seems at least as coherent as any other that has been proposed.

The immediate context of Amos 3:12 is that of a series of oracles directed against Israel. In 3:9–10 Ashdod and Egypt are summoned to witness the crimes of oppression committed by Israel. Yahweh announces punishment in 3:11, and 3:13–15 contain more descriptions of punishment. Traditional readings of 3:12 include it in the statement of punishment, thus making 3:11–15 a unit, at least thematically. In literary terms, however, 3:12 is a self-contained unit, beginning with a typical messenger formula, and containing no real stylistic connection to the foregoing oracle (Wolff 1977:197). The proposed reading of 3:12 casts the section between 3:9 and 3:15 as alternating

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17 It is worth noting that בני ישראל, which according to this proposal here refers to the poor and exploited of Samaria, is used four other times in Amos. In all of them (2:11, 3:1, 4:5, and 9:7) the phrase is vocative, a form of Yahweh's direct address to the people. Such vocative use of בני ישראל is also found elsewhere in the 8th century prophets (Isaiah 27:12, 31:6, Hosea 4:1). Amos' use of the phrase here may well be another inversion, intended to remind the oppressive ruling class that these poor were also בני ישראל, and deserving of better treatment.

statements of indictment and punishment, with both indictments (3:9–10 and 3:12) cast in highly symbolic terms. Indeed, the first three verses of chapter four continue this pattern, with a symbol-heavy indictment in 4:1 and punishment in 4:2–3. It appears that an identification of the ארי in Amos 3:12 as the oppressive ruling class of Israel is quite plausible, at least as much as the two options examined above.

CONCLUSION

The current study has surveyed the two most commonly proposed possibilities for the identity of the lion in Amos 3:12, Yahweh and Assyria. Analysis of the support for each reading in biblical and other ancient Near Eastern sources was conducted. A third possibility, that the lion represents the ruling class of Israel in its oppression and exploitation of the poor, was presented, and shown to be in conformity to substantial biblical precedent. Consideration of the interpretive implications of each position led to the conclusion that Yahweh and Israel are both quite plausible options, with Assyria somewhat less so, due to the probable historical setting of Amos. It remains nevertheless a viable option.

FIGURES†

(fig. 1 = Keel 1997 fig. 103)
(fig. 2 = Keel 1997 fig. 163)
(fig. 3 = Keel 1997 fig. 382)
(fig. 4 = Keel 1997 fig. 135)
(fig. 5 = Keel 1997 fig. 102)

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God's Human Speech: A Practical Theology of Proclamation. By Charles L. Bartow. Eerdmans, 1997, 169 pages.

In speaking of Jesus Christ, Charles Bartow states, "[W]hat he was and what he did were fully commensurable with what he preached. There was no separation of the medium from the message, of the man from his work" (p. 98). The same could be said of Charles Bartow and his book. The man who teaches passionately and preaches committedly, is fully embodied in the voice of his own text. Having worked with the author in and out of the classroom both as student and colleague for the past five years, it is impossible not to see the man in action and to hear resonances of his voice while engaging this text. The strength of this present work is that this is distilled Bartow: richly textured, keenly reasoned, and passionately articulated. In reading Bartow's text, one cannot separate from his work this flesh and blood teacher and preacher who has labored for thirty years to articulate the deeply perceived intuition that God *speaks* through the human words of Scripture and through the words of those who faithfully give voice to that witness through public proclamation.

What is at stake for Bartow is the nature of revelation, that is God's *self-revelation* in Jesus Christ as attested by Scripture through the power of the Holy Spirit. When one says, "Hear the Word of God" as Scripture is read and then interpreted in proclamation, it is not an invitation to hear the preacher. Rather, it is spoken to "alert people to the fact that, with what we say, God is about to make something of them" (p. 9). It is the *Word* of God that does this. The "words" we attend to are God's *human* speech.

In a deconstructionist, postmodern era Bartow asserts that something definitive *can* be said about God's self-revelation. Bartow argues that there is an objective referent to which both literal and figurative language point. In speaking out of human experience of divine action, it is figurative language that provides much more "abundant" insight into that referent, the God attested in Scripture. Bartow lifts up three tropes of human speech that God uses to reveal God's self: *oxymoron, metaphor,* and *metonymy.* In highlighting these three figures, Bartow is able, in an age of radical mistrust of truisms, to demonstrate how God's human speech, that is public reading, proclamation and interpretation of Scripture, both disconfirms and *confirms* expectations of what God's Word is for us.

When divine self-disclosure disconfirms our previous experience of God, we employ the linguistic gesture *oxymoron* in the endeavor to name

the inexplicable: a bush burning, yet not consumed; a virgin mother; a human who is fully God; a crucified, yet risen Savior; a foolishness that is wise (p. 12). On the other hand, when God's self-revelation confirms our previous experience of God, the language we employ in the service of naming this continuity is *metaphor*. Metaphors, such as Jesus' parables, enable humans to speak of divine reality (e.g. the kingdom of God) by way of the common and mundane: lost coins, planting and reaping, yearning for a lost child (p. 13).

The theological lynchpin for Bartow's work lies in his treatment of *metonymy*. In metonymy "objects of little import in themselves stand for other objects or persons of great import" (p. 16). Thus, a crown can refer to the one who wears it, as in, "The Crown wishes it decreed." Bartow makes the case that in preaching as well as in the sacraments God reveals God's self *metonymically*, where the lesser thing refers to and reveals the greater reality: in the proclamation of the word, the Word reveals itself to us; in the bread and cup Christ is revealed to us. In *metonymy* there is not only *revelation*, there is *presence*. True to a Reformed understanding of the real presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper, in *metonymy* the "presence" of the thing signified is present. Preaching functions as *metonym*. The Word of God is present in the speaking of those words that God has taken up in service of divine self-initiative on behalf of humanity.

Bartow's treatment of these figurative tropes returns a certain "tensiveness" to the act of proclamation: speaking the unspeakable, describing the indescribable, making present a seeming absence. This tensiveness is grounded in the theological paradox of Jesus Christ as fully God and fully human. In upholding this understanding of Jesus Christ, Bartow directs our attention to that tensive point where continuity and discontinuity are "conflagrated" (chap. 4), namely, in the communion of *actio divina* and *homo performans*. *Actio divina* is God's divine initiative, God's definitive Word on behalf of the world. This Word comes to humanity through *homo performans*, embodying, speaking, and enacting this divine self-attestation.

Jesus Christ is the definitive locus of both *actio divina* and *homo performans* (p. 95). This same Jesus is present in the faithful proclamation of the Church. How this is possible is what Bartow artistically articulates. The crux of the matter is expressed in his own kerygmatic formula: In Jesus Christ, God takes us as we are and presses us into the service of what God would have us be (p. 49). To this end, God employs human speech. To this end, God employs human beings in the act of proclamation.

Charles Bartow is a judicious writer. He states clearly and passionately his confessional stance. Like the figurative language he engages, though, he wants to leave room for a gracious openness in interpretation. Yet, the spectre of "faithful" imagining haunts this book. The tacit tensiveness of this work is of a man who is himself a walking tome of poetic literature, who grapples with granting license to imagine God in humanity's own image. Bartow does not negate human experience. In fact he maintains that the body is the locus of much of theological knowing. In matters of primacy of divine intiative and human experience, however, he does hold close to the Reformation dictum: the church and its understanding are reformed *according to the Word of God.*

Michael Polanyi speaks of the intuitive dimension of knowledge, that we know far more than we can say. If this is true, then there is a wealth of practical and imaginative knowledge left to be articulated by Charles Bartow. Bartow's present work says a lot. He offers practical steps to evaluate one's own and others´ preaching (chap. 5). Yet this is a dense work and requires reflective reading, indwelling and embodying. Bartow's words function figuratively in that they point to a much larger body of knowledge. This work is the distillation of years spent in the classroom and pulpit, refining ways to speak of what he intuitively knows and does. This practical theology of proclamation stems from the flesh and blood reality of a man who has been encountered by the solemn and ardent love of the very God he proclaims.

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Twin City Tales: A Hermeneutical Reassessment of Tula and Chichén Itzá. By Lindsay Jones. University Press of Colorado, 1995, xii and 482 pages.

Architecture speaks. It says something about the people who build it as well as about those who use it. And the interpretation of architectural meanings says much about the people who interpret. Lindsay Jones reads the architectures of ancient Mesoamerica for the tales they might tell; at the same time he critically reinterprets the tales told by modern interpreters. His methodological suggestions precipitate a fresh approach to understanding ancient cultures, especially their religious aspects and meanings.

Twin City Tales ostensibly addresses the uncanny similitude between architectural, sculptural, and other cultural remains from two pre-Columbian Mesoamerican cities, Tula in the present-day state of Hidalgo, Mexico, and Chichén Itzá in the present-day state of Yucatán, Mexico. Jones urges his readers to reconsider the accepted narratives explaining the puzzling similitude between these cities by examining the historiographical basis of those narratives and by considering a hermeneutics of sacred architecture that suggests alternative narratives.

Explaining the striking similarities of Tula and Chichén Itzá has preoccupied scholars of ancient Mesoamerica from the time of Charnay's first descriptions in the 1880s. Much of the debate over the decades centers on a story of Toltecs from the central plateau of present-day Mexico who imposed the architectural styles of their capital city of Tula following their conquest of the Maya of Chichén Itzá. But Jones insists that the debate surrounding the architectural similitude between Tula and Chichén Itzá derives from a problem that has confronted Europeans and their descendants from at least the time of Columbus: the European encounter of the indigenous other and the consequent imaginings of Indians in the most ambivalent and contradictory of terms. In Jones's estimation, the apparent similitude between Tula and Chichén Itzá that various interpreters have noticed for more than a century did not come about from the collision of two historical peoples, as many of these interpreters have claimed; instead, they emerge from the collision of two idealized images of the American Indian: the noble, intelligent, and contemplative Maya on the one hand and the savage, barbaric, and ruthless Mexicans on the other.

By relating the narrower problem of Tula and Chichén Itzá to a larger tradition of European imaginings of native Americans, Jones seeks to clear the way for his own interpretation. In doing so, he takes the reader into a broadly conceived methodological contemplation of how best to intervene in the reception history of the Tula/Chichén Itzá conundrum. Jones proposes a creative hermeneutics that begins with a hermeneutics of suspicion. But he is not satisfied with this deconstructive exercise that amounts to, in Jones's words, "the sort of 'diagnostic hermeneutic' that is dedicated primarily to laying bare the abuses, prejudices, and distortions of previous (and our own) generations of scholars" (p. 14). A creative hermeneutics, according to Jones, must follow its suspicions with a hermeneutics of recovery or replenishment. This second methodological phase serves as a constructive and heuristic approach to positing alternative hypotheses. Jones contends that "although they

are always interpenetrating, the hermeneutics of suspicion pave the way for a hermeneutics of retrieval" (p. 14).

In his turn towards a hermeneutics of replenishment, Jones makes two broad methodological recommendations. First, he introduces the concept of *ritual-architectural event* which he describes as "a relational notion that subsumes the work of architecture, the human users, and the ceremonial occasion that brings the architecture and people together into to-and-fro involvement" (p. 186). The advantage of this concept, according to Jones, emerges in part from a recognition that the mechanism of hermeneutical reflection manifests itself on two levels: at the level of the actual experience of the ritual-architectural event and at the level of interpretation of that experience. Consequently, this first recommendation shifts emphasis away from the interpretation of built forms as objects in themselves and toward the interpretation of the human experience of architecture.

Jones's second methodological recommendation involves what he calls "*a framework of ritual-architectural priorities*" as a "more hermeneutically and religiously significant principle for organizing and comparing specific sacred architectures" (p. 186). This framework, however, and its eleven general categories of priorities are not intended as a classificatory system for cataloging architecture or ritual-architectural events. "Rather," Jones explains, "it is *a heuristic tool* designed to evoke productive, hermeneutical conversations between interpreters and specific ritual-architectural circumstances; it is a methodological stimulant rather than a system of cataloging" (p. 212).

The interpretive force of Jones's methodological recommendations aims at devising a heuristic approach for creatively rethinking our interpretations of specific architectural objects. In their application, his recommendations can dramatically alter how we think about sacred buildings and other built forms. In the case of Tula and Chichén Itzá, for instance, the similitude so obvious to generations of observers suddenly becomes less apparent. Jones demonstrates that when the interpreter looks at the architecture, sculpture, and art of these two locales from the vantage of ritual-architectural priorities rather than in terms of form, technique, tradition, or other typical rubrics of comparison, the similarities become less prominent and the differences loom large. And those differences render the tales of Toltec conquest all the more unlikely.

The alternative tale that Jones presents may seem anticlimatic following his innovative methodological suggestions. Certainly, the narrative that emerges from his analysis, one that focuses on the processes of a cosmopoli-

tan, multiethnic synthesis, lacks the drama and flashiness of previous interpretations focused on bold Toltecs venturing into the Yucatán to conquer the passive Maya. But Jones's conclusions are not so much about retrieving an empirical reality as they are about finding a way to engage in plausible hermeneutical conversations. Thus, his methodological contribution highlights dialogue as the mode of scholarly understanding. And dialogues expand rather than restrict the potentials for interpretation, as Jones adequately demonstrates.

At the same time, however, Jones remains aware of the limits of dialogue and the extent to which his approach might prove useful. A significant interpretation, after all, depends on the interests, purposes, and intentions of the interpreter. Likewise, a persuasive account depends to some degree on the predisposition of those being persuaded. Jones repeatedly emphasizes that his own purposes are those of a historian of religions; he never claims his methodological insights as a panacea for a wider range of academic interests. But it would be unfortunate if cultural historians in general dismissed his work; the kinds of dialogues that Jones encourages have applications for a variety of scholars working with cultural artifacts. Above all, Jones reminds us that the artifacts of culture gain their significance in the experiences of humans, both individually and collectively. The stories we tell of these artifacts, regardless of our disciplinary commitments, must account for the history of human encounter with the objects, including our own encounters.

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Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. By Walter Brueggemann. Fortress Press, 1997, xxi and 777 pages.

Walter Brueggemann's monumental *Theology of the Old Testament* stands as the latest of this master interpreter's accomplishments. Brueggemann has been a leading interpreter of the Old Testament for over a quarter century. His publications include important works on the Psalms, the Pentateuch, and biblical theology, as well as significant commentaries on Genesis, Exodus, Jeremiah, and Isaiah. This volume is an attempt to interpret the theological witness of the Old Testament in a synthetic manner. As such, it is

certainly not Brueggemann's final contribution to biblical scholarship, but it may be his crowning achievement.

Brueggemann's *Theology* can basically be divided into six sections. The first section consists of a two-part history of Old Testament theology. In this section Brueggemann reviews the history of the discipline from its genesis in the Reformation up through the current situation. He treats the contributions of Luther, Calvin, Gabler, Eichrodt, von Rad, Childs, Jon Levenson, James Barr, Rolf Rendtorff, Phyllis Trible, and Sally McFague. As Brueggemann well knows, no historical account is written from an uninterested, objective perspective, and Brueggemann's history certainly isn't. His history of biblical scholarship is told from his own perspective, and it is written to feed into the main body of this book. For example, one of the interests which Brueggemann's history serves is his interest in writing an ahistorical, synthetic theology. Even so, this may be the finest, most accessible review of biblical theology available.

Brueggemann has organized the main part of his *Theology* around the metaphor of a trial. By means of this metaphor, Brueggemann is able to take up the often conflicting and contradictory theological witnesses of different sections of the Old Testament, yet it allows him to keep these contradictory theological witnesses under one umbrella. Brueggemann entitles Part I, "Israel's Core Testimony." Here Brueggemann focuses on the short, verbal sentences that he considers to be the heart of Israel's testimony about God: Yahweh is, creates, delivers, saves, and so on. He then moves on to the nouns: Yahweh as Judge, Kin, Healer, and so forth. In places, Brueggemann's interpretation is brilliant. This section and the one that follows are the heart of the book.

Part II is entitled "Israel's Countertestimony." In keeping with the trial metaphor, Brueggemann imagines this as a "cross-examination" of the core testimony. Here Israel hurls unrelenting questions at the basic theological witness. The loci of this section include Yahweh's hiddenness, providence, and theodicy.

In Part III, the trial metaphor is continued, as Brueggemann turns to "Israel's Unsolicited Testimony." This includes the Old Testament witness concerning Israel itself, humanity, the nations, and creation. Part IV, "Israel's Embodied Testimony," attempts to treat the institutions of Israel such as kingship, the Torah, prophecy, cult, and seer. Part V, "Prospects for Theological Interpretation," rounds off the book by placing Brueggemann's constructive work in dialogue with the issues that were raised in his history of scholarship section.

Brueggemann has taken an enormous risk—one with which I am not altogether happy—by choosing "trial" as the dominant metaphor for his theology. The strength of the metaphor is that it allows him to address the full diversity and range of the Old Testament theological witness without automatically subsuming one part of that witness. Further, the metaphor allows him to keep the theological witness of the Old Testament from disintegrating into nothing more than a series of isolated views. But there are risks in the metaphor. First, Brueggemann uses the trial metaphor very differently than it is used in the Bible. For Brueggemann, humanity offers the witness and is the jury; God is the object of the testimony. In the Old Testament, when the trial metaphor is used, God is judge, prosecutor, and jury while humanity is the defendant. In this same vein, the Church has historically considered the Bible to be *God's* Word (God's testimony), but Brueggemann's metaphor reduces the Bible to human word (Israel's testimony). Second, the choice of the trial metaphor is perhaps unfortunate. Recent public experiences of trials have suggested that trials are not venues of truth, but rather are merely places where power and money dominate. I am thinking of such celebrated trials as those of the Rosenthals, O. J. Simpson, the Menendez brothers, and the trial of President Clinton in the U. S. Senate. If the popular imagination has little faith in the fairness and justice of trials, then the metaphor might be an unfortunate choice for understanding the theological value of the Old Testament.

Several other issues are worth mentioning. First, could not the "Core Testimony" and "Countertestimony" have been reversed? On what basis did Brueggemann privilege the positive statements about God's activity and identity over the questions that Israel raised about God's hiddenness? Why does he choose to start with the verbal sentences about God? Second, what is the role of historical criticism in biblical theology? What is the role of history in biblical theology? Brueggemann's great synthetic interpretation of the theological witness of the Old Testament leaves unanswered both the "thorny issue of happenedness" and the relevance of historical-critical approaches to interpretation.

In spite of these questions, Brueggemann's *Theology* is an amazing achievement; indeed at places it is brilliant. Nothing on the scale or skill of Brueggemann's work has been seen in many years, and it may be that nothing soon will appear to equal it.

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For This Land: Writings on Religion in America. By Vine Deloria Jr. Edited by James Treat. Routledge, 1998, 310 pages.

For This Land, a collection of essays by Vine Deloria on Native American theology, culture, and politics, began as part of James Treat's master's thesis and eventually grew into a collaborative effort with Deloria himself. The anthology is not a complete collection of Deloria's writings on religion; in fact, Deloria resists attempts to systematize his work into any theoretical or ideological unity. But Treat has organized the book in a thematic and chronological order that "reflects the development of his thought over time."

The book opens with an essay by Treat entitled "An American Critique of Religion" covering the details of Deloria's life and career. In 1974, *Time* magazine listed eleven "theological superstars of the future" that included Vine Deloria. But despite this acclaim, his work has received a rather mixed reception by the religious academy. Treat tells us that this has more to do with academic parochialism and reactions against Deloria's polemical style than with any weakness in the work itself. And, while many readers take *God is Red* to be the definitive statement of Deloria's views on religion, Treat intends for the essays he has collected to demonstrate Deloria's engagement with a wider range of religious issues and concerns.

The book is divided into five sections, each with a brief introductory essay by Treat. The first division, "White Church, Red Power," covers the complex relationship between Christian missionaries and tribal activists. The essays chronicle the rise of tribal political activism during the 1970s and connect the character of the movement to the "problems, ideologies, and energies of domestic America" at the time. The writings range from an excerpt from his book *Custer Died For Your Sins* that is very critical of missionary institutions to a more balanced account of the excesses of both church officials and activists drawn from *The Indian Affair*.

The second section, "Liberating Theology," contains Deloria's critiques of liberation theology. According to Treat, these critiques are among the first to challenge liberation theology from the *left*. In these essays, Deloria concludes that liberation theology is problematic because of its dependence on "Western philosophical assumptions and modes of social analysis." For liberation to be taken seriously, he argues, theology itself must be liberated from "Western theories of knowledge and the construction of a new and more comprehensive synthesis of human knowledge and experience." He faults minority, feminist, and liberation theologians for ignoring the radical social transfor-

mations occurring around them and foresees new moral visions of "planetary existence" coming from grassroots leaders rather than professional theologians.

This is followed by "Worldviews in Collision," a series of essays written about the differences between Native American and Christian theologies. Deloria's distinctions are organized around four key differences: views of the nature of the universe, the nature of human experience, the nature of religion, and attitudes towards life itself. Deloria tells us that, "Tribal peoples do not hold a doctrine of creation intellectually; they may tell their stories of origins, but their idea of creation is a kinship with the world. Christians on the other hand have reasonably precise doctrines about creation, but seem to have no feeling that they are a part of the world."

His arguments in this section often hinge on rather problematic distinctions drawn between idealized worldviews. These are defined by "reason and reflection:" whereas Christians have reason, Native Americans are reflective. Treat tells the reader that Deloria's dichotomy is "commonly misread as an exercise in essentialist identity politics" but that Deloria is "more ambitious... he is after a unified theory of religion grounded in collective human experiences of specific natural environments." However, even when the terms of this argument are shifted to differences between "salvation history" and "sacred land" as rubrics for religious identity, the limitations of employing ideal types in analysis of Christianity and Native American religion quickly become very clear.

The title of section four, "Habits of the State," is a play on Robert Bellah's *Habits of the Heart*. Deloria argues that habits (behaviors and normative assumptions) are often less dependent on the content of people's hearts than on the political milieu in which they live. In this set of essays Deloria turns his attention towards the status of religious freedom in America. The final essay in this section, "Secularism, Civil Religion and the Religious Freedom of American Indians," argues that the conflict between Native American religion and American civil religion is derived from the fact that the former rejects devotion to the state.

The final section, "Old Ways in a New World," examines the popularity of Indian religious traditions among non-Indians and evaluates present efforts to revive traditional religions. Treat has included Deloria's introduction to *Black Elk Speaks*, a noteworthy defense of John Neihardt's project. Deloria admonishes us that while it is difficult to tell whether we are hearing Black Elk or Neihardt's voice in the text, it should not matter. Instead, the book should

be read as a dialogue that expresses transcendent truths about the human experience.

In most of these assembled essays, Deloria employs a common strategy in his critiques of Christian or "Western" thought. First, he frames cultural, scientific, and socio-scientific Truth claims as secular manifestations of religious beliefs in order to undermine their epistemic authority. He then moves to an attempt to recover the historical truths contained in tribal mythic narratives, juxtaposing what he terms colonial *ideologies* and indigenous *realities*. While Deloria often has been accused of wanting it both ways—that is, appealing to Truth and Authenticity in Native American beliefs while critiquing "Western" epistemology—he has a fascinating habit of confronting the reader with arguments that at first seem reductive but turn out to be marvelously subtle and complicated in their conclusions.

This volume provides a pedagogical gold mine. It is a fine source of individual reading selections that stimulate discussion of the politics of Native American religion and encourage debate over the paradoxes of religious appropriation and reinvention. Moreover, Treat's loosely chronological ordering allows for a reading of the entire collection as a diachronic mapping of problems and issues in the study of Native American religion in recent decades.

—ROBERTO LINT SAGARENA
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology. By Francis Watson. Eerdmans, 1998, viii and 344 pages.

This book sharpens and elaborates the author's earlier book *Text, Church and World* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994) in which he makes a good case for the priority of theological interpretation of the biblical texts over other interpretive approaches. In response to several criticisms of his earlier work, Francis Watson puts forth a stronger and more sophisticated proposal for doing biblical theology in a theological context. His central thesis is that Christian faith demands a theological approach to the Bible because it "has its own distinctive reasons for concern with the Bible" (p. viii). In response to this Christian demand, Watson sets forth an interdisciplinary biblical theology. Thus, Watson's "biblical theology" is first committed to overcoming

the disciplinary boundary and autonomy of three interrelated but virtually separate disciplines centering around the Bible: systematic theology, Old Testament theology, and New Testament theology. Watson laments that the separation of biblical theology from systematic theology impoverishes Christians' theological engagement with the Bible. Moreover, Watson diagnoses that resistance against theological engagement with the Bible results in the separation and self-sufficiency of OT and NT scholarship. Watson concludes that such disciplinary boundaries and autonomy hinder sustained attempts to interpret the biblical texts theologically. He goes on to state that current interpretive paradigms such as historical-critical, literary-sociological, and post-modern interpretive moves systematically distort their object of interpretation. However, Watson takes care to distinguish his interdisciplinary biblical theology from both the Biblical Theology Movement of the 1950s and 1960s and current postmodern radical hermeneutics.

This book is divided into two interrelated but distinct parts: Part One, "Studies in Theological Hermeneutics" and Part Two, "The Old Testament in Christological Perspective." The first study capitalizes on both modern and post-modern hermeneutical and historiographical theory (A. Cook and P. Ricoeur) in order to free gospel scholarship from its positivistic tendency to differentiate the so-called historical Jesus from the Christ of faith. In this study he concludes that the gospels are "a narration that is both theologically motivated and genuinely historiographical" (p. 10). Watson's discussion, however, is given wholly to hermeneutical and theoretical discussion without illustrating the hermeneutical principle he is advocating. The second study is devoted to refuting deconstructionist readings of the biblical texts, which emphasize textual multiplicity and indeterminacy. Through his careful analysis of the Transfiguration event in Mark 9, Watson proposes reading the gospel of Mark in light of this event in that it represents a form of the one single gospel: Jesus Christ. In opposition to a reader-oriented hermeneutic, the third study upholds the priority of authorial intention as the location of textual meaning by applying speech-act theory to the biblical writings.

What is assumed in these first three studies is that "theological interpretation must be oriented towards the external truth mediated through the biblical texts" (p. 12). Watson is adamant that "the truth of God is textually mediated over against theologies that downplay the irreducible textuality of Christian truth-claims" (p. 12). The fourth chapter seeks to lay bare "a variety of anti-textual, anti-scriptural strategies in the theologies of Schleiermacher, Harnack, and Bultmann" (p. 12). The study challenges these scholars' obses-

sion with the *Sache* of Christianity—an obsession that risks eliminating the textuality (Jewishness) of the Old Testament. In a sense, this chapter forms a transition to Part Two in that it hints at seeing the two testaments in interdependent relationship moving toward a single center, the Christ event.

In Part II, the fifth study examines Eichrodt, von Rad, and Childs' theological endeavors with special attention to their theological understanding of the interrelationship between the Old and New Testaments. Here Watson endorses von Rad's typological and salvation historical interpretation of the Old Testament to perceive the canonical shape of the Christian Old Testament with special focus on its progress toward the Christ. In opposition to two dominant understandings of creation—Moltmann's eschatological understanding and J. Barr's natural theological approach—the sixth study emphasizes the particular role of the creation narrative within the biblical narrative as a whole. The seventh study asserts that the Genesis texts are to be interpreted along christological rather than philosophical and anthropological lines, on the basis of the NT's identification of Jesus with the image of God. Overall, Watson's christological reading of OT texts aims at reviving "a central concern of traditional Christian OT interpretation, long suppressed by the hermeneutics of the Enlightenment" (p. 16). Through his analysis of Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*, in the final chapter, Watson affirms the essential Jewishness of Christian faith and proposes reading the Christian Old Testament as the Jewish "semantic matrix of Christian faith" (p. 17).

In sum, no one can avoid these sophisticated and at the same time practical issues as long as s/he wishes to work out a biblical theology that seeks to be a more self-conscious ecclesial enterprise, because any theological interpretation is bound to involve a normative use of the Bible. Historically considered, biblical theology has moved from serving a dogmatic concern to being a biblical theology that replaces systematic theology. Thus, it has lost its relevance to dogmatic theology. Serious biblical theologians cannot escape the responsibility of bringing their own biblical exegesis to bear on the dogmatic concerns of the faith community. There is no need to fear the encroachment of dogmatic theology on biblical exegesis, given that today's dogmatic concerns no longer have a unilateral influence on biblical theology. They may rather help discern significant interpretive issues that face all types of readers of the Bible and inform them of how they are exposed to philosophical and theological currents. Even if we admit to the need for cooperation between biblical theology and systematic theology, however, there still remains a question about how biblical theology relates to and interacts with systematic the-

ology in a more concrete theological setting. Watson's book pays little atten-
tion to this procedural issue. How could Watson respond to those who both
engage in the historical-critical practice and are firmly committed to the abid-
ing authority of the biblical texts, but do not necessarily agree that any
significant dialogue with systematic theology should take place? Such schol-
ars may tend to think that the theological significance of a text may be de-
rived directly from its literal, historical meaning without any need for an
additional disciplinary framework. However, we need to admit that there are
many instances in which other theological disciplines including systematic
theology would inform a more theological reading of the Bible. On a delicate
issue like homosexuality, an interdisciplinary dialogue between biblical
scholarship and other disciplines such as systematic theology and practical
theology may help the Church to plot its course somewhere between text and
context. In conclusion, this book certainly contributes to enriching inter-
disciplinary dialogue by focusing on a theological interpretation of the Bible
within an ecclesial setting.

—HAE KWON KIM
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Missional Church: A Vision for the Sending of the Church in North America.
Edited by Darrell L. Guder. The Gospel and Our Culture Series. William B.
Eerdmans, 1998, viii and 280 pages.

The editor acknowledges that this book is not simply another "how-to
manual" for "every conceivable problem a struggling congregation might
face," nor is it yet another analysis of the crises which the church in North
America encounters (p. 2). It is a volume written by an ecumenical group of
authors who at least claim to recognize the reality that they are located "eth-
nically, ecclesially, geographically, and intellectually" (p. vi). Guder, et. al. un-
dertake a valiant attempt to grapple with the challenge of North American
religiosity, which they define as becoming more pluralistic, individualistic
and private. It is a weighty endeavor which seeks to find spiritual and theo-
logical answers to the crises Christianity confronts in the North American
mission field. Guder maintains that these answers will not be found at the
level of method and problem solving (p.3). In this regard, the authors provide
a unique and refreshing approach to the theory/praxis debate.

Each of the nine chapters focuses on a particular missional aspect of who and what the church is as well as needs to be, including: church, context (read culture), challenge (read culture), vocation, witness, community, leadership, structures, and finally, connectedness. The first three chapters describe the roots of North American Christianity in culture and denominationalism. An understanding of the church as institution includes a brief description of the self in what is identified as an emerging postmodern condition. The parameters of their task do not permit a thorough discussion of postmodernity but essential questions are raised. Chapters Three through Six set forth the authors' vision of what a missional church is and does. Chapters Seven through Nine focus on issues related to congregational practice.

Though the authors acknowledge that culture is not an easy term to define, they begin with a citation from Leslie Newbigin's *Other Side of 1984*, "The sum total of ways of living built up by a human community and transmitted from one generation to another" (p. 9). Although Guder suggests that their evolving definition of culture becomes increasingly complex, subcultures in North American Christianity are not sufficiently differentiated. The church culture which appears to provide the basis for discussion is mainline Caucasian Protestant North American church culture; the significance of race, ethnicity and geography are overlooked. Diversity, when discussed, is often included anecdotally in the introduction to a chapter (pp. 19, 47) and not mentioned again. The definition of culture is revisited by Inagrace Dietterich in Chapter Six in her proposal for a church which "cultivates communities of the Holy Spirit." She concludes that culture is "a dynamic process with which Christians should interact in a critical, discriminating and constructive manner" (p. 151). Culture is not the focal point of her argument, yet she addresses it creatively, clearly and concisely.

With all of the discussion about culture one might begin to ask if the authors ever advance an exact definition of, or prescription for, the missional church. George Hunsberger offers a "synoptic vision" for a missional church in Chapter Four which "takes seriously" the "images of the reign of God as a gift one receives and a realm one enters" (p. 95). The mission stated succinctly is to represent the reign of God in three ways: as its community, as its servant, and as its messenger. Hunsberger admits that even these images are not without their dangers (p. 95f.) but concludes that the three facets of mission he proposes answer the most "fundamental questions and challenges for the contemporary church" (p. 108). These challenges are "the free world of the

autonomous and decentered self," "the secular world of privatized religious faith," and "the plural world of relativized perspectives and loyalties" (p. 108f.). Whether or not one completely agrees with his analysis or his project, Hunsberger's voice is a necessary one in the sea of solution-oriented megachurch proposals available. He places the accent where it belongs—on the gospel of Jesus Christ.

As I read the arguments and proposals of the various authors I was often left wondering if there was a congregation anywhere in North America that might even begin to live up to the ideals set forth. The final chapters of the book focus primarily on aspects of leadership and church structures; they are, however, abstract and theoretical. The entire volume would have been enhanced by one or more case studies of congregations that attempted some kind of missional transformation. Or, is there a congregation in "anywhere North America" that has already achieved a missional revision?

Those interested in Ecclesiology, Evangelism, Missiology and Practical Theology will benefit from the collected efforts of the authors who share their vision for a North American missional church. Noteworthy is the extended bibliography included for those who desire to continue their study of what it means to be a missional church. Particularly helpful is the arrangement of the resources according to topics of interest.

—Carol L. Schnabl Schweitzer
Princeton Theological Seminary

Saints' Lives and the Rhetoric of Gender: Male and Female in Merovingian Hagiography. By John Kitchen. Oxford University Press, 1998, xv and 255 pages.

Taking on the current prevalent proposition that women hagiographers of the early Middle Ages understood and portrayed sanctity differently than did their male counterparts, John Kitchen examines and rejects gender-based differences in hagiographies of women by women. He does this by examining not only the life of a woman written by a woman, Baudonivia's *Life of Saint Radegund*, but by first examining the corpus of work by two contemporaries, Gregory of Tours and Venantius Fortunatus. "The main objectives of this study are therefore to establish the chief rhetorical strategies of the standard authors as they narrate the lives of male saints and then to situate

what these same writers say about female saints within the context of their larger literary corpus" (p. 17). Having done this, Kitchen can then compare the way female saints are portrayed by these male hagiographers to the way in which Baudonivia portrays St. Radegund.

Kitchen does not, however, go directly to a discussion of gender and hagiography, but begins with a chapter on "Methods and Metaphors" which will be of great use to all students, regardless of their interest in Merovingian hagiography. Kitchen writes that "[a]t the end of the twentieth century, hagiographic scholarship verges on becoming an amorphous field of study indiscriminately incorporating a variety of scholarly trends and disciplines, none of which, as an independent approach is specifically suited to treat the sources in any satisfactory manner" (p. 7). To criticize this state of affairs— the non-existence of hagiographic research as a field of its own—Kitchen compares Hippolyte Delehaye, the most renowned of the Bollandists, and Peter Brown of Princeton University. Current hagiographic scholarship is largely indebted to a Brownian method which incorporates diverse fields such as sociology, anthropology and psychology, but which is without an over-arching methodological scheme explicitly holding the fields together. Kitchen contrasts this with the Bollandist method, and Delehaye's in particular. Delehaye wanted to make the study of hagiography a scientific one and he worked on setting up a systematic method unto itself. Kitchen regrets that Delehaye's approach to hagiography has not developed into a distinct field of research but has been used by diverse scholars with diverse backgrounds looking to hagiography with questions which are often innappropriate for the texts. Historians and literary theoreticians, who most often use hagiography, frequently ask the wrong questions, while theologians and biblical scholars, who could greatly add to our understanding of hagiography with their questions, ignore these texts completely.

Kitchen champions the Delehayean approach which, he holds, is more interested in the literary over the historical importance of the texts, and which maintains an interdisciplinary approach while offering a rigorous systematic method of its own. While his reproach of Brown, that he has offered no systematic methodological approach, is one he shares with others, Kitchen himself does not offer any overall approach nor any positive suggestions other than the invitation to develop further Delehaye's approach. He faults scholars for using hagiography as they see fit yet does concede that hagiographical research calls for interdisciplinary studies. In addition, while Kitchen's support of Delehaye is refreshing after the thrashing that the latter usually re-

ceives, he would have been more persuasive if he had directly confronted and dealt with Delehaye's failings.

This essay on the deficient state of hagiographical research is linked to his theme of treatment of gender in that Kitchen maintains that the main problem with the study of Merovingian female saints and writers is that it is over-specialized and based on assumptions about female sanctity and spirituality which may be overstated or false. He concludes that "the present search for a distinctiveness that is determined purely on the basis of gender is undoubtedly a misguided approach to the study of Merovingian Vitae" (p. 159).

Kitchen wants to put womens' *vitae* back into their Merovingian context, criticizing such scholars as Susan Wemple and Jo Ann McNamara who study only the women and do not relate them to their male counterparts in order to see if they truly are different. He begins, therefore, by discussing and comparing the works of Venantius Fortunatus and Gregory of Tours concerning male saints. After having established the patterns into which these *vitae* fall he then examines the way in which they differ from writing about a woman saint. While both authors preface their lives of women with the traditional talk of the "weaker sex" and their potential for becoming more manly in sanctity, he concludes that the two do not understand female sanctity in the same way since Gregory of Tours portrays St. Monegund in the same way as he does his other saints while Fortunatus emphasizes St. Radegund's severe self-mortification in a way which never occurs in any of his other *vitae* and which Kitchen sees as a hagiographical anomaly.

Baudonivia's *Life of Saint Radegund*, written as a supplement to Fortunatus', has often been pointed to by scholars as a prime example of how differently women authors viewed their subjects than did men. Baudonivia's *vita* has a more subdued asceticism than does her predecessor's and she focuses on Radegund's religious life and her reading of texts with nuns, reinforcing scholars' belief that women emphasized nurturing and mothering themes and charity over asceticism and manly spirituality. However, Kitchen points out that Baudonivia's Radegund also burns down a pagan temple and performs punitive miracles, both acts which are associated with a male ideal of sanctity.

Kitchen's conclusion that search for gender distinctiveness is not necessarily a useful way to look at hagiography should bring up many interesting questions among those who have been studying lives of women saints.

His book is a valuable addition to any study of female gender in hagiography and should lead people to turn to a renewed interest in the life of St. Radegund.

—MARIANNE M. DELAPORTE
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Landmarking: City, Church and Jesuit Urban Strategy. By Thomas M. Lucas, S.J. Loyola Press, 1997, xiii and 245 pages.

As eloquent as it is penetrating, Thomas M. Lucas' *Landmarking* successfully demonstrates Ignatius Loyola's vision of urban mission. With seventy figures of maps, paintings, and statistical data, Father Lucas skillfully proves an old Jesuit proverb correct: "Bernard loved the valleys, Benedict the mountains; Francis the towns, Ignatius loved great cities." During the late Medieval Age the mendicant orders had entrées into almost every important European city. Once they were inside, politico-religious competition to occupy the center of the city ensued. The papal bull of 1265 ordered the triangular pattern for mendicant building emplacement, particularly in the cities of central and northern Italy. This triangular design for locating the principal churches of the city was exported to several cities of the New World during the sixteenth century. However, Jesuits used a different strategy from the beginning: Ignatius always opted for the center of the city. He believed that there was a better chance to gain access to the large population and to cooperate with the local rulers of the city-state if the main church was located in the center of the city. Ignatius initiated this vision of the downtown church: "Take special care that you obtain a good and sufficiently large site, or one that can be enlarged with time, large enough for house and church, and if possible, not too far removed from the conversation of the city; and having bought that, it will be a good beginning for all that follows" (p. 140). Lucas gives us marvelous visual presentations of the central siting of the principal Jesuits' downtown churches in Vienna, Naples, Palermo, Milan, Lisbon, Coimbra, Florence, and Rome. Each city is presented with two illustrations, one of the city and another with an enhancement showing the Jesuit downtown properties. Lucas' historical investigation of the siting of the Collegio Romano and the Chiesa del Gesù ("The Jesuit Pole") of the city of Rome is

particularly extraordinary. The original illustration with enhancement, the original property outline, a bird's eye view of the building itself, and a contemporary picture of the the Chiesa del Gesù help us to see not only the development of the Jesuits' real estate in Rome but also the vision of the Jesuit urban mission.

Lucas seems best qualified to write this kind of book. He participated in the large project of the restoration of Ignatius' own room in the Chiesa del Gesù. He also led the exhibition entitled "Saint, Site, and Sacred Strategy: Ignatius, Rome, and Jesuit Urbanism" which ran in 1990–1991 in Vatican City as part of the "Ignatian Year" celebration of the 500th anniversary of Ignatius Loyola's birthday and the 450th anniversary of the foundation of the Society. The spirit celebrating the Ignatian vision can still be shared through Lucas' book.

The book consists of nine chapters followed by three appendices (Database of Ignatius' letters, the Constitutions 622 and 623, and the Modo de Proceder letter). Chapter one describes the Jesuit movement as an urban phenomenon with specific illustrations of Goa, San Francisco, Lima, Macao and Beijing. Baltimore and New York are discussed as more recent examples of Jesuit urban mission strategy. To Ignatius and his early followers the city was Opera Pietatis, the Sacred Theater, and the Jesuits were the actors on the urban stage. Chapter two contains biographical information on Ignatius Loyola, focusing on his journey from city to city. The following two chapters discuss the history of Christianity in relation to the urban civilization of Europe. During the Medieval Age, Benedict's vision to build a self-sufficient and self-containing monastery as a social unit was challenged by leaders of the city-state who dominated the secular realm of society. Chapter five continues to cover the significance of church location in the city from the thirteenth century to the period of Paul III (1534–1549), from the rise of mendicant orders to the reprise of the Roman Renaissance. Chapters six through nine constitute the main argument of the book. Igantius' vision of Opera Pietatis with the city of Rome is well articulated with many useful maps, paintings, chronologies and charts. The statistical figures 7.2 (Annual Growth of Jesuit Colleges and Houses, 1538–1556), 7.3 (Chronology of Foundation of the Society of Jesus, 1538–1556), 7.4 (Cumulative Growth, Jesuit Colleges and Houses, 1538–1556) and 7.5 (Jesuit Institutions by Type) are extremely helpful resources for understanding the early institutional development of the Society of Jesus. Those who want to study similar topics further can fully benefit from Appendix A (Database: Relevant Letters of Ignatius Loyola).

Father Lucas classifies the 6742 letters of Igantius from 1524 to 1556 into fifteen categories and lists them in a beautiful and comprehensible chart. He deserves many thanks from his colleagues and students for the work.

Cities have expanded in different ways, both in size and function, expressing varying aesthetics in their diverse modes of expansion. Moreover, the speed of differentiation has accelerated in the process of modernization. Cities, especially metropolises, have been home for modernists ever since the great Enlightenment thinkers embraced the idea of uniform progress in their urban environments. They reinvented the concept of the modern city with a distinctive epistemological foundation, including "capitalism's history of creative destruction" (David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Blackwell, 1990:18). David Harvey postulates a direct connection between the modernization process and urban evolvement in detail: "The qualities of modernism seem to have varied, albeit in an active way, across the spectrum of the large polyglot cities that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, certain kinds of modernism achieved a particular trajectory through the capitals of the world, each flourishing as a cultural arena of a particular sort" (Ibid., p. 26).

However, the modernists' dream of the uniform city has been challenged by postmodern attractions of difference among city dwellers. In the postmodern city, there is praise of fragmentation, chaos, decentralization, and differentiation, with a wholesale paradigm shift in the cultural, economic and even religious reality of city life today. New urban plans have been proposed to fit the paradigm shift to postmodernity. Again, Harvey tells us that "it is nowadays the norm to seek out 'pluralistic' and organic strategies for approaching urban development as a 'collage' of highly differentiated spaces and mixtures, rather than pursuing grandiose plans based on functional zoning of different activities" (Ibid., p. 40). How can we read *Landmarking* properly in this pluralistic world? Father Lucas' articulation of Ignatius Loyola's vision of urban mission, based on a paradigm shift from the Medieval concept of *contemptus mundi* into the world-affirming concept of Opera Pietatis, challenges us to reconsider an appropriate location for the church today. We are invited to adjust our religious praxis in the new form of city life which is undergoing a paradigm shift with postmodern realities. Where is the best location for the church in our postmodern cities?

—S. K. KIM
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Textual Development of the Qumran Community Rule. By Sarianna Metso. Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah 21. E. J. Brill, 1997, xi and 173 pages, XIII plates, 4 charts.

The *Rule of the Community* is one of the central documents associated with the Qumran Community. Its importance to the Community is attested by at least twelve manuscripts found in the Caves: 1QS [1Q28], 4QS^{a-j} [4Q255-4Q264], and 5Q11. At least three other manuscripts may preserve portions of the *Rule of the Community*: 4Q265, 5Q13, and 11Q29. The *Rule of the Community* provides not only rules but also theological reflection about the Community and its identity.

From a literary analysis of 1QS as well as from the textual evidence of the multiple manuscripts, scholars have long recognized that the *Rule of the Community* is a composite document with a complex history. The availability of all of the manuscripts of the *Rule of the Community* provides the basis for renewed analysis of the compositional history of this important document. Sarianna Metso's *The Textual Development of the Qumran Community Rule*, a slightly revised version of her doctoral dissertation, provides one of the first monograph length studies of the textual evidence.

The first steps in Metso's analysis are the reconstruction of the Cave 4 manuscripts based on the material evidence using the methods developed by H. Stegemann and the transcription of the 4Q255-264, 5Q11, and 5Q13. Metso provides plates of the Cave 4 manuscripts and presents in an appendix charts sketching the relative placement of the fragments of 4Q257, 4Q258, 4Q259 and 4Q319 [4QOtot], and 4Q260. Metso prepared her transcriptions of the Cave 4 material independently from that of E. Qimron, although she has included discussion of Qimron's transcriptions in the final stage of her work (p. 2).

Metso arranges the manuscripts according to textual traditions. Due to the fragmentary remains of the manuscripts, Metso is unable to determine the textual traditions of 4Q257, 4Q260, 4Q261, 4Q263, 4Q264, as well as that of the Cave 5 manuscripts (pp. 92-5). She discerns at least three major versions of the *Rule of the Community* represented among the various manuscripts: 4Q256 and 4Q258, 4Q259, and 1QS. One major line of textual tradition is represented by 4Q256 and 4Q258 (pp. 74-90), which are nearly identical manuscripts with the exception that 4Q258 began with a parallel to 1QS beginning at 5.1 while 4Q256 preserves material which also parallels 1QS 1-4 (p. 74). 4Q256 and 4Q258 tend to preserve shorter readings than 1QS.

Therefore, Metso judges 4Q256 and 4Q258 to preserve an earlier edition than 1QS (pp. 89-90).

In Metso's analysis, 4Q259 represents a second textual tradition (pp. 69-74). The tradition represented by 4Q259 may have also begun with a parallel to 1QS 5.1 and following, but does not preserve a parallel to 1QS 8.15b-9.11, which she identifies as a secondary insertion (pp. 48-54 and Appendix C). Moreover, instead of a parallel to 1QS 10-11, 4Q259 preserves a calendrical text scholars have titled *Otot*, 4Q319 (pp. 48-54 and Appendix C). On the basis of the textual evidence, Metso argues that 4Q259 represents an edition earlier than 1QS (pp. 73-4).

Finally, according to Metso, 1QS represents the third major tradition. 1QS, in turn, reflects redactional activity as a second scribe has corrected and otherwise modified the material in columns 7-8 (pp. 95-105).

Thus, Metso envisions a complex history for the development of the *Rule of the Community* (pp. 105-55). According to Metso, the *Rule of the Community* originally consisted of the short version of the parallel to 1QS 5-9 addressed to the *Maskil* with possibly the *Otot* material; Metso calls this stage "O." One strand of the tradition ["A"], represented by 4Q259, includes the *Otot* material and adds the scriptural justifications as well as the material which strengthens the self-understanding of the Community; i. e. the longer version of the parallel to 1QS 5-9, but without a parallel to 1QS 8.15b-9.11. Another strand of the tradition ["B"], represented by 4Q256 and 4Q258, preserves the shorter parallel to 1QS 5-9, but includes a parallel to 1QS 8.15b-9.11 and a parallel to 1QS 10-11; eventually, represented by 4Q256, a parallel to 1QS 1-4 is also added to this strand. A third strand ["C"] is represented by 1QS which is a combination of strands "A" and "B." Strand "C" undergoes a further development ["D"], which is represented by the second scribe who corrected and modified 1QS in columns 7-8, at times following the tradition of strand "A," at other times following that of strand "B," and at still other times possibly acting independently of any textual tradition.

Significant questions arise when Metso's textual analysis is considered in conversation with the dating of the manuscript witnesses. The identity of the earliest manuscript witness, however, has been the subject of much confusion because of two seemingly contradictory, but influential dates for 4Q259 [4QS^e] given by F. M. Cross and J. T. Milik in the secondary literature. Milik consistently refers to a manuscript whose contents are now clearly designated as 4Q259 as dating to the second half of the second century BCE, making it the oldest copy of the *Rule of the Community*. Cross, in

a recent list of the dates of 4QS manuscripts, however, dates 4Q259 [4QS^e] to 50-25 BCE. Metso does not adjudicate the discrepancy between these two positions (p. 48), but tends to privilege Milik's earlier date (see p. 147). The situation is complicated by Cross' earlier reference to a Cave 4 papyrus manuscript as the earliest copy of the *Rule of the Community* which "is tentatively designated 4QS^e" (*The Ancient Library of Qumran*, p. 89 in the 1958 edition which is reprinted on p. 95 in the 1995 third edition; compare p. 119 in the 1961 revised edition). M. T. Davis, J. H. Charlesworth, and B. A. Strawn have pointed out to me that the manuscript Cross was referring to is now designated 4Q255 [4QS^a], since only two of the 4QS manuscripts are papyri, 4Q255 [4QS^a] and 4Q257 [4QS^c], and Cross in his recent list dates 4Q255 to the second half of the second century BCE. How does one account for Milik's dating of 4Q259 as the earliest manuscript? I would suggest that it is due to a miscommunication between Cross and Milik. In his earliest reference to 4Q259, Milik indicates that he is actually relying on Cross for the dating of 4Q259; "Un des mss. de la Règle préente une écriture assez archaïque et daterait, *d´après F. Cross*, du début du Ier s. av. J.-C" (*RB* 63 [1956]: p. 61; emphasis added). Since it is now clear that Cross was referring to 4Q255, not 4Q259, as the oldest manuscript, Milik's claim that 4Q259 is the earliest manuscript witness is not an independent dating. Rather, Milik's dating is dependent on Cross who in turn was actually referring to 4Q255. Thus, paleographically the earliest manuscript is not 4Q259, but 4Q255, followed by 1QS and 4Q257.

The manuscript dates and the results of Metso's textual analysis raise the question, why are the presumably earlier textual traditions copied by later scribes? 1QS, which is significantly earlier than 4Q256 and 4Q258 on the one hand, and 4Q259 on the other, preserves a longer text and, according to Metso, a later tradition than those later manuscripts. The tradition preserved in 1QS 1-4, which is also considered by Metso to be a later addition, is attested in 1QS, 4Q255, and 4Q257, the three earliest extant manuscripts. While this does not necessarily refute Metso's analysis, it does suggest that other developmental schemes must also be considered.

Nevertheless, Metso's study provides a significant contribution to understanding the development of *Rule of the Community*. Metso's analysis underscores the composite nature of the *Rule of the Community* and groups the manuscripts into plausible textual families. Her work incorporating text criticism, literary analysis, and material reconstructions, provides a model for similar studies which need to be done on other Qumran documents with

complex textual histories such as the *War Scroll* (1Q33, 4Q491-4Q496, and possibly 4Q497).

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Word Without End: The Old Testament As Abiding Theological Witness. By Christopher Seitz. William B. Eerdmans, 1998, xi and 355 pages.

In a collection of twenty two essays (nine of which were published previously), Seitz effectively addresses the challenge of the increasing number of new approaches to biblical studies by explaining the ultimate significance of canonical shaping for discerning theological meaning. Obviously influenced by the canonical approach of Brevard Childs, Seitz makes his own contribution to its theory through a probing analysis of the foundational questions that ought to inform a Christian reading of the Old Testament. Answers he supplies to the questions, "*whose* book is the Old Testament and *why* is it being read in the first place," (p. 340, italics his) support his conclusions concerning the appropriateness of the canonical approach to scripture.

Moving beyond a discussion that focuses only on the principles sustaining his biblical theology, Seitz has divided his essays into three sections titled "Biblical Theology," "Exegesis," and "Practice." In the exegetical section, he has taken the initiative to apply those principles to the exegesis of Old Testament texts (primarily from Isaiah). He deals with topics that include (1) a redefinition of unity within the book of Isaiah, (2) connections noted between Isaiah and other canonical books (Lamentations and the Psalms specifically), and (3) the canonical tasks imposed upon Christian readers to interpret "the Old Testament *per se* and the Old *in novo receptum*, as received in the New" (p. 194). In his final section, Seitz delivers essays on contemporary and controversial issues facing the church. Two essays deal with the modern proposal to use inclusive language for God, two deal with human sexuality as presented in scripture with an emphasis on the questions regarding homosexuality, one deals with the role of the church in the city, and another presents a critique of current patterns applied to lectionary readings.

At the heart of every essay, one encounters Seitz's conviction that the Old Testament is "the record of God's discourse with one particular people" (p. 73), and that Christians have become recipients of God's promises and word found there only through Christ. As outsiders who have been adopted into the household of Israel and into a relationship with God, Christians have no basis for claiming "the capacity to choose and discriminate about God and about those texts capable of letting God speak" (p. 48). With a high view of scriptural authority, Seitz consistently defers to scripture when addressing issues raised within the church, whether that means preserving the Bible's language as it has been handed down without assuming a license to change it, or recalling the words of scripture in its "plain sense" in order to discern the proper Christian stance toward human sexuality. What is striking in Seitz's presentation is the coherence he seems to discover between his interpretations of texts from the Old Testament *per se* and the New Testament's understanding of the same texts.

Seitz vividly describes the challenges confronting theological education today with its "increasing specialization" and the creation of varying perspectives that fail to truly engage one another (p. 3). In the field of Old Testament study, he notes that students are different than they were at mid-century. Not only do "students lack a command of the general content of the Bible" (p. 77), but most lack any "deep-seated, long-nurtured, instinctive, prerational commitment to the Old Testament in its present form" (p. 79). As a result, many perceive the Old Testament as "simply old, and therefore out of touch" (p. 77). With his emphasis on scriptural authority, it is not difficult to see why he laments "the loss of the biblical world as a trustworthy, challenging, cleansing world that all Christians longed to inhabit" (p. 297).

While his theological approach hopes to restore faith in and commitment to the biblical text, his opposition to modern trends in scholarship makes his contribution incompatible with a number of views that may not be so easily abandoned. Any proposal he perceives as threatening to the present form of the biblical text is quickly discarded as an unauthorized and illegitimate move by an outsider. There is no tolerance of a hermeneutics of suspicion or dissent while interpreting scripture because the words of scripture have been "gifted" to Christians through Christ (p. 49).

But this reader asks whether some of the concerns raised by the contemporary community are truly at odds with the reverence Seitz attributes to "God's word." For example, in his essay "the Divine Name in Christian Scripture," he claims that questions regarding permissible language for God and

"the sufficiency of scripture to describe God as he really exists" (p. 251) are eclipsed by the more important question of "whether we are entitled to call God anything at all" (p. 252). While this is certainly a larger question that must be answered before one moves to consider the way God should be addressed, it does not negate the possibility of using non-traditional language for God when it is consistent with the character of God as described in "God's word." Another example of the barrier Seitz has erected between his view of scripture and tradition and modern questions about the competence of traditional language for today's world can be found when he asks, "are we to swap the collective wisdom of the ages for the wisdom of some new power group?" (p. 298) It is only without a hermeneutics of suspicion that Seitz can assert that the "wisdom of the ages" has been a faithful rendering of God's word unaffected by the interests of any particular power group.

Consistent with other works from Seitz, this book's strength is its exegetical insight. As he demonstrates the dialectical relationship between the Old and New Testament, Seitz presents compelling interpretations of several biblical texts. An expert with regard to the book of Isaiah, Seitz illuminates the significance of its message for both the Jew and Christian and highlights the continuing relevance of its words "in the sense that Isaiah's former vision remains the church's final vision" (p. 227).

Whether used by students as a required textbook for a seminary or by ministers as a hermeneutical tool, this book will help define and sharpen the theological decisions that confront every modern interpreter of the Bible. For the student intrigued by Childs' canonical approach, Seitz's work demonstrates its potential to produce exegetical and practical results. But perhaps most significantly, Seitz has managed to show through his skillful exegesis that the Old Testament continues to be a relevant word from God ... a "Word without End."

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The Dead Sea Psalms Scrolls and the Book of Psalms. By Peter W. Flint. Brill, 1997, xxiii and 322 pages with X plates.

Flint begins this revision of his 1993 Notre Dame doctoral dissertation rather boldly. He is confident that his "ambitious" volume "will be welcomed by many

scholars who are interested in the Book of Psalms, in view of the wealth of primary data and pertinent information contained in Part I ... and because this is the first comprehensive investigation of the Psalter in the light of the Dead Sea Scrolls" (p. xi). Flint quickly points out, however, that he is not so confident about Part II of his work. Before assessing whether or not Flint's confidence is mis- or well-placed, a brief overview of these and other constituent parts of the book, which appears in the prestigious *Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah* series (volume 17), is in order.

Flint begins with an introduction to the Psalms scrolls, previous scholarship, and the plan of his study. Chapter 1 follows with a treatment of what he calls "appropriate terminology." This includes how later terms such as the "Masoretic Text" (MT), "Canon," "Bible," and "Apocrypha" must be understood in order to avoid anachronism. Chapter 2 comprises a survey of all of the Psalms scrolls found in the Judean Desert, including Qumran proper and other locales (Naḥal Ḥever, Masada), as well as various "non-biblical" scrolls that have bearing on the Psalms material (e.g., 1QpPs [1Q16], one of the *pesharim* ["interpretations"] of the Psalms). Chapters 3–5 along with the five appendices present the results of Flint's painstaking work with the primary data. Chapters 3 and 4 include a full listing of variants (nicely defined as a difference from the MT *or* from another one of the Psalms scrolls; pp. 10, 51) both by manuscript and by Psalm (number and verse). Chapter 5 is a synopsis of the data on superscriptions, postscripts, and doxologies in the MT, the Scrolls, and the Septuagint (LXX). Appendices 1–5 supplement these chapters in various ways; Appendix 3, "Adjoining Compositions in the Psalms Scrolls," is especially important as it delineates the exact content and order of each Psalms manuscript Flint discusses.

Chapters 6–10 form Part II: "Addressing the Main Issues." Here Flint attempts to support and demonstrate the validity of what he calls James Sanders's "Qumran Psalms Hypothesis" (see pp. 8 and 135–241 *passim*). These chapters deal with the stabilization of the Psalter (Chapter 6); textual affiliations and editions (Chapter 7); the structure, provenance, and nature of 11QPsᵃ, around which the "hypothesis" debate swirls (Chapters 8–9); and the Psalms scrolls and the LXX (Chapter 10). Following this is a brief conclusion, the appendices (pp. 243–71), a bibliography, and eight very helpful indices (pp. 287–322).

The book is handsomely produced. There are several typographical errors, but in a work of this nature, presenting so many technical and textual difficulties, the publishers are to be congratulated on keeping these to a mini-

mum. The volume concludes with ten plates showing various scrolls, mostly Psalms manuscripts.

All in all, this is a fascinating and thought-provoking volume. This is high praise for a work that is primarily text-critical in nature! Indeed, I found Flint's work so evocative that it is impossible to do it justice here—either in praise or in problematics. Still, to return to an earlier point, Flint's confidence in Part I of his work is well-founded. This section, particularly Chapters 3–4 with their presentation of variants, is invaluable. This is a rich database that one can easily and quickly access when wishing to consult the Scrolls evidence pertinent to the Psalter. Even so, the reader must be aware of two critical points: *First*, Flint obviously had to compose and/or use editions of all of the Psalms manuscripts in order to compile the list of variants. Unfortunately, the reader is not provided with these editions in this volume. It should be noted that Flint intends this work to complement the forthcoming official editions by the *Discoveries in the Judaean Desert* team (of which he is a part). Still, without the benefit of the editions, it is difficult to evaluate many of these variants (their readings, states of preservation, contexts, and so forth). *Second*, and more significantly, composing this list of variants *prior* to the publication of the final editions means that this database could potentially become obsolete. That is, if Flint and/or other members of the Psalms scrolls editorial team change any readings, the list is no longer correct. Flint has endeavored to make his work useful even if this latter scenario develops; and, in any event, he is to be thanked for providing this gold mine of textual information.

Flint is less confident in his Part II, which largely revolves around 11QPs^a and the "Qumran Psalms Hypothesis" of Sanders. Here Flint argues for a two-stage stabilization of the Psalter, attempting to demonstrate that Psalms 1–89 (Edition I) were finalized before the Qumranic period (and perhaps existed as a separate collection, at least in some manuscripts), but that Psalms 90 and onwards remained fluid until the end of the first century C.E. when the proto-Masoretic Psalter (Edition IIb) eclipsed all other editions (p. 149). Flint then adds another stage, Edition IIa, primarily attested in 11QPs^a. This scroll, the longest of the Psalms scrolls, has been the subject of a lively debate ever since its initial publication by James Sanders in 1965. Flint convincingly argues that this manuscript belongs to a textual family at Qumran, indicating that a second edition of the Psalter existed there. He calls this the "11QPs^a-Psalter" and believes its structure, which he reconstructs to contain fifty-two psalms, is related to the solar calendar of exactly fifty-two weeks so important among

the Jews of Qumran. Flint goes on to argue that this "Psalter" was "compiled and used by wider Jewish circles" which also used the solar calendar (p. 199).

This last point is certainly the most controversial and, despite the three arguments Flint adduces (the dating of the compositions of 11QPs^a; the absence of distinctively Qumranic/"sectarian" language; and the presence of the solar calendar in other, non-Qumranic Jewish writings), the least convincing part of his thesis. *First*, linguistic—not to mention compositional—dating is notoriously complex and typically remains tentative. *Second*, it seems *non-sequitur* to suggest that the sharing of calendrical concerns equates with sharing a manuscript tradition, especially since we have *no non-Qumranic evidence* for the "11QPs^a-Psalter." Indeed, the Psalms scrolls from Masada, at least MasPs^b, support the Masoretic tradition. So, while 11QPs^a may be "scripture" or "canon" at Qumran, there is no definitive evidence that the same holds true anywhere else. *Third*, many documents from Qumran lack sectarian terminology but are no doubt compositions or compilations of the community. The excerpted manuscripts of Deuteronomy (e.g., 4QDeut^j), for instance, do not contain "sectually-explicit" language (Carol Newsom's term), but in their selective reordering and abridgement of the biblical material reveal themselves to be Qumranic compositions, used and useful (probably) for the liturgical life of the community. Flint is well aware of these "secondary collections" (pp. 167, 217–8) and admits that this phenomenon may also be reflected in the Psalms scrolls, but concludes instead that 11QPs^a is a true, scriptural Psalter, "canonical" at Qumran and elsewhere. Flint goes this route, evidently, primarily because in his estimation the "secondary collection" argument *assumes* that the "MT-150 Psalter" was finalized prior to Qumran. Though this logical connection could be challenged, it must be repeated that Flint has compiled an abundance of information to support his contention that the latter portions of the Psalter were in flux until the end of the first century C.E.

Flint presents a fascinating argument in Part II, though it will not persuade everyone. I, for one, am still unconvinced. In my judgment, the primary methodological issue is not in determining or valuing whether the "MT-150 Psalter" or the "11QPs^a-Psalter" was earlier. Methodologically, we cannot *presume* that the "MT-150 Psalter" was stabilized or finalized prior to Qumran (so Flint), but neither can we *presume* that 11QPs^a was paradigmatic for Jews outside Qumran nor even for the Jews of Qumran (*contra* Flint)—the textual evidence is simply too pluriform, complex, and contradictory (see MasPs^b for outside Qumran; the many Qumran manuscripts that *appear to* or *might* support the MT for Qumran itself). Hence, we must be at pains to

ensure that we do not (1) underestimate the Dead Sea Scrolls and so overestimate the MT, *nor* (2) underestimate the MT and so overestimate the Scrolls. Flint has done an admirable job for the former; less so for the latter. In my judgment, however, the fault lies not with Flint but with the field's general understanding of the relationship between text-criticism and the Scrolls. Somehow, we must strike a better balance in accounting for the surprising pluriformity (Psalters, canons, Bibles, etc.—all plural!) that we find in the textual evidence from antiquity and the very specific manuscript information at our disposal. Flint helps immeasurably in this regard, but the last chapter has yet to be written.

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The Common Task: A Theology of Christian Mission. By M. Thomas Thangaraj. Abingdon Press, 1999, 167 pages.

In a highly readable work which is aimed at the church at large, M. Thomas Thangaraj offers his reflections on how a theology of mission should be conceived of today. These reflections are both personal and academic; for Thangaraj, as for other theologians, the task of theology necessarily incorporates both the personal and the professional life of the theologian (p. 28). Thangaraj is D. W. and Ruth Brooks Associate Professor of World Christianity at the Candler School of Theology in Emory University, an institution related to The United Methodist Church. He is also a South Indian Christian, part of a community which responded positively to the Christian message when it was brought by Anglican missionaries in the early 19th century. His theology, then, explicitly draws on both his Indian heritage as well as his thinking and experience in the United States of America.

The logical starting point for Thangaraj's construction of mission theology is his understanding of the word "theology": it is, quite simply, "God-talk" (p. 61). With this definition of theology in mind, Thangaraj raises two pertinent questions. One is the question of who are our conversation partners when we engage in God-talk, and the second is what is the context of God-talk regarding Christian missions today? By comparing his own conversation partners and context at the end of this century to the conversation partners and context of those publicly talking about God and Christian mission

at the beginning of this century—specifically at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910—Thangaraj concludes that there has been a great widening of the circle of conversation partners over the century, while there has been a simultaneous faltering of confidence in the viability and even desirability of Christian mission. The circle of conversation partners has widened to include not only Christians of various traditions and theological inclinations, but also people of other religions and no religion who are greatly interested in Christian mission today. The crisis in confidence arises from a variety of factors such as the two world wars, the collapse of colonialism, the rise to prominence in the Western consciousness of other religions, and most importantly for Thangaraj, postmodern thought which "questions and deconstructs overarching narratives that govern our thinking" (p. 25). In his work, Thangaraj aims to embrace the widening circle of conversation partners while quelling the crisis of confidence in Christian mission.

The locus for Thangaraj's theology of Christian mission is humanity at large. By starting with this extremely wide circle of conversation partners, the author tries to make room for all who may be interested in talking about mission. An unavoidable (but unmentioned) consequence of this starting point is that Thangaraj is going to fail to attract the conversation of those involved in Christian mission who do not want to talk to the rest of interested humanity, nor even to interested Christians of different theological and ideological bents. This may not be too bad a fallout were it not for the fact that great numbers of people involved in Christian mission do have such a negative attitude to people of theological and religious persuasions different from their own.

That being said, how does one include Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, atheists and agnostics, not to mention feuding Christian factions, in a circle of God-talk regarding Christian mission? Thangaraj does it by first talking not at all about Christian mission, but about "the idea of the mission to humanity. Let's call it *missio humanitatis*" (p. 40). Mission here has two main features: it has to do with sending and going forth, and it is undertaken in "a network of relations" (p. 48). The hallmarks for a mission to humanity are responsibility for other human beings and the earth, solidarity with other human beings and the earth, and mutuality among all human beings. In other words, Thangaraj advocates what might be broadly called a mission of care.

The first, and perhaps most important of the three hallmarks above is responsibility. Thangaraj points to H. Richard Niebuhr's *The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Philosophy* and Gordon Kaufman as seminal for his

thinking (p. 50) on responsiblity. The idea of solidarity, also from Niebuhr, follows from responsibility. While responsibility "has the danger of implying that it is something *we* do for others: *we* take responsibility *for* others"(p. 53), solidarity ensures that such responsibility is taken in the spirit and attitude which takes into account the fullness and importance of others' humanity. "Response and responsibility do not always mean an 'over-against-ness'; rather, they involve much more a 'being-with-ness'" (p. 54). The act of responsibility must be done in a mode of solidarity.

The idea of mutuality takes the movement from responsibility to solidarity one step further. Not only are we to act responsibly for others in a mode of solidarity, but we are to be open to the mission of those others to us. "Humans have a mission to one another.… There are no longer 'missioners' and 'the missioned.' All are missionaries in a relationship of mutuality" (p. 57). In the end, then, "the mission of humanity is an act of taking responsibility, in a mode of solidarity, shot through with a spirit of mutuality" (p. 58).

After defining and explicating his idea of *missio humanitatis*, Thangaraj then turns to Christian mission. How does the *missio humanitatis* become the *missio ecclesiae* (which is also the *missio Dei* and the *missio Christi*)? The answer is that the hallmarks of responsibility, solidarity and mutuality take on a specifically Christian character. Christian mission involves cruciform responsibility, liberative solidarity and eschatological mutuality. Cruciform responsibility "emanates from the cross" (p. 66) and is characterized both by vulnerability to others and protest against the demonic exercise of human responsibility. Liberative solidarity is compassionate solidarity where solidarity with all of humanity is achieved through specific and preferential solidarity with those who are oppressed, poor and marginalized. Finally, eschatological mutuality "invites us to join [and learn from] the groaning of the whole of creation toward the day of freedom and liberation" (p. 75).

Once Thangaraj has established the categories of cruciform responsibility, liberative solidarity and eschatological mutuality, he uses them as criteria for evaluating various issues in mission such as evangelism and social transformation (chapter 4); the variety of missionary methods used throughout mission history (chapter 5); and the biblical witness with respect to missions (chapter 6). The final chapter offers some practical tips on how to motivate local congregations for Thangaraj's type of Christian mission.

There are many commendable facets to this slim, thought provoking volume. One is that it offers a constructive theology of mission from an Asian Christian who is neither defensive about his Christian tradition nor hyper-

critical of the Western tradition. A second commendable feature of this work is that it is ecumenical and interreligious yet radically Christian. A third is its attempt to be as catholic as possible in outlook. In all these ways, Thangaraj reflects the best that Methodism has to offer to Christian conversation regarding mission.

One can make some minor criticisms of this book; for example, it presents overly sweeping generalizations of the biblical tradition, and it misreads history at certain points. Perhaps more importantly, the circle of conversation partners seems to omit Pentecostals; its vision of ecumenicity appears to be restricted to those who would be included in a World Council of Churches assembly today. Yet *The Common Task* is certainly worth reading for the insights and ideas it offers, as well as for the questions and reflections it generates.

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